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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

AMERICAN OBESITY: ROOTED IN UNCERTAINTY, INSTITUIONS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY

Despite the efforts of policymakers, medical professionals, and other
stakeholders, obesity and related health problems show no signs of receding from their
record-high rates. Public policy has largely taken the form of consumer advice, (e.g.,
USDA’s Dietary Guidelines). Since consumers bear most of the costs associated with
their obesity, the goal of obesity prevention appears to be incentive-compatible, prima
facie. That is, there is no a priori case for much further policy intervention unless existing
advice is deficient or consumers’ exhibit systematically poor decision-making.
My review of the literature shows that scholars have long conveyed a consistent
narrative regarding our scientific understanding of obesity—one which emphasizes the
apparent behavioral ‘anomalies’ of consumers. Unacknowledged by most investigators is
a body of scientific literature which, if valid, severely undermines the predictive and
explanatory power of most accepted models of obesity. That is, credible institutions may
prevent consumers from discovering obesity-alleviating diets because nutrition
authorities and policymakers have condoned only one approach to healthy eating for
several decades. I advance a theory of obesity rooted in Shacklean uncertainty about the
operationally relevant characteristics upon which consumers should base their decisions.
I relax the standard assumption that consumers exhibit open satiation isocalorically.
To measure consumer preferences in the pre-obesity epidemic era, I perform a
content analysis of American cookbooks from the early 18th to the middle of the 20th
century. Results show that, if anything, past Americans preferred food that would be
considered worse—even further from the USDA ideal.
Using USDA survey data (1994-1996), I construct a finite mixture model to
analyze Americans’ consumption patterns, preferences, knowledge, and beliefs about diet
and health. My estimation shows that Americans were aware of the tenets of healthy
eating at that time and consumption patterns were broadly consistent with the strength of
these beliefs and preferences. I argue that economic theory would not predict rates of
obesity doubling in the interim, given consumers’ continued exposure to information and
their experiences. I hypothesize that this is evidence for a significant discrepancy

between institutionalized advice and advice which is truly effective— a form of
uncertainty. I use the extant scientific literature to show the ways in which healthy
decision-making is constrained relative to what it would be under counterfactual policy
arrangements. I do not reject the null hypothesis that consumers would have been at least
as well off with no policy at all. I use the same dataset to replicate Butler’s (1982) work
which models the relationship between social stigma and the decision-making of
consumers who receive food stamps.
KEYWORDS: Obesity, Nutrition, Public Policy, Nutrition Policy, Behavioral
Economics, Public Health, Economics of Healthcare, Institutions, Habits, Uncertainty,
Content Analysis, Stigma, USDA
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Chapter 1. Introduction
The latest numbers from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) indicate that any
policy change that could bring about a significant reduction in obesity rates would pay
huge dividends, all else equal (Fox, 206). According to the CDC, “The age-adjusted
prevalence of obesity in 2013-2014 was 35 percent among men and 40.4 percent among
women,” a new record in both categories. They estimate that the 38 percent of U.S.
Adults and 17 percent of teenagers are currently obese. Suffice it to say, the personal
incentives to avoid or alleviate obesity are significant and far more than cosmetic.
Obesity, per se, may be among the lower-ranked concerns for the obese individual
because it is also commonly associated with higher rates of heart disease, diabetes, some
cancers, arthritis and Alzheimer's disease. Among the less obvious costs, a study by
Gallup and Healthways estimated that obese adults are 29 percent more likely to say they
lack purpose in life and nearly 34 percent more likely to suffer financially than non-obese
adults. Despite the obvious costs associated with obesity, the latest estimates predict that
the epidemic will not improve anytime soon (Fox, 2016).
In terms of costs, a 2015 Health Affairs article (“Severe obesity in adults cost
state Medicaid programs nearly $8 billion in 2013”, Wang et al.) estimated that severe
obesity alone cost the U.S. $69 billion, which is still only 60-perecent of total obesity
costs, just in the year 2013. “Approximately 11 percent of the cost of severe obesity was
paid for by Medicaid, 30 percent by Medicare and other federal health programs, 27
percent by private health plans, and 30 percent out of pocket. Overall, severe obesity cost
state Medicaid programs almost $8 billion a year, ranging from $5 million in Wyoming
to $1.3 billion in California” (p. 1943). The authors predict that these costs will continue
to rise as more obesity treatments become covered by Medicaid.
The modern definition of obesity is based on a formula pioneered by Adolphe
Quetelet, a 19th century Belgian mathematician studying the relationship between height
and overall body-size in order to come up with a relative weight index. He concluded
that, for the most part, ‘‘the weight increases as the square of the height’ (Eknoyan, 2007)
and lent his surname to the measurement. The concept was popularized and renamed the
Body Mass Index (BMI) in 20th century by American cardiologist Ancel Keys. In 1972,
1

Keys concluded that BMI, the ratio of weight to the square of height, was best available
way to measure overall fatness because it showed relatively little correlation with height
and was consistent with more direct, independent measures of body fat (e.g., the
thickness of the subcutaneous fat layer). The threshold for obesity is crossed when BMI
equals or exceeds 30. ‘Normal’ BMIs lie between 18 and 25 and overweight covers BMIs
from 26 to 30.
Since obesity was first recognized as a serious, public health problem (around the
turn of this century), most investigators in this area, (be they economists, nutritionists,
public health researchers, etc.) have come to more or less agree on the major contributors
to the obesity epidemic. There is a sense in the literature that widespread obesity is an
inevitable consequence or tradeoff to the United States’ rapid increase in income,
productivity, and technological progress in the post-World War II era. While all of these
developments have made Americans’ lives much better in innumerable ways, it appears
that American habits are no match for the ‘obesogenic’ environment that followed (Lake
& Townshend, 2006).
More specifically, rising incomes and increased agricultural productivity mean
that the cost of food, as a proportion of a household’s budget shared, has dropped
significantly. In general, this is a good thing because now even the relatively poor can
better afford to feed themselves than in the past. The tradeoff, of course, is that cheaper
food may encourage consumers to buy more than they otherwise would, leading to
‘overconsumption’ and, eventually, obesity.
Second, changes in the American labor market and physical environment reduce
the incentives for losing weight. Fewer jobs require strenuous physical effort than in the
past, meaning there is no strong incentive for consumers to lose weight to increase their
productivity or wages. More generally, the physical environment in many areas is such
that it also discourages everyday physical exertion by, for example, encouraging driving
over walking or other means. Technology may also contribute to Americans’ inactivity
because it provides entertainment options that require little physical exertion (watching
Netflix versus going to the theater or doing something outside). Again, the benefits of
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easier work-lives and more convenience seem to be partially offset by worsening health
outcomes.
Finally, modern medicine makes obesity (and the other maladies associated with
it) a less costly health problem than it once was, further reducing the incentives that
would otherwise encourage Americans to lose weight and eat well. An obvious example
is that Type 2 diabetes, commonly associated with obesity, has become a much more
treatable and tolerable condition than it once was (American Diabetes Association, 2013).
The same goes for heart disease, although it remains the number one killer of
Americans, aside from Asian Americans, Pacific-Islanders, Native Americans or Alaska
Natives, for whom the number one cause is cancer. According to the CDC, 49% of
Americans have at least one of the following three risk factors: high blood pressure, high
LDL cholesterol, and smoking. There are also several lifestyle choices that are associated
with a higher risk of heart disease: diabetes, overweight and obesity, poor diet, physical
inactivity, and excessive alcohol consumption (CDC, 2016). While researchers have yet
to pin down the precise relationship between these afflictions and choices, the benefits to
eating better are manifold since doing so appears to reduces the risk of developing several
chronic diseases and premature death.
The interaction of bad consumer habits and increasing medical productivity over
time is interesting because the latter is, to some extent, intended to reduce the costs
associated with the former. That is, consumers with access to medical care have the
opportunity to make a trade-off between short-term behavior change and paying for
treatment. Given this choice, the consumer’s decision to change her long-term habits
becomes relatively less appealing than it otherwise would be. A more trivial example not
directly related to obesity is the increased marketing of heartburn medications, which
allows consumers to avoid even the short-term costs of eating whatever they are used to.
Of course, medical care and lifestyle change can also be viewed as complements to one
another but the marginal costs and benefits of each will determine the efficient mix for a
given patient.
The three developments mentioned above (cheaper food, lower costs to obesity in
general, and significant medical advances) are often marshalled as evidence to explain
3

why American dietary habits have, apparently, proven so resistant to change. In this
dissertation, I do not reject these as contributing factors but, rather, argue that they are
probably not sufficient to explain obesity’s high prevalence and resistance to social
interventions. While all of these changes make obesity more likely to develop and easier
to live with, they do not change the fact that obesity imposes high costs upon American
consumers and society, as discussed above. The mere fact that obesity is cheaper than it
otherwise would be does not necessarily imply that the costs of habit change are too high
to be undertaken, a priori.
In this dissertation, I hope to bring a new perspective to the obesity debate by
revealing the ways in which credible stakeholders in the nutrition domain (including
government, experts, and professionals) may have, despite their best intentions, actually
contributed to the ‘bad’ habits that are now so commonplace in the United States. In fact,
they may be encouraging the persistence of obesity among at least some Americans
because a set of plausible nutritional hypotheses were prematurely enshrined in policy at
a time when heart disease was the big, nutrition-related health concern and obesity was
receiving relatively little public attention. Starting in 1978 (when obesity rates were low),
federal agencies began to offer advice to Americans about what they should eat in order
to live long, healthy lives—advice that has changed little since that time.
In other words, my null hypothesis is that prevalence of obesity would be no
higher than it is today had the federal government chosen to enact no formal nutrition
policy, in direct contradiction to conventional wisdom. My alternative hypothesis, which
I can test only indirectly, is that a significant proportion of the rise in the prevalence of
obesity came about because consumer choice has been inefficiently restricted by a
nutrition policy that has long granted a monopoly on credibility to those (still unproven)
hypotheses. Over time, policy has interacted with other credible social institutions,
ultimately shaping habits, preferences, and health outcomes in unpredicted ways. I
interpret the fact that obesity rates have not receded as potential evidence for a
discrepancy between advice or information that is institutionally credible and advice that
is appropriate for the individual consumer in question. Specifically, policy advice and
credible institutions have long emphasized the importance of calorie-reduction and
4

exercise as a means to lose weight, and fat-reduction to avoid heart-disease. Based on my
review of the scientific literature, there may, in fact, be a range of other viable strategies
for healthy weight-loss that conflict or directly contradict this advice.
If I am correct, then uncertainty may play a much larger role than is commonly
thought because Americans assume conventional nutrition advice is credible while diets
that differ significantly from it are not. As a result, the menu of dietary options (i.e., the
range of choices the consumers deems viable) may be unnecessarily restricted. If that is
the case, it reduces the explanatory appeal of obesity models which emphasize a lack of
self-control because those models assume consumers know what they ‘need’ to do but are
unable to commit to their plan in the long-term. If consumers are not aware of efficient
choices that would be strictly-preferred, then the more fundamental problem at issue is a
lack of information about the proper course of action—i.e., uncertainty. As I will discuss,
the nature of credence goods (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006) and consumer habits may
contribute to this uncertainty and a dearth of market-based experimentation and learning.
It is, after all, generally considered rational to take behavioral cues from credible
institutions. But, this does not imply that institutional wisdom is always correct.
In contrast to the conventional wisdom, I hypothesize that consumers have
attempted to act much more rationally to prevent and alleviate obesity than is commonly
supposed. I do not reject the premise that some consumers might ‘rationally’ become
obese because of the nature of their intertemporal preferences. However, I do argue that a
rational consumer who does wish to lose weight may soon find herself disappointed by
the results of her behavior change. This does not imply that she will give up on dieting
immediately, but, on the other hand, it is hard to fathom why someone would continue to
try the same, ineffective advice indefinitely.
Over time, consumers may become discouraged and revert to their old, preferred
eating habits. It is not that they cannot follow conventional advice, but that the advice is
ineffective providing little incentive to continue eating the healthy diet. To the extent that
this advice is ill-suited to these discouraged dieters, the choice to revert to old habits may
become more utility-enhancing over time because doing so at least allows the consumer
to derive some short-term benefit from her diet. Again, this is distinct from the usual
5

situation in which a fully informed consumer rationally trades-off the short-term benefits
of eating poorly with the long-term costs of doing so.
Since food is generally modelled as an economic good, and calories are the unit of
measurement that is used to measure food quantity, economists, among others, have long
assumed that consumers are characterized by non-satiation with respect calories, all else
equal. Furthermore, Americans’ inability to reduce their calorie consumption is generally
taken as evidence for the stable preferences that appear to be preventing widespread habit
change. While this may be a good first approximation of the problem, closer inspection
reveals that satiation may be idiosyncratic and significantly affected by food
characteristics other than calories. Importantly, policy advice tends to discourage
consumers from eating some of the more satiating American foods (e.g., red meat) and
encourages them to eat less hearty foods (e.g., fruits, vegetables, and whole grains) in
their place. If the healthier diet is both ineffective and less satiating, I hypothesize that
this may explain why preferences have remained stable—consumers have enough
practical experience with healthy eating to know it’s not for them.
The latest election results (2016) indicate that a majority of voters in four
municipalities (Albany, Oakland, and San Francisco, California and Boulder, Colorado)
believe direct taxes on sugary beverages are, indeed, justified as a more direct, albeit
more regressive, way to discourage unhealthy eating habits. The trend toward more direct
market interventions to address obesity is increasingly popular worldwide amongst public
health advocates (Aubrey, 2016). While I do not deny that Americans could stand to eat
less sugar, and would probably benefit from doing so, the problem with such
interventions is that they may still be based on a model of obesity which emphasizes the
wrong characteristics in the first place. The purpose of the tax is ultimately to reduce
consumption of calories but, as I discuss at length below, the tax may not have been
needed if Americans were not consistently encouraged by nutrition policy and experts to
fixate upon calorie and fat reduction for the past 36 years or so

6

Chapter 2. Literature Review
Introduction
Before I discuss the social science literature directly related to the United States’
obesity epidemic, I will begin by introducing a few basic theoretical concepts from
economics and public policy that I believe are relevant to the current inquiry. I expand
upon and apply those concepts in subsequent sections of this, and later chapters.
Information and Uncertainty
Any serviceable economic analysis of a consumer’s utility maximization problem
considers the agent’s information state and how it may change over time. Most economic
models begin with consumers who have rational expectations about the future. That is,
consumers learn to expect a list or range of payoffs from particular courses of action and
use that information to maximize their expected utility through their consumption
activities. But consumers are always subject to some level of risk (Quiggin, 1993, p. 4)
because they do not know the exact value of potential payoffs, at most only their
distributions. Economic theory has tended to focus on event uncertainty or uncertainty
over exogenous events, a more tractable problem than market uncertainty, under which
consumers are uncertain about other agents’ supply or demand offers (Hirschleifer,
1979). Depending on the expected payoff to their known, possible courses of action,
consumers may either rationally adapt to their current state of information, or decide to
acquire information in order to update their beliefs about the probability of future states
of the world.
Economists have tended to use the terms risk and uncertainty rather
interchangeably, though Knight (1921) distinguished between the two: risk applies to
situations where probabilities are known while uncertainty is reserved for those in which
the probabilities attached to particular courses of action are unknown. Although
generalized expected utility theory is now the most common and accepted way to treat
uncertainty, other economists have expanded upon Knight’s observation that not all kinds
of uncertainty are the same. Shackle wrote at length about the shortcomings of this now
dominant approach (Epistemics & Economics, 1976).
7

Shackle takes major issue with the use of probability as a way for measuring
knowledge. Much of his criticism questions the validity of assuming that all possible
consequences of all actions are known in advance to the agent. Shackle introduces the
idea of a “surprise function”, which measures the degree of surprise the agent experiences
following an unexpected outcome or payoff. In theory, the agent could rank the degree of
surprise she would experience among a number of different payoffs. Outcomes, or sets of
outcomes, which are known to occur with certainty, on the other hand, would take on a
zero value. This is an intuitive enough concept, e.g., if used to think about innovation, but
the inherent difficulty of modelling such situations may explain the concepts’ failure to
take hold in the literature (Shackle, 1976).
As mentioned, if an agent finds herself in an uncertain state, she may, and in
many cases will, rationally decide to acquire more information about the products she
wishes to consume. Economists frequently model consumers as having preferences for
‘goods’ (not “products” per se) which, along with prices, can be transformed into demand
schedules, curves, and so on. Although this is convenient and intuitive enough, it is a
somewhat circular simplification of reality—goods (including services) are simply things
for which some consumers have positive demand while economic “bads” are things for
which some, or often most consumers have negative demand or would pay to avoid.
Although this approach does not objectively delineate which products should be
categorized as goods or bads, in the way a physicist can distinguish between different
elements, both terms do retain objective, empirically testable definitions.
Upon closer inspection, and with the inclusion of market prices, the intuition of
the basic model is generally enough to overcome its logical shortcomings because
rational consumers are highly unlikely to consistently pay positive prices for things they
do not consider desirable or “good”. Producers know this and act accordingly in how they
design and market their products. Over time, an efficient equilibrium would theoretically
develop in which “products” and “goods” are more or less equivalent concepts.
As useful as it is, the convention of modelling products as goods per se is not
always appropriate. In an uncertain state, the consumer will tend to seek out information
on a variety of goods offered in the market. In the process of doing so, she may come
8

across multiple, non-identical products purporting to offer the same benefits at similar
prices. Ergo, the decision-making process for a rational consumer must be finer-grained
than one which treats goods and products as equivalent.
Characteristics and Uncertainty
Lancaster recognized this shortcoming in traditional demand theory (“A New
Approach to Consumer Theory”, 1966). He popularized and refined the idea that
consumers are more appropriately modelled as having demand for the characteristics or
properties that are embodied in the goods they actually buy in the market. Since budget
constraints are over goods while preferences are over characteristics, the consumer
actually faces an additional constraint relative to the traditional model. The consumption
technology is Lancaster’s term for the objective link between goods and characteristics.
As in the traditional model, preferences still vary subjectively depending on how much
weight consumers attach to different characteristics. In the market, consumers will
ultimately choose the best bundle of characteristics (good) available to them subject to
budget constraint.
In the introduction to Modern Consumer Theory (1972), Lancaster highlights
several implications of his model that differentiate it from traditional approaches. The
first is the importance of adequate consumer information about characteristics so that
consumers are capable of arriving at their preferred bundle. Second, the small number of
characteristic that enter into consumers’ decision-making relative to the number of goods
in the marketplace means modeling aggregate demand in terms of a “representative
consumer” (p. 5) is less plausible than a model based on a diversity of preferences.
Finally, the structure of the consumption technology can be used to quantifiably compare
or differentiate otherwise incomparable goods in terms of the quantities of characteristics
which they do or do not possess.
Lancaster’s more fine-grained analysis of the realities inherent in consumer
decision-making shows that the process can be more complex than it appears. In a state of
uncertainty, a rational consumer may rather quickly turn her attention to the
characteristics of a given class of goods. In Lancaster’s model, the consumer must decide
which characteristics or groups of characteristics are relevant to the current choice. She
9

can then compare goods within distinct groups horizontally according to the proportion of
relevant characteristics they contain. Lancaster further posits the existence of vertical
separability of the utility function between groups of goods, an adaptation of the
separability of utility in goods space to characteristics space, which preserves the “multistage optimization property” found in traditional demand analysis.
In traditional demand analysis, the economics of information is important to a
complete understanding of consumer preferences. Since acquiring information is costly, it
stands to reason that consumers’ stock of information may be associated with their
observable characteristics, (e.g., education and delay-of-gratification) that predict rational
behavior in other domains. In economics of health applications, this is called health
capital and used to understand consumers’ varying levels of demand for health
(Grossman, 1972). Consumers with more health capital are predicted to have more
information or have an easier ability to use health information, all else equal, and better
health outcomes. The reverse is true of those with low stocks of human capital, though
this may change as their preferences or circumstances dictate.
Since Lancaster’s model preserves many of the properties of traditional demand
theories, it is possible to relax the assumption of consumer certainty regarding the most
efficient consumption technology. By construction, Lancaster’s consumption technology
can be changed or improved in a number of different ways over time (1972, p.44, 48-49).
He takes this as further theoretical support for the provision (presumably via some form
of policy) of better consumer information in order to increase household efficiency in
consumption. The inclusion of consumer uncertainty over the consumption technology
allows for the possibility that consumers could be uncertain about the characteristics or
group of characteristics most relevant to their decisions. This is particularly true in a
world of with more goods than characteristics, which is what motivated Lancaster’s more
modern theory.
Aside from increased provision of information, Lancaster does not specifically
address this hypothetical problem. Or, more precisely, Lancaster assumes the efficient
consumption technology is known and uniform, in which case “efficient choices are the
same for all consumers” (p.45). In this scenario, the uncertainty the consumer has over
10

groups of characteristics can be successfully corrected because the rational consumer is
or will rationally become aware of the consumption technology. In a market of many
goods possessing many characteristics in variable proportions, awareness of such
technologies would be drastically more efficient than, say, learning by trial-and-error.
Does economic theory offer any guidance to consumers for how to choose the
correct consumption technology? If, as Lancaster writes, the consumption technology is
known to be efficient for all consumers, then economic theory suggests consumers should
use it and economists ought to try to understand consumers who do not. The technology
itself is assumed to be exogenous, as is the knowledge of the validity and value of this
new technology.
If, on the other hand, the consumption technology’s true value is technically
uncertain, economic theory cannot proceed with nearly as much confidence. In either
case, economists must rely on sources of information outside their own discipline to
model consumer demand in many different markets, particularly in order to establish
technical relationships (Barzun 1966). If those sources are accurate, actual consumer
behavior can be compared to a hypothetical consumer who acts ‘perfectly’ upon such
information, potentially revealing areas where consumers are prone to error. Importantly,
due to the division of knowledge in society, researchers may not have the skill nor the
opportunity to completely vet research outside their respective fields. As a result, models
tend to be built upon sources of information that are considered institutionally credible.
Satiation
In a chapter based on a lesser-known article included in Modern Consumer
Theory (“Operationally Relevant Characteristics in the Theory of Consumer Behaviour)”,
Lancaster uses his characteristics-based theory of demand to analyze another fundamental
assumption in traditional demand analysis, that of non-satiation. In economic jargon,
satiation occurs when a consumer is not made better off by additional units of a good.
Economists typically assume that consumer ‘true’ demand for goods is unlimited, all else
equal, but that consumers must optimize their utility function subject to a budget
constraint. The demand for money, subject mainly to time and human capital constraints,
is a context where non-satiation is a reasonable assumption.
11

Although satiation is not a particularly popular topic in economics, some authors
argue that it helps to explain the incredible growth of modern market-based economies
(Witt, 2001). If consumer demand were easily satiated by simple goods, consumers
would not experiment with new goods or new varieties of goods and there would be little
incentive for firms to innovate and compete for their business—the economy would
become stagnant. The market encourages innovation and competition because there is
always some unmet demand for firms to compete for.
To be clear, this unmet demand does not occur simply because markets encourage
efficiency, leading to higher real incomes, an expanded budget set, and so on. Nonsatiation could easily apply in situations where real income is held constant, leading firms
to expand or change their variety of products through cost-cutting measures or better
consumer research. New, more innovative and nimble firms could still enter the market.
Lancaster shows that, for more complex goods, satiation may depend on the
particular characteristics of the good in question. His example is food and he uses the
characteristics of calories and flavor to model the relationship between a consumer’s
degree of satiation and the mix of those two characteristics. The resulting indifference
curves are more “C”-shaped than in those exhibiting non-satiation. As in traditional
versions, there is a negatively sloped portion where consumers are made better off by
additional units of the y-axis good (calories). This is followed by a region of “neutral”
satiation, represented by a vertical line segment, where consumers are indifferent to
additional units of the y-axis good. Finally, the curve’s slope turns positive to represent
the fact that the consumer regards additional units of the x-axis good (flavor) negatively.
There are a number of implications to these satiation curves that do not apply to
traditional indifference curves with single-peaked preferences. A region of neutral
satiation implies there may be a wider range of choices on a given budget constraint over
which the consumer would be indifferent, as opposed to strictly preferring one choice out
of many. Second, consumers who lie on the positively sloped portion of their satiation
curve could be made better off by “taking” a characteristic away, either by buying an
alternative good with less of the characteristic (which may or may not be available in the
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market) or, perhaps, by modifying the good itself. Analyses of demands for goods which
assume non-satiation do not allow for this possibility.
Modelling satiation in this way is intuitive. When applied to food, satiation
implies a feeling of “fullness”, a physical limit to how much can be consumed in a
period. Therefore, literal non-satiation clearly does not apply in this domain (though it
may still be a useful assumption) because consumers do stop eating periodically, as
Becker (1992) also noted (“Habits, Addictions, and Traditions”). However, in Lancaster’s
example, the consumer’s satiation is not determined by physical feelings or cues but
psychological ones—weight-consciousness leads the consumer to regard calories past the
neutral zone as negative.
Institutions, Information and Habits
As a social construct, institutions are “rules of the game” in a given society.
Institutions are economically important because they influence the menu of options
consumers consider to be efficient in a given context. They are bigger than, and affect the
behavior of, organizations, firms and individuals. Religion is an obvious example of an
institution that gives individuals rather explicit rules of conduct. Cultural norms serve a
similar, if subtler, purpose. Government is an institution in theory but an organization of
individuals who make rules in practice. The market in general sets the rules used to trade
most goods while firms and consumers typically operate in accordance with those rules,
i.e., within the confines of that institutionally defined environment. Science, too, can be
modelled as a social institution which tends to enhance society’s understanding of the
natural world (Barzun 1966). Like the other examples of institutions, markets can
facilitate the efficient expansion of technology, but technological progress itself can still
occur independent of the market process.
Information, therefore, is institutionally credible if it reflects the prevailing
opinion of individuals within a socially relevant institution. The socially relevant
institutions in a given domain have considerable sway over which characteristics should
be considered relevant in that domain. For example, in medicine, if a hypothetical
government regulation to reduce mistakes in the operating room were strongly opposed
on basic, technical grounds that it simply would not work by the major professional
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organization representing surgeons, it would not be an institutionally credible regulation.
The regulation’s goal attempts to remedy a characteristic of the good, surgery, that is
clearly relevant to both sides of the market, but an institutionally credible, non-market
organization could play an important role in preventing bad policy at the hands of
misguided regulators. The political reality is that such organizations will inevitably find a
way to influence any policies they deem relevant to their domain (Olson, 1971).
Institutions can prevent short-sighted mistakes because they tend to change more
slowly, to act more deliberately, than organizations or firms. When they are functioning
well, institutions can enhance the efficiency of decision-making by reducing uncertainty
and doubt because they are often the best-known and most reliable sources of
information. As a result, pervasive social institutions can help to severely cut down on
costs of searching for information about traded goods, particularly in contexts where
characteristics are numerous. In the long-run, more efficient widespread habits, which at
least approximate the wisdom embodied in some institutions, may take hold in a
population.
As Becker (“Habits, Addictions, and Traditions”, 1992) discusses, social
institutions must compete with habits, addictions and traditions in attempting to influence
consumer behavior. According to Becker, habitual behavior displays a positive relation
between past and current consumption and may be beneficial or harmful. Addictive
behavior is defined as a strong habit and traditional behavior as “habits that are sensitive
to choices in the more distant past” (p. 330).
In Shackle’s language, there should be no place for a surprise function in
consumers’ demand if social institutions are functioning efficiently because they should
convey the necessary information (i.e., the consumption technology) to consumers, or at
least point them to it. Over time, the process of utility-maximization should lead
consumers to systematically avoid forming bad habits—i.e., patterns of behaviors that
differ significantly from the recommended credible consumption technology. Such
actions would, themselves, be surprising only because they would be considered
irrational in such a context. Institutions can bring society to an equilibrium that is
superior to a world without good institutions but still short of a perfectly competitive
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equilibrium. Depending on how they evolve, they may indeed nudge society along in a
more efficient direction over time.
Behavioral Economics
For many social scientists today the word “nudge” is associated with more
specific strategies or public policies intended to improve consumer decision-making
(Sunstein 2008). “Nudges” are policy interventions which are meant to bring about
improved consumer behavior by making minor changes to the environment. There are a
variety of policy areas in which nudges have become popular, many of them healthrelated. They are generally assessed positively by obesity researchers as part of a strategy
to change consumer habits. Nudges are generally preferred to direct regulations because
they are meant to be less onerous to market participants because they are not meant to
bring about large increases in actual prices (Marteau et al., 2011).
Studies in behavioral economics reveal the ways in which relatively minor
changes to the environment can affect decision-making in important, unobserved ways.
Present-biased preferences, visceral factors, and status quo bias are examples to explain
sub-par decision-making in the context of food-related decision-making (Liu, et al.,
2014). Behavioral economists tend to point out the ways in which actual consumer
decision-making differs from the ‘rational’ behavior found in the models economists
have tended to use. Theoretically, public policy may enhance decision-making by
structuring the environment so that it nudges some consumers toward the more efficient
decision without any loss of efficiency in the choices made by the un-nudged
consumers—so-called libertarian paternalism (Thaler, Sunstein 2003).
Behavioral economics has gained popularity in recent years but the roots of the
field can be traced at least back to Herbert Simon’s paper in which consumers “satisfice”
given their situation, rather than optimize subject to some assumed set of constraints
(“Behavioral Model of Rational Choice” 1953). Other critics argue that economists as old
as Adam Smith (Thaler, 2012) were aware of the decision-making biases that everyday
consumers suffer from. While there is surely some value in being reminded of common
decision-making biases, their extent and importance remains empirically difficult to
measure in everyday life. In policymaking, one could argue that the extent of the
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decision-making bias does not matter so long as the nudge proposed to remedy it meets
the standard of libertarian paternalism.
While this may be true in theory, others argue that we should not be too confident
in the ability of policy to correct behavioral biases. Researchers in public choice
(Berggren, 2012, Schnellenbach & Schubert, 2014) have responded by pointing to the
inherent difficulties which are likely to arise when these nudges are the outcome of a
political process—so-called behavioral political economy. While consumers may suffer
from decision-making biases, the actors involved in the political process are subject to
their own biases when they attempt to design policies intended to improve the decisions
of consumers. Public choice scholarship further suggests that stakeholders in a given area
of policy have an incentive to convey confidence in the efficacy of their proposed
intervention.
More specific applications of behavioral economics to obesity research are
discussed later in this chapter.
Habit Formation and Credence Goods
Up to this point, I have focused upon the positive, efficiency-enhancing role that
institutions can, and often do, play in reducing the uncertainty that consumers would
otherwise face in the marketplace. By providing useful information, they may tend to
bring about improved habits among consumers in the long-run, consistent with
microeconomic theory. However, there is also a strain of literature in economics which
stresses the inefficiencies that may arise in situations where typical assumptions do not
hold.
Horner (2002) presents a competitive model in which consumers positively
associate the relative price of a good (versus its rivals) with the reputational effort of the
selling firm. Importantly, since consumers can always defect to competitors in this
setting, firms have an incentive to always devote high effort to protecting and enhancing
their reputations in order to prevent loss of revenue. Consumers, meanwhile, are unlikely
to switch to a firm that is lowering its prices because they associate doing so with low
effort. In Horner’s model, consumers are aware of the reputation of competitors and their
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respective customer bases, which may prevent firms from raising prices in order to
appear more “upmarket” because consumers will see through the attempt and buy the
(now) cheaper version. Firms that maintain their high reputation will enjoy loyal
customers and their reputations increase with age.
Horner’s model is meant to illustrate the conditions under which such healthy
competition is likely to take place and weed out disreputable firms. In contrast, the
market for medical services is characterized by an information asymmetry between
consumer and expert, and far less information being shared among the customer bases. In
this case, experts also have an incentive to be as credible as possible, because they are
supplying a credence good (Dulleck, Kerschbamer, 2006)—i.e., one with qualities that
consumers cannot easily ascertain before purchasing. Doctors, for example, join
organizations like the American Medical Association (AMA), at least in part, to shore up
their credibility with patients.
But such efforts do not preclude the existence of “quacks” (“Experts and
Quacks”, Sandford 2010), who represent one variety of “fraudulent expert” (“Credence
Goods and Fraudulent Experts”, Emons 1997). In Sandford’s model, consumers cannot
reliably distinguish between experts and “quacks” without repeated interaction. A firm’s
incentive to invest in improving its reputation will depend on how tolerant its customers
are of bad outcomes. A customer’s tolerance for bad outcomes depends on the costs of
switching firms and her opinion of available alternatives. In his model, already-reputable
firms have an incentive to coast on their reputation, but the presence of quacks in the
market compels the experts to invest in customer relationships, bringing incentives back
into proper alignment. According to Sandford, an equilibrium of all quacks is always
possible but an equilibrium of only experts is not because of the information asymmetry
that will always persist between experts and customers. Finally, he finds that the
equilibrium proportion of experts will decrease as switching costs rise and as the relative
costs of expertise over quackery rise.
Sandford echoes much of what Wolinsky in “Competition in a Market for
Informed Experts' Services” (1993) claims about the importance of switching costs in
determining the organization of such markets. Wolinsky goes further by relaxing the
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assumption that experts can diagnose customer’s problems with perfect accuracy, which
may give rise to a negative search externality. Wolinsky models a situation in which
experts are obligated to fix a problem at their originally quoted price. Because firms
cannot perfectly diagnose their customers’ problems, low-cost experts may suffer the
“winner’s curse” (p. 395) as customers opportunistically seek out their best option. In
order to prevent this possibility, the equilibrium price level increases relative to what it
would be in the absence of search and reputation costs.
Where food is concerned, Grolleau and BenAbid (2001) discuss the positive role
that “public authorities” (p. 208) can play in providing mechanisms which allow
consumers to monitor “credence characteristics” (p.208). In that paper, the authors refer
to recent food safety scares in Europe and the increased attention paid to genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) as examples of characteristics consumers might deem
relevant to their food purchasing decision.
To the extent that these characteristics are, indeed, relevant to consumers, the
authors contend that (well-designed) monitoring mechanisms can improve consumer
habits more quickly than in their absence—a public good. In economics, the public-ness
of a good is frequently used as a potential justification for its provision by the
government. Above, I discussed the role that social institutions can play in enhancing
consumer decision-making by improving their stock of information. Information is often
treated as a public good when it is unlikely to be provided by producers. Ergo,
government may be able to improve the efficiency of the market by making relevant
information more available to all consumers. Alternative, non-government entities could
play a similar role but the authority and reputation of the government could speed up the
process of widespread adaptation to new information, all else equal.
The parallels and differences between the above scenarios and the study of
obesity are worth noting. Fifteen years after Grolleau and BenAbid’s article (2001),
Compared to food, consumers seeking medical care have little opportunity to assess the
efficacy of the services they purchase beforehand and must rely on their physician’s
reputation. After the fact, they may still need to heal or otherwise wait before they know
the ‘true’ value of their purchase. As such, not unlike in Horner’s model, the consumer is
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faced with the task of distinguishing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ doctors without much
direct information at all and with a potential delay in feedback received compared to a
competitive context. Sick consumers have little-to-no ‘appetite’ for ‘bad’ doctors, and
avoid them to the extent that they can.
On the other hand, with reliable labelling, GMO containing foods are easily
distinguishable from their non-GMO counterparts. Moreover, to the extent that improved
taste is associated with non-GMO status, consumers can assess their purchases much
more quickly and cheaply than in the medical care example. They can easily observe
their compatriots’ purchases as well. Consumers who do not care about GMO content are
left unharmed by the label itself. In fact, there appears to be little downside to anyone
(buyer or seller) from simply adding a (truthful) label as long as compliance costs (i.e.,
the cost of acquiring an anti-GMO ‘reputation’) are low, in stark contrast to the costs and
risks that come with reputation-building in the medical profession.
Consumers who are concerned about GMOs presumably avoid them whenever a
non-GMO version is close in price. More ‘sophisticated’ or price-sensitive consumers
may make trade-offs based on the benefits of non-GMO status for a particular food or
food characteristic—the marginal (health or taste) benefit of non-GMO meat or poultry
versus those of non-GMO fruits and vegetables, for example. Consumers who switch to
non-GMO foods on the basis of perceived health benefits may (rightly or wrongly)
attribute improved health outcomes to their new habits and come to expect further
improvements in their long-term health. To the extent that these expectations are more or
less met, consumers will continue to buy from “good” firms, bolstering those firms’
reputations over time, as Horner (2002) might predict.
Since obesity is commonly associated with increased calorie content, a
characteristic that is both universal and unique to food (a necessity), in the obesity
literature it is common to assume that the association between calorie content and actual
satiation is a weak one. This is in keeping with the standard economic assumption of nonsatiation with respect to goods, all else equal. This reasoning is backed-up by the
previously mentioned USDA Guidelines. To the extent that consumers consider obesity
an economic “bad”, economic theory suggests they should make tradeoffs in order to
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avoid it, including eating less. The fact that obesity’s prevalence has steadily increased
over the past several decades is generally taken as evidence for Americans’ inability to
change their poor eating habits sufficiently, in spite of the personal benefits that are
supposed to follow.
Compared to the GMO example, the expected benefits of dieting to lose weight
are much higher but, at least in dollar terms, the marginal cost of a weight-loss diet is low
because it technically requires the consumer to buy less. More realistically, consumers
may choose to spend the same amount of money on fewer, higher quality calories or may
decide to allot a larger portion of their budget to higher quality food because of a reordering of preferences.
Given that much of the obesity problem seems to come back to the issue of
consumer habits, there is a clear role for institutional economics to play (Hodgson, 2004)
in understanding their social evolution. Economists in that field are well-versed in
analyzing the significant effects (positive and negative) social institutions can have on the
evolution of a given society, even if the source of their influence is nebulous or hidden
(Hodgson, 2003). Regardless of their benefits, there is no economic or social ‘law’ of
which I am aware that claims credible institutions are necessarily infallible.
While the market tends to punish irrational behavior, including actors who peddle
bad information, irrational rules made in non-competitive (e.g., political) contexts may
endure if those institutions remain socially credible and their rules continue to guide
consumer behavior. If irrational institutional rules are made over the wrong set of
characteristics (among many), revealed preferences in the market will be neither a
reliable guide for consumer preference nor a promising source for behavioral insights
(Lancaster, 1971).
That is, the credibility of the information provided by a given institution may be
based on a reputation-effect that has little to do with the quality of the information itself.
Its actual quality will likely depend on the competitiveness and incentives that obtain in
the institutional environment that led to its creation and provision. Scientists, for
example, operate in a non-market setting but compete in other ways in order to encourage
higher quality output. But that setting is affected by the behavior of various other
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institutions—government, academia, business, etc.—all of which may affect the
trajectory of scientific research and discovery over time. Nor are scientists themselves
immune to the reputation effects of their peers.
In Lancaster’s analysis, an efficient equilibrium is easily obtained because there is
no real uncertainty in the consumption technology, just a failure of consumers to make
full use of it. This is how typical nutrition advice is regarded today. In contrast, if there is
real, unacknowledged uncertainty, an efficient equilibrium may be prevented altogether,
particularly if the choice of institutional rules is made politically rather than
competitively (Olson, 1971). If the credibility of those rules “sticks”, Horner’s (2002)
analysis suggests that their credibility will tend to rise over time, all else equal.
Moreover, the persistence of inefficient rules increases the probability of a pathdependent process developing (Liebowitz & Margolis, 2000). A path-dependent
equilibrium is antithetical to a stochastic, rational equilibrium because when most actors
are unaware of efficient courses of action, they cannot form complete, rational
expectations and will fail to learn or discover the most efficient, obesity-reducing course
of action. Persistently bad rules may set society on an inefficient “path” that no one
would have chosen had they known about other paths at the beginning of the “journey”,
so to speak. Once on the inefficient path, other paths may not be known if they are not
considered credible, particularly the longer one remains on a given path. When choice is
not so restricted, a more efficient equilibrium can evolve in the medium to long-run
because the ‘market for rules’ would be more competitive.
Shackle’s surprise function is useful for understanding the situation from the
consumer’s perspective. As Figure 1 shows, there is an inverse relationship between the
consumer’s belief function and her surprise function. Consumers who have high levels of
nutrition information or are otherwise motivated to follow credible advice will tend to
have stronger beliefs about the ‘correct’ quantity of various nutrients to consume in order
to lose weight or maximize their health. They also have an incentive to inform
themselves further about the characteristics of a healthy diet.
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Figure 1. Surprise and Belief Functions

*Based on (Dodd, L., (2011)

In Figure 1, N* represents the quantity or proportion of a particular nutrient that
the government recommends as part of healthy diet. Obese consumers are likely to be
most concerned about calories but the government makes recommendations for a litany
of nutrients, including the macronutrients: fat, carbohydrate, and protein. As I will
discuss, fat has received the most attention from nutrition authorities since the 1970s or
so. This may explain why the American diet is relatively close to recommendations when
it comes to the proportion of calories from the three macronutrients (though fat
consumption remains higher than authorities would prefer).
Rational consumers are unlikely to venture far to the left or right of N* along the
belief curve because they do not believe such courses of action will lead to their preferred
future outcome. Conversely, the further one moves from the corresponding point on the
surprise curve below, the more surprised the consumer would be to experience an
outcome as good as what he expects to experience from N*. Consumers who wish to lose
weight probably recognize the long-term value of cultivating healthy habits (as opposed
to short-term dieting) and will be particularly unlikely to venture far from N*. Given
multiple N*’s, consumers might find the complexity of the problem difficult at first. Over
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time, however, the market appears to provide enough opportunity for experimentation
and low-cost learning, reducing complexity over time as new habits take hold.
Another complicating factor in this domain is the fact that weight-loss requires
some patience from the consumer. The time investment of undertaking a new, lesspreferred diet further encourages consumers to choose credible options (close to N*) so
that they do not need to repeat the process. But, according to critics, there is an array of
bundles of dietary characteristics which are unnecessarily excluded from nearly all
consumers’ “consideration sets” (Shocker, 1991), ultimately because they are not
considered credible by nutrition experts or authorities. These options are likely to lie so
far from N* that they will not be attempted, particularly for any length of time, because
of the high costs of change and low, or negative, expected return.
It may be the case, however, that a large proportion of obese consumers would be
better served if they aimed for a point far to the left or right of N* and allowed
themselves to be ‘surprised’ by the outcome that follows from the ‘incredible’ option. If
consumers are discouraged from trying such options even in the short-term, the need for
patience in the absence of immediate results rises the further one ventures from N*
because the ‘incredible’ option will lose credibility over time, depending on the
consumer’s experience—the opposite of the situation for a competitor with a longstanding, good reputation (Horner, 2002)—while the credibility of options close to N*
stays level.
In his article, “Public Decisions as Public Goods” (1971) Tullock points out an
obvious flaw in the chain of reasoning often used to justify government provision of socalled public goods (p. 917):
The public decision-making process is a procedure for generating a public good;
and the persons involved in it, whether they are the voters, judges, legislators or
civil servants, all can be expected to treat it as any other public good. Hence, we
can anticipate that they will invest less in the “private costs” of considering that
public decision than is optimal.
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In theory, relaying valuable information to the populace is a prime example of a
public good. In practice, however, proper justification for such actions requires that the
information promulgated be accurate and useful to the intended audience.
A proper investigation into the origins of American eating habits and the obesity
epidemic requires a long-run analysis of the interactions between government, nutritionrelated institutions and American consumers because habits tend to change slowly and
interact in subtle ways with these institutions. Relatedly, I think it is important to review
the long history of policy in this area in order to understand how government, as an
institution, has tended to interpret and address societal nutrition issues. In the next
section, I attempt to summarize these interactions over the preceding decades in order to
explain the narrative that now informs most discussions of obesity, nutrition policy, and
the relevant microeconomic factors at play.
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Origins of the Current Narrative
Long before obesity became widespread, human societies had to overcome big,
nutrition-related shortfalls that threatened their very existence. Thanks to Robert Fogel
(2004), among others, economists are well-aware of the fairly recent and remarkable,
“techno-physio” evolution (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service,
Food and Rural Economics Division, 1999, p. ii) of agriculture and the food market. The
relatively recent boom in agricultural technology and productivity has led to a better-fed
world population than would have otherwise been possible in a world without both
technology and trade. The innovations Fogel recounts are also pre-conditions for an
obesity epidemic because they allow for “overconsumption” to happen in the first place.
More obscure is the diet-related work of Irving Fisher. As an economist, Fisher is
best known for his contributions to econometrics, but for a short time he also attempted to
educate everyday consumers about how to live healthy lives, based on the latest science
at his disposal. I do not know the extent to which the book influenced economists’ or the
public’s thinking on such matters, but, on the whole, the advice is remarkably similar to
the dietary advice published today and not particularly at odds with most of the other
perspectives recounted below.
In How to Live: Rules for Healthful Living Based on Modern Science (Authorized
by and Prepared in Collaboration with the Hygiene Reference Board of the Life
Extension Institute, Inc., 1917) Fisher and co-author Eugene Lyman Fisk cover many
dimensions of health and hygiene over the course of the volume’s 345 pages, made up of
5 chapters and a series of supplemental notes. It is obvious from the beginning of chapter
2 (“Food” p. 28) that Fisher and Fisk subscribe to the caloric view of obesity. The advice
is familiar:
“Meals should be light and frequent, rather than hearty and infrequent. A little
fruit may be taken on rising and a glass of hot water. A light breakfast is
advisable; one or two poached eggs, no sugar, bread and butter in small quantity.
For dinner, choice may be made of chicken, game, lean meat, fish not cooked in
fat, in moderate portions, and of such vegetables as celery, spinach, […], bulky
vegetables of low food [caloric] value. Tapioca or similar pudding may be used
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for desserts, and melon, and other cooked unsweetened fruits…Foods to avoid, in
cases of overweight, are sugar, fats, milk as a beverage, salmon, lobster, crabs,
sardines, herring mackerel, pork and goose, fat meats, nuts, butter, cream, olive
oil, pastry and sweets, water at meals…” (Fisher, 1917, p.215-216)
As this passage indicates, Fisher believes that one of the keys to a healthy,
weight-reducing diet was moderation in total calories consumed and a general avoidance
of nutrients from which Americans derived utility —namely sugar and fat. This should
come as no surprise given that Fisher was a vegetarian (“Irving Fisher” 2008), but his
advice also had the scientific backing of his Institute’s Hygiene Board, made up of
physicians, professors, and various members of state boards of public health, all of whom
appear to have been credible in their respective fields at the time. How to Live… was
meant for a popular audience, not an academic one, and was apparently rather
commercially successful—going through 15 editions between October, 1915 and March,
1921.
Fisher stresses the importance of proper mastication (chewing) and “slow eating”
(p.51-54) both of which lead to “food instincts” that “are far more keen and correct…than
if he bolts his food [eats quickly]” (p. 54). On the topic of overweight and obesity, Fisher
stresses the importance of establishing healthy habits early on if overweight runs in the
family, encourages obese consumers to avoid sugary high-fat foods, and claims that
hunger is “largely dependent upon the contractions of the empty stomach, and not upon a
general bodily craving for food” (p. 261), a claim which is now considered untrue.
Fisher’s primary explanation for the onset of overweight is consumers’ failure to count
their calories completely and properly (p. 32-33), though they should choose the proper
level for themselves, using changes in their weight as a guide in their decision-making (p.
34).
Anthropologist Margaret Mead is another figure worth discussing in order to
arrive at a clear understanding of how social scientists and policymakers have typically
viewed Americans’ habits vis-à-vis healthy diets. Mead served on the Committee on
Food Habits, which first met in January, 1941and was assigned to the Division of
Anthropology and Psychology of the NRC. The Committee on Food Habits was meant to
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work in tandem with the Committee on Food and Nutrition (later renamed the Food and
Nutrition Board), it being assigned to the Division of Biology and Agriculture, all under
the auspices of the National Research Council (NRC, 1943).
The NRC is one of many government agencies that began involving itself in
matters of national nutrition in the 1940s. The NRC and National Academy of Sciences
were the “parent organizations” of the Food and Nutrition Board, which was “born in a
period of war emergency.” (Board, p.3) Russell M. Wilder served as the first chairman of
the board, which had 21 initial members; nine more were added a year later. These
included 13 biochemists, nine physicians, three home economists, two agricultural
economists, one food industry executive, one food technologist, and one physiologist
(Board p.4). Dr. Wilder’s “charge” to the members captures the committee’s broad
directive:
It is no longer a question of a few experts in our colleges and research
centers talking about vitamins and minerals. What we must do now is
make people understand that nutrition is not an academic matter but a
thoroughly practical consideration, concerning every person in the
country—producers, processors, marketers, consumers, nutritional
experts—everyone! (Board, p.5)
In other words, the Food and Nutrition board’s purpose was to provide
information about nutrition science in order to influence individual American’s tastes in a
healthier direction. The difficult task before the members of the committee (and its
various sub-committees) was to quantify the meaning of the word “healthy” in terms of
nutrient content in an individual’s diet.
The reasoning behind the two-committee setup was clarified shortly after the first
meeting of The Committee on Food Habits:
…the National Research Council has acted on the assumption that, while the first
step toward achieving an adequate national nutritional level is the securing of
scientific information on what constitutes proper diets, there remains the second
step, requiring an equally scientific approach, of finding the most effective ways
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and means of adjusting the habits to needs, of getting people to what they need.
This Committee, in undertaking its assignment, agrees wholeheartedly with this
point of view and feels that governmental agencies as well have a similar twofold
responsibility. (Mead, 1943, p.10)
Not surprisingly, given the time period in question, there is considerable attention
paid to how various war-time measures should be best handled to avoid the inculcation of
detrimental habits once the war ended (p. 21).
Mead, like most of her fellow committee members, was an anthropologist and
they used the tools of cultural anthropology to approach the issue of food habits,
which are defined as “the culturally standardized set of behaviors in regard to
food manifested by individuals who have been reared within a given cultural
tradition” (p.21). She notes that “[W]hile cultural factors are expected to account
in very large degree for the food habits of mankind, there is also the possibility
that combinations of foods may exert a certain degree of coercion upon
physiological responses, so that the constitution of foods themselves must also be
taken into account.” (p.21)
Mead goes on to identify other cultural, psychological characteristics of American
food habits that are less talked about today but may still be relevant to the discussion of
pervasive obesity:
European peasant conception of status which have given an importance to white
bread, much sugar, meat every day; the Puritan tradition of a connection between
food which is healthful and food which is disliked and the tendency in
communities with a Puritan tradition to use food for purposes of reward and
punishment and to handle delicious food as the reward for eating healthful, but
disliked food; the equally definite Southeastern food pattern in which the
emphasis is not upon health and duty but upon personal taste and a personal
relationship between the eater and his food. (Mead, 1943, p.23)
She also notes an increasing emphasis on the appearance of food in the
marketplace and a growing preference for “refined, purified, highly processed foods.”
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Almost contemporaneously, economist George Stigler wrote on the more applied
problem of “subsistence diets” in his 1945 article (“The Cost of Subsistence”). Stigler
was more interested in the consumer problem of supplying an “adequate” diet at the least
cost. In order to define “adequate” Stigler could not rely on his training an economist but,
rather, facts and figures from the NRC, admitting that: “[t]he science of nutrition is much
too young to have attained even an approximate measurement of the "health" function for
representative individuals, or to determine the extent of individual variation.” The NRC
figures did provide him with daily “allowances” “(a term used to indicate their
preliminary nature)” (304-305) quantities for nine nutrients, including calories, protein,
calcium, iron and various vitamins. From here, based on the prices for the various foods
which contain these nutrients, it is at least theoretically possible to compute the least-cost
option for a subsistence diet.
However, Stigler notes at least six areas over which “a larger margin of
uncertainty” still remain in the solving of this particular problem:
1. Many nutritive values have not been established
2. Most foods are not even approximately homogenous with respect to
nutrient content
3. The maturity, and length and conditions of storage are important.
4. The way in which food is prepared also affects nutrient content, even if it
is known.
5. Food waste is difficult to measure
6. Many nutrients in foods may not be fully extracted for biological reasons.
Stigler proceeds with his analysis and finds that “the content of a diet can be
altered substantially without affecting its cost appreciably” (p. 311). Moreover, he finds
that his diet is of lower cost than several other diets then marketed as low-cost. Stigler
reasons this is because “dieticians [sic] take account of the palatability of foods, variety
of diet, prestige of various foods, and other cultural facets of consumption. Primarily on
such grounds can one explain their emphasis on meat and the inclusion of sugar”. In
other words, Stigler’s diet is cheaper and less palatable while still meeting the minimum
requirements specified by the NRC. He reasons that his diet would serve as a better
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recommended minimum diet for two reasons: these non-nutritive recommendations are
“highly personal” and “non-scientific” and because it would be difficult to adapt such
minimum requirements to the diverse tastes of the American population.
The origins and validity of Stigler’s attitudes toward dietitians, nutritional science
and the allowances provided by the NRC are unclear. If they reflected popular opinion at
the time, those opinions must have shifted rather rapidly following this initial period of
government interest in the science of nutrition. The RDAs were revised every five years
following their initial publication in 1943, at least up until 1963, “so that new information
might be incorporated as it became available.” (Board, p.13)
Included in an NRC Retrospective piece (The Food and Nutrition Board: 19401965: Twenty-five Years in Retrospect, 1966) is a 1958 article reprinted from Journal of
the American Dietetic Association by Lydia Roberts, who served as chairman of the first
committee to publish the Recommend Daily Allowances. According to Roberts, “the
members worked hard and long for more than a year and enlisted the efforts of scores of
other nutrition specialists” in formulating the allowances.
The tentative allowances were opened up to comment from other members of the
Board and, as part of a “democratic approach”, disseminated to “nutrition workers” (p.
34) throughout the country in search of criticism and suggestions. After receiving
feedback, the allowances were revised and sent out again and, finally, modifications were
made by the Board. The allowances were then presented to members of the American
Institute of Nutrition at their annual meeting. Roberts was somewhat surprised to find that
there were no “serious disagreements or attacks” to the allowances and attributes the
favorable response to the process itself (most stakeholders had already had a say) and the
quality of the science at the time.
Roberts has many positive things to say about the allowances 16 years after the
first version was published, “For the first time in history, all groups working for
nutritional betterment have used a common allowance instead of the varied and
conflicting ones which previously obtained.”(p.36) She explains the wide acceptance and
use of the allowances in terms of the credibility of the NRC, “whose reputation for
scientific caution and dependability is outstanding” and the “democratic procedure” that
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birthed them, concluding, “All have realized that the consensus of judgment of nutrition
authorities should prevail and have therefore been willing to accept allowances so derived
until further evidence should justify changes.”
Jordynn Jack (2009) argues that what Roberts refers to as a “democratic
approach” to science is, to some extent, a rhetorical strategy that she, personally, used
throughout her career to “forge consensus among experts, shoring up her own authority
and that of the NRC.” Jack notes that “using “democratic” approaches mainly to increase
one’s own credibility or that of other elites can be problematic, especially if it occludes
the interests and perspectives of the publics who might contribute scientific knowledge.”
(p.126)
This is not to imply that the Roberts’s findings, or those of any committee under
the auspices of the Food and Nutrition Board were necessarily wrong or inaccurate. The
nature of relying on experts and large institutions, including science and government,
requires some degree of trust in those institutions and the actors within them. Roberts
demonstrated a clear ability to win that trust from her peers and used it to spread her
vision of the common good via the NRC. Stigler, whatever his misgivings, had little
choice but to rely on the initial allowances in formulating his subsistence diet.
Twenty years after Stigler’s diet problem, Arrow wrote on the topic of uncertainty
in medical care (“Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care”, 1963). In
the second paragraph of that paper Arrow says that, compared to medical care, at low
levels of income basic “commodities”, among them nutrition, are likely to be more
important in terms of their impact on health. Presumably Arrow is referring to
consumers’ ability to afford a diet that meets basic survival needs. As the title suggests,
the focus of the paper is “the complex of services that center about the physician, private
and group practice, hospitals, and public health” (p. 941). Today, of course, many
consumers interact with the medical-care industry due to an excess of one nutrient or
another.
Arrow goes on to compare and contrast the market for medical care with the more
familiar competitive model. One of his key insights, for my purposes, is that
“information, in the form of skilled care, is precisely what is being bought from most
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physicians and, indeed, most professionals” (p. 946) before concluding that virtually all
of the special features of this market stem from uncertainty. Though imperfect in terms
of risk-bearing and information transmission, Arrow points out that “in some
circumstances other social institutions will step into the optimality gap, and that the
medical-care industry, with its variety of special institutions, some ancient some modern
exemplifies this tendency [to substitute other institutions for the market’s failure]” (p.
947).
Writing on uncertainty, Arrow gets to the heart of the informational and
reputational problem when a consumer seeks dietary advice from a physician or
Registered Dietitian (RD):
Because medical knowledge is so complicated, the information possessed by the
physician as to the consequences and possibilities of treatment is necessarily very
much greater than that of the patient, or at least so it is believed by both parties.
Further, both parties are aware of this information inequality, and their relation is
colored by this knowledge. (Arrow, 1963, p. 951)
While the Food and Nutrition Board was active in shaping government policy and
beliefs about nutrition science between 1940 and 1965, a new body took the helm eight
years later: The United States Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs
or the McGovern Committee for short, after George McGovern, its sole chairperson.
Though the Food and Nutrition Board first began studying the importance of dietary fat
and its relation to disease in the 1950s, by the late 1970s there was widespread agreement
among many scientists, including nutritionists and dietitians, and physicians that
Americans were eating too much fat and increasing their risk of chronic disease,
particularly atherosclerosis, in the process.
Not unlike the policy response four decades earlier, these committee meetings
eventually lead to the creation of a committee to study American eating habits, their
consequences, and potential remedies which culminated in the publication of the Dietary
Goals for the United States, which would soon after become the basis for the USDA’s
Dietary Guidelines (Select Committee…1977). Among the members of the McGovern
Committee, there was at least one dissenting viewpoint present during the formulation of
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the Goals, Senator Charles H. Percy. According to a committee print of excerpts from the
committee’s meetings, Percy said “…science cannot at this time insure that an altered
diet will provide protection from certain killer diseases such as heart disease and cancer”.
Surely this is not Percy’s professional opinion as a Senator but, rather, based on his own
sources. In the same document, Dr. C. Samuel West calls this statement “unwise” and
“foolish”.
In 1980, the USDA began publishing its Dietary Guidelines, later partnering with
the Department of Health and Human Services HHS) in their creation. Much like the
RDAs, these Guidelines are revised every five years. The latest version was published in
2015 (USDA, ERS, Food and Rural Economics Division., AIB 750.)
The Economics of Obesity Today
Recent work on economic issues related to obesity and nutrition has lost virtually
all of the skepticism that runs through Stigler’s early article or Arrow’s article on medical
care. One exception is The Food Police, by economist Jayson Lusk. In it, he discusses the
pitfalls in rhetoric and reasoning that characterize much of the popular food policy
discussion. It serves as a much-needed counter to books like Marion Nestle’s Food
Politics (2008), required reading for my university’s public health course on the topic of
food systems, in which obesity figured prominently. Nestle places most of the blame for
Americans’ poor eating habits (i.e., relative to the Guidelines) and diet-related health
outcomes squarely on the shoulders of the food industry and its efforts at “lobbying,
marketing, [and] engaging the services of nutrition experts” (ix).
In Nestle’s version of recent history, obese consumers are essentially the
unwitting victims of manipulation by food companies seeking to maximize their profits.
She devotes little to no attention to consumer preferences per se nor to consumer theory
and concludes her condemnation of the food industry with a series of policies intended to
further promote the “eat less, move more” message. In order to improve the “social
environment”, and thus decision-making, Nestle suggests better labelling, food
advertising disclaimers and prohibitions, education campaigns, better school lunches and
bans on selling junk foods in schools. She also supports increased healthcare training in
nutrition, more research on the “environmental determinants of food choice”. Finally, she
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recommends subsidies for fruits and vegetables and taxes on soft drinks and other junk
foods to both curtail demand and fund the aforementioned education campaigns (p. 367).
Lusk, on the other hand, devotes a chapter (4) to a discussion of why it is
frequently assumed, without much basis in theory or fact, by the “food police” that
Americans need a government authority to tell them how to eat in the first place. Lusk
also directs criticism at findings from behavioral economics, which are increasingly
mustered as evidence in support of more direct market interventions—e.g., food taxes. He
discusses three myths that are perpetuated in such discussions—that the findings are
“really important”, that “paternalism is different from elitism”, and perhaps most
relevantly, that “experts can make better decisions than layfolk”. As these headings
imply, Lusk is skeptical of the effectiveness of policies inspired by insights from
behavioral economics, politicians, and experts alike to reduce obesity’s impact.
In the chapter on fat taxes (and obesity in general), Lusk debunks several other
arguments that are used to justify government interventions meant to improve national
nutrition. Most pertinent to the present discussion, he points to the apparent
ineffectiveness of government education campaigns regarding proper diet, discussed
earlier. Turning conventional thinking in this area on its head, he asks “[I]f the billiondollar weight-loss industry cannot, with all its marketing expertise, persuade people to
lose more weight, what makes the government think it can?” (p. 150). After briefly
noting that the USDA’s early Food Pyramid “did not stem the rising tide of obesity (and
according to low-carb advocates, it actually contributed to it)”, Lusk then quotes another
economist, Steve Sexton, “The causal-chain from mandatory information consumption to
improved health outcomes is so weak that one wonders whether it is worth making
people feel bad about themselves” (p. 151). Quite the departure from Nestle’s assessment
of the situation.
Although Lusk’s extended debunking of common myths surrounding food,
nutrition, behavior and politics is welcome, he does not dig quite deep enough to
understand the role that information and uncertainty might play in the etiology of today’s
obesity epidemic (granted, that is not the purpose of his book). More favorably, Lusk
assumes far less than others about the validity of our existing knowledge with respect to
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obesity—a skepticism he rightly extends to possible policy interventions. However, in so
doing, Lusk mostly ignores the possibility that policy, credible institutions, and marketprovided commitment devices have already shaped, and continue to shape, consumer
preferences and habits in ways that are counter-productive to the weight-loss and overall
improved health that many Americans are seeking.
To the extent that citizens find their government credible, its decision to endorse
and promote certain beliefs would increase the credibility of those beliefs, all else equal.
Though consumers will likely never be perfect in implementing their dietary plans, and
producers are not angelic in their marketing practices, such ‘inefficiencies’ do not
naturally lead to a confident prediction of an obesity epidemic.
Since obesity is, by all accounts, a disease of overconsumption (of one nutrient or
another) economics is one discipline that could provide insights into its origins. Many
economists now rely upon a model of obesity wherein the consumer lacks the self-control
or knowledge required to follow the diet they would ideally prefer. Self-control (Thaler
and Shefrin, 1981) and willpower are concepts used in the more traditional economics
literature to explain tempting (Ozdenoren and Salant, 2012) behaviors, and economists
have increasingly used them to explain diet-related behaviors, including obesity. As is
their wont, behavioral economists point to the cognitive biases that may lead consumers
to miscalculate the healthfulness of their diet. Consumers may mis-estimate portion sizes
or nutrient content of particular foods, for example, as a result of environmental cues.
Present-biased preferences, visceral factors, and status quo bias are other concepts used to
explain sub-par decision-making in eating contexts (Liu, et al., 2014).
The behavioral health literature has also yielded some interesting results, but it is
not always obvious how such analyses are substantively different from traditional
economic analyses because the tools for analysis are often the same (Galizzi, 2014). Fan
and Jin (2014) found that, despite a stronger intention to lose weight, overweight and
obese individuals were less likely to meet recommended nutrient or physical activity
levels. The authors attribute the finding to a lack of self-control compared to individuals
of normal weight, and conclude by saying, “knowledge-based anti-obesity intervention
policies are likely to have limited effects.”
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This narrative appears plausible because, like almost everyone else, social
scientists have long believed that they know, with certainty, at least a few hard facts
about diet, health and obesity. John Cawley’s model of obesity and physical activity is
among the better-known general treatments of the microeconomics of obesity (“A
Framework for Understanding Eating and Physical Activity”, 2004). In that article,
calories are counted as health “costs” (because of their contribution to obesity) but
economic “benefits” (because they increase short-run utility) while exercise is an
economic “cost” (because it cuts into leisure time) but a health “benefit” (because it
consumes energy). Cawley also includes a term, δ, to account for differences in
individuals’ metabolic rates as a function of their genes, G. Consumers may not know the
precise value of δ, but their family history should provide some guidance, especially over
time. Cawley is careful to note that his SLOTH model is meant only as an approximation,
and should be judged according to its usefulness. The consumer’s problem is to balance
these competing goals, behaviors and incentives as best she can over the course of her
day.
These classifications conform to everyday experience (and may be useful enough
for a preliminary model) but, in reality, they clearly do not apply homogenously across
calories, activities, situations or people. It is important to acknowledge, particularly in
this domain, that tastes are not, in practice, constant, fixed and identical across time or
individuals (Stigler and Becker, 1977) (Cowen, 1988). Individual tastes will, quite
literally, dictate the diminishing marginal returns of any particular food. Likewise, the
appeal of any form of physical exertion depends on its type, circumstance, as well as the
goals and past experiences of the individual. The existence of a large market for diet and
exercise-related goods and the apparent success of at least some consumers in avoiding or
remedying their own obesity constitutes further evidence against the fixity of preferences,
healthy or unhealthy. In fact, absent a significant change in overall consumer preferences,
it is hard to imagine a significant, sustained reduction or increase in obesity rates over the
period during which such a change might occur, and indeed has occurred since the
middle of the last century (“America’s Eating Habits: Changes and Consequences”,
USDA, 1999).
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Cawley (2004) goes on to discuss possible rationales for obesity-related
interventions. He rightly notes that there is no economic rationale for intervention in the
absence of a market failure. One form of market failure is externality, in which one
market actor imposes costs upon another who is not party to the original trade. In such
situations, government policy can act to coordinate action or rearrange property rights to
bring about an efficient allocation of resources.
In their piece “Who pays for Obesity?” (2011) Jay Bhattacharya and Neeraj Sood
show that the answer is, for the most part, “the obese”. Thus, the externality argument for
intervening via public policy is limited because the obese are already paying the vast
majority of the costs associated with their consumption. In theory, such incentives might
be sufficient to bring about behavior that is desirable for individual and society alike—a
Pareto improvement. The authors do not deny that there is a clear personal incentive to
worry about obesity due to its link to other chronic illnesses but absent an externality
justification, they reason that another potential justification for government intervention
is on the “basis of helping people to address problems of ignorance or self-control that
lead to obesity” (p. 141).
Cawley (2004) goes on to explain that another rationale for policy intervention is
to provide information, a public good which the government already has a fairly long
history of providing and regulating in the form of the Guidelines. Cawley notes that this
information may be ignored or drowned out by advertising, and that consumers may need
still easier-to-use forms of information in order to bring about sustained reductions in the
prevalence of obesity.
A third possible rationale for policy intervention is described under the heading
“Consumer Protection”. Cawley notes that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) closely regulate the provision of information on
nutrition labels and advertising, respectively. Such labels can provide useful information
but they may also mislead consumers—Cawley’s example is that of a “cholesterol-free”
label on vegetable oil (an inherently cholesterol-free food), which conveys useful, true
information but may also give consumers the false perception that the so-labelled oil
confers additional health benefits relative to its unlabeled competitors. Cawley also notes
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that there is a beneficial role for government to play in preventing deceptive advertising
by the weight-loss industry. In addition to the obvious financial and time costs, deceived
consumers also pay the opportunity costs of not pursuing an effective weight-loss method
and if “repeatedly fooled by deceptive advertising may become discouraged and abandon
attempts at weight loss or exercise” (p. 121).
The final possible economic rationale for policy intervention Cawley discusses
applies to situations in which “Individuals are not Rational”, to be judged by “whether
the individual is capable of acting in his own interest” (p. 122). Time-inconsistent
preferences, i.e., “succumbing to the temptation to accept immediate gratification at the
expense of long-run best interest” (p. 122), is suggested as a possible rationale for a tax
because it would force consumers’ to account for the long-run costs of their actions to a
greater degree than they presently do. Finally, in this section, Cawley discusses some
relatively early findings from behavioral economics that relate to nutrition, including the
positive association between portion sizes and calorie consumption.
More recently, many other researchers have explored insights from behavioral
economics and their potential applications to understanding obesity’s recent rise. In her
dissertation, Economic Aspects and Implications of Obesity (2009), Elise Hefti
incorporates several assumptions, alone and together, about this market that deviate from
standard, rational consumer theory. Among these are hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic
discount functions, both of which incorporate consumers’ dynamically inconsistent
behavior. Arguing in support of a hyperbolic discount function, Hefti proposes that there
are four patterns observed in reality that cannot be accounted for by an exponential (i.e.,
time-consistent) discounting model:
1. Violation of the stationary property or the common difference effect,
“characterized by lower implicit temporal discounting for long delays than
for short delays” (Chapman and Weber 2006 p. 590)
2. The absolute magnitude effect (“less discounting of large outcomes than
of small outcomes” (p. 590))
3. Gain-loss asymmetry (“losses are discounted at a lower rate than gains”
(Hefti 2009 p. 117) )
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4. Delay-speedup asymmetry, an asymmetry between speeding up and
delaying consumption in which agents demand far more to delay receiving
a reward than they demand to consumer it sooner (Loewenstein and Prelic
1992).
Ultimately, Hefti concludes that a quasi-hyperbolic discount function is most
appropriate because of its tractability, results from studies which showed measured
differences in how obese individuals brains’ reacted to food versus their lean
counterparts, and because food’s action in the brain is similar to that of drugs (p. 120).
Referring to Gruber and Koszegi (2001, p.121), she distinguishes between “naïve”
hyperbolic discounters and “sophisticated” ones. Naïve agents are unaware that they face
a self-control problem and ignore preference reversals whereas sophisticated agents are
aware of their self-control problem and plan accordingly.
In one version of her model, Hefti incorporates an addictive good in the form of
carbohydrate as a way to account for cycles of overeating in spite of time-consistent
maximization of a standard utility function. The possibility of addiction raises the
question: can consumption of addictive goods be modelled “rationally”, as some
economists have argued (“The Family and the State”, Becker and Murphy, 1988)?
According to the model of Gruber and Koszegi (2001), given time-inconsistent behavior,
which ignores naïve agents, both exponential discounters and hyperbolic discounters
decrease consumption of an addictive good when faced with a price increase so long as
the degree of addiction is sufficiently low. Their model also makes virtually the same
behavioral predictions as a model based on rational addiction.
Although the models’ predictions are the same, as Gruber and Koszegi point out,
the optimal government policy depends on which is a more accurate depiction of reality.
If obesity is the result of a rational addiction, there is no market-failure to correct and
thus no reason for government intervention. In contrast, if consumers’ preferences are not
time-consistent, then the revealed preferences observed in the market may be a poor
guide for what consumers would actually prefer (p. 1285-1286) and there is a potential
argument for policy intervention.
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Richards and Hamilton (2012) find experimental evidence for a statistically
significant positive correlation between consumers’ quasi-hyperbolic discount rates,
BMI, and drinking behavior. While there may be an externality argument for policy
intervention in the case of rational addiction (with time-consistent preferences), under
time-inconsistent preferences the purpose of the intervention is to correct an internality—
behavior in the present which has negative spillovers on a future self or selves. Based on
their results, Richards and Hamilton suggest that anti-obesity policy should target “more
general behaviors associated with impatience and immediate gratification” (p. 193).
Policy efforts should not focus on more of the same diet and exercise messages and
“would be best directed to informing individuals as to the long-term implications of
short-term gratification, rather than taxing foods directly” (p. 181) because the future cost
of the taxes will be discounted by the hyperbolic discounter relative to an exponential
discounter (p. 193).
Gruber and Koszegi (whose article focuses on smoking) are dismissive of the
potential effectiveness of market-tested self-control mechanisms (i.e., commitment
devices) even for sophisticated agents because “they are probably undercut by the market
mechanism itself” (p.1286) and because there will always be an incentive for future
selves to revert to old habits. Weight-loss diets are commitment devices (goods) which
are consumed in order to bring about more time-consistent behavior between the present
self who wants to enjoy a meal for its short-term utility and the future self who wants to
live a long, healthy life (Strotz, 1956, Bryan, 2010). The need for commitment devices
comes about when there is conflict between the agent as “farsighted planner” and
“myopic doer” (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981 p. 392).
Regardless of which discounting model is more useful (exponential or
hyperbolic), even sophisticated consumers might “allow” themselves to become
overweight or even obese for a period of time before they reach some threshold (perhaps
when the scale finally reads X) at which point they will either implement a known diet, in
the case of exponential discounters or sophisticated hyperbolic discounters, or educate
themselves about healthy diets and the relationship between various foods or nutrients
and health outcomes and strategies for achieving them in the case of naïve hyperbolic
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discounters. Some consumers may decide to trade eating poorly and enjoying it in their
early years in exchange for a healthy (less enjoyable) diet once they decide they are “too
fat”. Empirically, that scenario is indiscernible from one in which a previously obese
individual has a “burst” of self-control, receives a life-changing piece of advice, or
experiences some diet-related “wake-up call”. Nor are these four scenarios mutually
exclusive.
Clearly this point, the “obesity-preference threshold”, will vary between
consumers but, less obviously, even relatively informed consumers probably will not
know the exact weight that will actually spur a change in behavior. In this sense,
overweight and obesity are “experiential bads” because the costs associated with eating a
particular way accrue gradually over time and are not fully known until after eating habits
are established. In contrast, among chronically obese individuals, leanness may be, for all
intents and purposes, an experiential good.
Even consumers who rationally allow themselves to gain weight and plan to lose
it later do not necessarily know the true behavioral costs of doing so until that moment
comes—i.e., the value of X is not known in advance. Consumers may find old habits
harder to change or new habits harder to implement than previously anticipated. Or, they
may settle into an acceptable weight or eating pattern combination before X is reached.
Consumers who have a history of alternating between a healthy and an unhealthy weight
have particularly sensitive discount functions, reflecting their discouragement.
Although the case for policy interventions is not cut and dry (Bhattacharya, J. and
N. Sood 2011), the microeconomic incentives to attempt to change one’s behavior are
self-evident and becoming more so over time if only due to consumers’ increased
awareness of the problem in their everyday lives. Moreover, to the extent that a given diet
“works” in the short term, in practice, as judged by the consumer, one might expect that
consumers’ new, health-promoting behaviors would eventually evolve into truly healthy,
long-term habits. It seems somewhat damning to microeconomic theory that this has not
happened yet.
According to the latest research, the decision-making problem that faces the obese
consumer is basically known and understood to both her and the researchers studying the
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problem. The practical difficulty lies in solving it. Kenkel (1991) discusses the folly in
assuming that more public health information will necessarily lead to improved behavior,
though he focuses on smoking and drinking. Consumers must have a personal incentive
to follow information for it to have the intended effect. Incentive incompatibility may
help explain why, despite the long history of efforts by the US government and state
education systems to convey information about diet and health to consumers, obesity and
other diet-related maladies are stable or increasing in prevalence. Kenkel’s point that we
should not expect miracles from more information is well-taken but, then, how should
one view obesity in this context? Would it be even worse with no public information
campaigns at all?
In their analysis of the past and future benefits of the federal government’s antismoking policies, Jin, Kenkel, Liu, and Wang (“Retrospective and prospective benefitcost analyses of US anti-smoking policies”, 2015) estimate that they reduced the
prevalence of smoking by 28% resulted in a consumer benefits of $573 billion (2010
dollars) between 1964 and 2010 based on a 3% discount rate. The authors were unable to
compute the costs of those policies but discuss evidence suggesting the net benefits were
substantial. They go on to project the consumer benefits of a simulated, future antismoking regulation arriving at a figure of $100 billion between 2010 and 2040 but are
less certain that such a regulation represents a net benefit because it imposes costs upon
some consumers.
Cutler, Jessup, Kenkel and Starr (“Valuing Regulations Affecting Addictive or
Habitual Goods”, 2015) also performed a benefit-cost analysis of smoking regulations
and also find that the net benefits of anti-smoking regulations are still positive, even
amongst smokers who experience withdrawal or ongoing losses from smoking cessation.
They compute these losses as only 20-25 percent of health gains. Marginal smokers, on
the other hand, will be induced to quit by the regulation and are unlikely to experience
significant losses. Interestingly enough, this is far lower than the offset that the FDA has
assumed in similar articles. Compared to anti-obesity policies, anti-smoking policies have
been much more effective, perhaps because there are important differences between the
demand for smoking and unhealthy foods.
42

As mentioned, various time discounting rules and time-inconsistent preferences
are the most accepted tools with which to explain the development of obesity in
individuals in spite of the various personal and public efforts to remedy it. And dieting is
an obvious real-world example of time-inconsistent behavior (Frederick, et al. 2002,
Laibson 1997). Changing any preference is difficult, especially one as habitual, familiar,
and personal as those for food (Todd & Morrison 2014).
Healthy habits may have been easier to maintain in the past, when food was
simply less available. Prior to the “techno-physio” evolution of the food environment
(Fogel 2004), our species had far, far less choice in terms of the quantity or quality of
food—they were in some sense “given” by nature and had to be extracted by humans via
the costly processes of hunting and gathering for comparatively immediate personal
consumption. The far more pressing issue then was starvation and diseases of deficiency.
Although evolution of the food environment was surely the result of human-directed,
purposive action, it is plausible that, in dealing with new, rapidly spreading agricultural
technology, we could end up with a food environment that no one is particularly happy
with, one that makes food choices which lead to obesity less immediately costly than in
the past (Cutler, et al. 2003).
On the other hand, the degree of choice provided by the modern food environment
is a remarkably large and positive innovation because of both the quantity and variety of
foods to which consumers now have easy access. Obese and lean individuals shop in the
same supermarkets, so it is not as though the two populations live in completely separate
physical environments. No one is forced to consume the unhealthy foods sold in the
market in excess any more than they are forced to eat kale at every meal. Likewise, it is
not as though this market has moved uniformly in the direction of supplying only
unhealthy food. The rising tide of obesity itself lends itself to profit-making opportunities
and, indeed, various market-provided diets, foods, exercise equipment, etc. are also
available to assist consumers in controlling their willpower in pursuit of their health goals
(Bryan 2010).
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Based on my reading, the economics of obesity literature distinguishes itself
somewhat from other disciplines that study the subject by how it treats the following
aspects of behavior in obese consumers:
1. Self-control: It is common to refer to obesity primarily as a problem of
self-control, often modelled as a conflict between present and future
selves, (Fan & Jin, 2014, Legg, Puri, & Thomas, 2000, Thaler & Shefrin,
1981).
2. Rational obesity Related to the first point, obesity itself is technically not
a problem in and of itself unless the consumer deems it so. To some
extent, consumers are likely to trade-off their preferences for health with
those for palatability and other preferences surrounding food.
3. Stable preferences Individuals have stable, and hard-to-change
preferences for their particular unhealthy diet, which may be treated as
endogenous to the economic and social system (Palacios-Huerta and
Santos, 2004).
4. Non-satiation Calories of food enter consumers’ demand functions as
normal, homogenous goods which do not, by themselves, convey
sufficient feedback to prevent consumption past the point where obesity is
maintained.
In order for Cawley, Hefti, Fisher and others to model obesity as a social
phenomenon, they must trust that the dominant literature coming from an unrelated
discipline captures the salient dimensions of the problem reasonably well. Cawley’s
model of economic behavior is necessarily built upon a model of the relationship between
diet, physical activity and obesity—such a model or an absence thereof seems a necessary
part of the foundation for any economic or behavioral framework in this area.
As such, Cawley’s model pre-supposes that obese individuals became that way
because they failed to undertake certain behaviors—namely, reduced calorie consumption
or increased exercise. He simultaneously assumes that this would be the consumers’
preferred allocation of resources given complete knowledge of the alternatives. As a
result, his, and nearly every other explanation for obesity ultimately reduces to differing
44

individual preferences (p 120). Unlike “those working in public health” (p 120), Cawley
argues, economists are more likely to assume that individuals are acting in their best
interest whereas the former are quick to assume the opposite.
Synopsis and Critique of Obesity Literature
To sum up, most social scientists seem to agree that the causes of obesity are
common knowledge (Geanakoplos, 1992), meaning everyone, including the afflicted,
basically knows how obesity works. But solutions, in the form of changed habits, have
proven difficult for obese individuals to implement because they lack the necessary selfcontrol or, less convincingly, information. On the policy side, 70-plus years of federal
efforts in the form of Dietary Allowances, Goals, and Guidelines were implemented to
prevent precisely this sort of situation. Paradoxically, because so few researchers wishing
to address the issue question the underlying wisdom of the Guidelines themselves, they
spend little time on normative models of consumer behavior and instead try to refine
descriptive models (Quiggin, 1993, p. 5), which up to this point can explain only a
fraction of obesity’s meteoric rise (Baum & Chou, 2015).
The preceding pages show that, despite much research and writing on the topic,
there is still considerable uncertainty about the best choice of policy or policies to combat
obesity and its associated health problems, mostly because few policies have proven
particularly effective so far. Nevertheless, researchers seem sure that they know which
side of the market is most in need of change: the demand side.
For the remainder of this chapter I will review literature and evidence suggesting
that the apparent ineffectiveness of past and present nutrition policies may be the end
result of long-unacknowledged or unknown uncertainty at more fundamental levels of
analysis than is commonly understood by the stakeholders and policymakers in this
domain--that is, uncertainty about the fundamental causes of, and cures for, obesity. The
USDA continues to publish Dietary Guidelines, including advice related to obesity,
which are broadly similar to the original Goals in 1980 (Sollid 2015). According to
government nutrition policy at least, there is no uncertainty regarding the causes and
cures for obesity nor the basic requirements of an otherwise healthy diet.
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Assuming I knew nothing about obesity trends in the past several decades (but
everything else about society), imperfect preferences are a reasonable and defensible
explanation for the onset of obesity in an individual or even large group in the short to
medium-term. There is no a priori reason to assume consumers’ preferences for food,
health and the actual environment will quickly and harmoniously align with the social
goal of optimal long-run health, a perspective I share with economists in this area. Those
who suffer from food allergies probably understand this point well when eating out.
However, the current predicament is that more and more individuals are becoming obese
and remaining that way or worsening. That is how a country, and the world (Caballero,
2005, Prentice, 2005), develops obesity on such a large scale. At some point, basic
microeconomic theory suggests that obesity rates might stabilize, settling into a “natural”
rate of obesity.
Like the natural rate of unemployment, the causes of a “natural” rate of obesity
may have frictional and structural components. The shape of a consumer’s discount
function may lead her to change her habits only after becoming obese, analogous to
frictional unemployment, which comes about by choice. “Structural” obesity could be
explained by the time it actually takes to change habits or lose weight—behavioral
factors, traditionally considered.
Even considering the difficulties that come with dieting and habit change, it is still
rather hard to understand exactly why so many consumers would continue to make the
same chronic mistakes day-in and day-out. Contrary to the traditional narrative, one
might think this is precisely the sort of inefficiency a market system with functioning
institutions would correct or prevent. Unlike, say, cars or appliances purchased in the
United States, which have improved in quality over time, obesity statistics show that
American diets have not followed suit.
According to the latest empirical research (Baum &Chou, 2015) behavioral
economists are as yet unable to explain the vast majority of the increase in obesity’s
prevalence—at most 6.5% of the 15% increase in the past decade. It seems even with the
incorporation of behavioral factors in economic models, there is a large component of
obesity’s causes which remains unexplained.
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Unfortunately, in order to determine precisely why one consumer is more or less
obese than another, a researcher would need complete knowledge of consumer
preferences, motivations, metabolism and precise nutrient consumption. Since this
empirical requirement is impossible to meet, mainstream theories for obesity’s rise
technically cannot be falsified so long as American diets do not meet USDA
requirements. That is, so long as the average American diet and diet-related health status
deviates from the ideal, Americans will always appear to lack some self-control.
Moreover, well-known measurement and self-reporting issues (Fave, et al., 2009) that
accompany observational nutrition research render the task of interpreting empirical
results with precision all the more difficult.
Both behavioral and more traditional economists consistently direct the focus of
their analyses toward the impediments (be they mental, physical, or environmental) that
prevent individuals from following a healthy diet, as defined by the nutrition authority
embodied in various federal agencies. In so doing, they are often, in effect and perhaps
without realizing it, analyzing two sorts of questions at once: 1) microeconomic questions
about changing preferences and habits to meet long-term goals and 2) the more “macro”
question of how or the degree to which preferences are shaped by social institutions,
including government policies. Researchers of all stripes seem to have assumed that
preference change, by and large, remains too difficult for obese consumers to achieve, in
spite of the microeconomic incentives, policy efforts, and market-tested commitment
devices. Despite the lack of evidence for nutrition policy’s effectiveness up to this point,
research in this area often, though not always, argues or at least implies that further
policy interventions in pursuit of the same behavioral goal may bring about a reduction in
the prevalence of obesity. Baum and Cho (2015) suggest behavioral interventions can
play, at best, only a minor role.
There are two corollaries to the mainstream point of view that I wish to consider.
One is that the obesity epidemic would be as bad or worse under most alternative policy
regimes—e.g., if the government had never endorsed any Guidelines at all, one could
only assume that the situation would be worse. Exceedingly few researchers in this area
argue that the solution to the obesity problem is for consumers to follow advice which
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differs substantively from USDA advice so I assume that they believe it to be mostly
correct or among the best available alternatives. I say “most” alternative regimes rather
than “all” because in a counterfactual world that lacks a government-endorsed diet, other
institutions and the same sorts of experts and professionals we have today might operate
much as they do now. It is entirely possible that things would have turned out much the
same as they have (for better or worse) in the absence of any government action at all.
Secondly, if hyperbolic discounting or other self-control based theory is a useful
way to explain obesity’s onset and persistence, we still do not know whether the costs
associated with obesity’s persistence are, on average, high enough to bring about the
significant, long-term changes in consumer habits that policymakers, nutritionists and the
public-at-large would like.
Though hyperbolic discounting models are frequently used to explain myopic
behavior, part of their appeal lies in their prediction that, at some point, the myopic
consumer will choose the more rational option because it pays, in the moment, to do so.
Put differently, an obese individual’s incentive to change her heretofore fixed, poor
eating habits should increase with time (i.e., the duration of her obesity) as long as she
experiences negative (health) consequences associated with obesity and, also, because of
the reduction in expected utility due to the reduced quality of life or premature death. But
the evidence (rising obesity rates) suggests that sustained preference reversals are more
than outnumbered by people who fail to heed sensible eating advice.
Similar to the issues involved in falsifying a widespread self-control problem,
there is no way to know if continued efforts to affect consumer behavior in the same
basic ways will ever have the intended effect. We do not have the requisite information
about the parameters of consumers’ discount functions that would allow for such a
prediction. Two questions that may be important to the future of nutrition policy come to
mind: Do obese consumers need to experience higher costs in order to change their eating
habits? And if so, should this be interpreted as evidence in support of some form of tax
on food or specific nutrients? My reading of the literature suggests that, as long as current
trends in the field continue, researchers and stakeholders in this domain are increasingly
likely to answer “yes” to both questions.
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I have identified two significant, interrelated shortcomings in the obesity literature
which relate to the obesity epidemic itself and nutrition-related policy efforts past and
present. The first is that at least some prominent voices were ignored in the early
formation of nutrition policy, when the science was weak and uncertainty arguably was
high. The possibility for this to occur in the policy process is raised by Jack in his critique
of “democratic” approaches to science and, specifically nutrition science policy (“Lydia
J. Roberts's nutrition research and the rhetoric of" democratic" science” 2009). That is, it
is possible that some voices will be ignored in a deliberation process dominated by
experts directed at reaching some consensus. Minority, dissenting, opinions may be
ignored, glossed over and explained away by a majority of experts in ideological
agreement, in pursuit of some policy-prescribed goal. In the case of nutrition science, this
means a failure by other disciplines, including public policy and economics, to wade into
the science of nutrition itself for clues as to why obesity has proven such a vexing public
health problem.
Second, by ignoring this real uncertainty (between “rival hypotheses” (Shackle,
1972, p. 19), credible institutions may be reinforcing a suboptimal equilibrium of their
own creation without even realizing it.
In the obesity literature, economists have ignored the possibility that consumers’
preference formation is the dysfunctional result of interaction with nutrition institutions
and policy. If useful scientific input has been ignored both politically and institutionally,
it raises the possibility that consumers’ habits alone are poor guides for how best to
understand and combat obesity. The extent to which such uncertainty can explain
obesity’s rise, then, depends on two important questions: 1) the substantive differences
between relatively credible rival hypotheses regarding the causes and remedies for
obesity, and 2) the extent to which consumer habits’ and beliefs are already informed by
or “adapted to” credible institutions.
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The Case for Uncertainty in the Scientific Literature
Since the purpose of this dissertation is to counter current and extant theories of
widespread obesity, which frequently rely on explanations in terms of individual lack of
self-control, I will now explore the scientific roots of this, the dominant narrative
regarding the obesity problem in the United States.
Gary Taubes, a science journalist and author, who eventually became interested in
the science related to diet, health and obesity, has done as good a job as anyone in
critically reviewing the long-lived and often poorly-understood field of nutrition. In his
book, Good Calories, Bad Calories: Fats, Carbs, and the Controversial Science of Diet
and Health (2007), Taubes argues that much of what we believe to be true about the
causes of obesity and, importantly, other diet-related illnesses may, in fact, be mistaken.
In order to make his case, Taubes reviews the study of obesity in great detail, focusing on
the history of scientific and popular thought regarding the causes and cures for obesity.
He traces the modern study of obesity to the 19th century, when the first weight-reducing
diets began to appear. The first of these diets was popularized by William Banting in
1863 in his pamphlet, Letter on Corpulence, Addressed to the Public. Medical authorities
at the time were quick to criticize Banting and his diet as nothing new, which Banting
willingly acknowledged (Taubes, x-xi), as his only wish was to help others like him.
According to Taubes, our failure to keep widespread obesity at bay may have its
roots in the public’s (or its’ trusted authorities’) failure to heed Banting, and his
intellectual predecessors—Claude Bernard (French physiologist), Jean Anthelme BrillatSavarin (French lawyer, politician, and gastronome), and Jean-Francois Dancel (French
physician and military surgeon), all of whom had written favorably on the topic of
Banting-like diets. That is because Banting’s diet is the first popular example of a
seemingly effective low-carbohydrate diet. A low carbohydrate diet is, proportionally,
low in the macronutrient carbohydrate, constituting 20-30% of calories consumed. Under
such diets, fat makes up another 50-60% of calories while protein, the third of the three
macronutrients, makes up the remainder. Unlike traditional low-fat, low-calorie diets,
calories are not the variable of primary concern for weight loss, whether that means
reducing consumption or “burning” them through exercise. According to Taubes, our
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current understanding of the relationship between diet and obesity is actually one of two
schools of thought which have competed with one another since Banting’s original
pamphlet was published (Banting 1993).
In contrast, since it began publishing the Guidelines in the 1980s, the USDA has
promoted a low-fat, low-calorie diet, along with exercise, as a healthy approach to losing
weight and avoiding chronic disease. Low-carbohydrate diets claim to offer the same set
of benefits even though they are starkly different from what has long been considered
healthy by most Americans. Such diets were re-popularized in the 1970s by Dr. Robert
Atkins and his own eponymous diet has waxed and waned in popularity since.
Randomized control trials comparing low-carbohydrate, high-fat, ad-libitum (i.e., without
caloric-restriction) diets and low-fat, low-calorie diets for weight loss did not begin to
appear until 2003 (Foster, et al., 2003). Today, the so-called low-carb “fad” is enjoying
another resurgence in popularity among consumers and scientists alike, as I will
demonstrate.
Compared to a low-fat, reduced-calorie diet, a low-carbohydrate diet has a much
higher percentage of fat (around 50 percent of calories), much of it saturated fat, a
nutrient long-vilified for its role in heart disease though meta-analysis and clinical trials
indicate that the risk of developing Coronary Heart Disease (CHD) or Cardiovascular
Disease (CVD) is unaffected by saturated fat intake (Siri-Tarino, et al., 2010).
Meanwhile, low-carbohydrate diets are much more restrictive when it comes to eating
sugar, starch and grains, including whole grains, compared to their low-fat counterparts.
Part of the reason for their high saturated fat content comes from their opposing views on
which fats are “good” and “bad”. In direct contradiction of longstanding USDA advice,
low-carbohydrate diets typically encourage the consumption of saturated, animal fats
instead of polyunsaturated vegetable oils that are generally considered healthier.
Vegetables and fruits, for the most part, remain healthy, but relatively small, parts of both
diets
It is difficult to properly stress just how at odds these two approaches to curing
obesity are—i.e., the extent to which they are rivalrous in consumption strictly because of
the different consumption patterns they recommend. In the event that one dieting
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approach were to be scientifically verified as the proper approach, there would be a clear
case for some regulation or provision of information about the quality of the foods and
the proper role within said diet (Beales, et al, 1981) This might not present a problem in
some contexts but, according to Taubes, it has long been the case in nutrition that “[T]he
urge to simplify a complex scientific situation so that physicians can apply it and their
patients and the public embrace it has taken precedence over the scientific obligation of
presenting the evidence with relentless honesty” (Good Calories, Bad Calories 451).
In the opening chapter of the book, Taubes quotes Hilde Bruch, a psychoanalyst
specializing in eating disorders, as saying “The great progress in dietary control of
obesity was the recognition that meat…was not fat producing; but that it was the innocent
foodstuffs, such as bread and sweets, which lead to obesity.” That was in 1957, around
the time when excessive fat and saturated fat intake were emerging as potential public
health problems. According to Taubes and his ilk, there is no obvious, scientific reason
why low-carbohydrate diets should have ever gone out of fashion as methods for weightreduction. At the time, the scientific evidence in support of low-fat diets was not
sufficiently clear nor convincing for a scientific consensus to be enshrined in policy.
Several fundamental questions surrounding diet and health were far from settled, and
arguably remain unanswered.
Few argue that low carbohydrate diets are appropriate for everybody but, for
some time at least, they were viewed as the go-to method for weight loss. More recently,
however, weight-reducing diets which focus on reducing the raw food-energy consumed
and increasing the energy exerted through exercise have competed with low-carbohydrate
diets--and mostly won (U.S. News & World Report 2016). Taubes goes to great, and
effective, lengths to show that these two views of obesity are not compatible with one
another. To illustrate, if, in addition to being low in carbohydrates an individual’s diet is
supposed to be low in fat (for example, to avoid some other perceived health risk),
following a low-carbohydrate diet becomes incoherent—holding protein intake constant
(the US average is 15%), a diet cannot really be “low” in both carbohydrate (~25% of
calories) and fat (~30%) without adding some fourth, non-existent macronutrient to make
up the remaining 30% of calories.
52

While Good Calories, Bad Calories serves as a brilliant and thorough historical
summary of the obesity literature, Taubes was not the last to question the conventional
wisdom surrounding diet and health. Nina Teicholz, another science journalist, echoed
much of Taubes’s research and sentiments in her book The Big Fat Surprise: Why Butter,
Meat and Cheese Belong in a Healthy Diet (2014). William Davis, a practicing physician,
published the best-selling book Wheat Belly: Lose the Wheat, Lose the Weight, and Find
Your Path Back to Health (2011) after successfully treating his patients with a wheat-free
diet. Grain Brain: The Surprising Truth about Wheat, Carbs, and Sugar--Your Brain's
Silent Killers (2013) by David Perlmutter and Kristin Loberg is another popular example
of recent books on the subject. These books are part of an extant and growing popular
literature that questions the scientific basis, and some fundamental beliefs, of
conventional nutrition advice. These authors tend to conclude two things:
1. That fat, saturated fat, and cholesterol are not the problems they are made out to
be with respect to cardiovascular health and may, in fact, make up a large part of
a healthy diet.
2. Grains, especially refined grains (particularly white flour and sugar), may be
more problematic and linked to more health problems, including obesity, than is
commonly believed (Cordain, 1999).
Since 2003, after several decades of public policy advocating the use of lowcalorie, low-fat diets, many clinical studies have been conducted to test efficacy and
healthfulness of low-carbohydrate, “paleo”, or high-protein diets. The results indicate that
individuals placed on a low-carbohydrate diet often lose at least as much weight, on
average, as subjects placed on low-calorie, low-fat diets. Furthermore, their cholesterol
readings, and other measures of cardiovascular health tend to improve or at least not
worsen (Boden et al., 2005, Brehm et al., 2003, Brehm et al., 2005, Brinkworth, et al.,
2009, Foster et al., 2010, Gardner et al., 2007, Guldbrand, H. et al., 2014, Lindeberg et
al., 2007, Samaha et al., 2003, Shai et al., 2008, Shea et al., 2011, Siri-Tarino, Sun, Hu, &
Krauss, 2010, Stern et al., 2004, Volek et al., 2004, Yancy et al., 2004). Based on my
reading of the evidence, low-carbohydrate diets are at least worth considering for
individuals looking to lose weight and otherwise improve their health. On the other hand,
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I cannot credibly refute the experiences of those who have successfully lost weight on a
low-calorie or low-fat diet.
Other researchers have stressed the negative health consequences associated with
even moderate grain consumption (Davis, 2011, Perlmutter and Loberg, 2013). Still
others suggest that more specific nutrients, such as fructose, may be to blame for some
individuals’ metabolic dysregulation (Arora & McFarlane, 2005, Basciano, Federico, &
Adeli, 2005, Elliot, 2002). Fructose represents about half the caloric content of the sugar
found in most foods.
What all of the above suggests is that obesity, as a biological, metabolic, or medical,
problem, is far more complex than is commonly understood today. Confusingly enough,
an article entitled “Is a calorie a calorie?” appeared in the American Journal of Clinical
Nutrition in 2004 (Buchholz and Schoeller), which answers the titular question in the
affirmative while simultaneously admitting that “units of dietary energy are
metabolizable energy and not gross energy” (what is eaten is not the same as what is
“burned” by the body) and that the macronutrient composition affects energy
expenditure. This is a particularly relevant finding if the scope of macronutrient
composition has been unnecessarily restricted.
That same year, in another journal, Feinman and Fine (“"A Calorie is a Calorie"
Violates the Second Law of Thermodynamics”, 2004) reached the opposite conclusion
when it comes to weight-loss and obesity. In 2008, Feinman, et al. published an article
(“Analysis of dietary interventions: A Simple Payoff Matrix for Display of Comparative
Dietary Trials) containing a “payoff matrix” comparing the efficacy of different diets
used to lose weight. Carbohydrate-restricted diets emerged as the winner. Critics of the
mainstream view emphasize the point that the metabolism of the obese is important in
attempting to understand the emergence of the obesity epidemic, as metabolic processes
may have a significant impact on both preferences and satiety (Gerstein et al., 2004,
Fiszman et al., 2014, Rolls, et al., 1988).
Because this scientific controversy has been largely ignored, in present-day parlance
a “healthy” diet invariably refers to one that is relatively low in calories (<2,000), low in
fat (<30% of total calories), low in sugar (variable), low in salt (<2400 mg), focused on
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lean meats and high in fruits and vegetables. My finding is that this is the case with many
popular diets—they are either roughly similar to existing recommendations or amenable
to them with a few minor changes (U.S. News & World Report 2016). This is consistent
with economic theory given that the tenets of healthy eating are well-understood and
believed—more credible goods tend to have larger markets. As such, vegetarian diets, for
example, are not far afield of these basic tenets even if they are not technically equivalent
to the USDA endorsed diet.
That is, a vegetarian diet is not inherently rivalrous with a USDA style diet and could
easily be considered a first or second best option for some consumers. A lowcarbohydrate diet is highly rivalrous because it embodies an entirely different set of
beliefs, some of which do overlap with mainstream advice. Consumers also have some
room for latitude in their choices and may choose to combine approaches that do not
conflict practically or theoretically.
The exception to the rule that differences between diets or foods marketed as
healthy will be relatively minor is found in low-carbohydrate diets. Although researchers
interested in low carbohydrate dieting are part of a growing minority in the nutrition
field, few of their insights have penetrated the fields of economics or public policy. One
exception is economist Zoë Harcombe, PhD whose book (“The Obesity Epidemic…”,
2010) calls attention to the poor science that underlies nutrition policy and everyday
advice, as well as the potential promise of low-carbohydrate dieting. Using her
economics training, she tests a model of obesity using data from clinical studies and is
able to show that subjects’ success or failure to lose weight can be better explained,
statistically, by differences in carbohydrate consumption, as opposed to the differences in
calorie consumption, as was generally argued by the original authors.
This is not to argue that one diet or another should or should not be recommended
to any particular person. As I have shown, recent clinical evidence suggests that many
approaches can bring about weight loss. There are a multitude of diets on the market and
in the media from which to choose. However, on the matter of policy, according to
Taubes (2007) and other like-minded critics, the government acted prematurely in
endorsing one interpretation of the evidence, and that interpretation has been with us ever
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since, embodied in the Dietary Guidelines for Americans. These represent not only the
government’s opinion on what constitutes a healthy diet but, today, that of thousands of
professionally licensed individuals, including Registered Dietitians (RD) and physicians
who then relay that information to their clients (Center for Nutrition Advocacy, 2015).
As the prevalence of obesity has increased, media attention to the issue has as
well. It, too, reflects the commonly-held belief that obese Americans are some
combination of ignorant of proper nutrition or lacking in self-control—that their
underlying, fixed habits are inherently unhealthy and apparently incredibly durable. The
healthiness of any given diet is framed in terms of its resemblance to a low-fat or lowcalorie diet, particularly if the individual in question is known to be obese or to suffer
from diet-related illness (U.S. News & World Report, 2016).
Policy, Institutions, and Habits
The second shortcoming in the literature, facilitated by the aforementioned
knowledge gap, relates to the interactions among nutrition policy, information,
institutions, consumer preferences, and habits. The literature in this area, written at a time
when obesity rates are at an all-time high, naturally seeks to explain obesity as a failure
of self-control, in some broad sense, to the extent that it assumes that obesity-reduction is
on-net utility-enhancing. The personal incentives appear to be in place, information is
plentiful but the four previously mentioned modelling conventions (p.20) lead researchers
to focus on the impediments to losing weight or remaining lean. In so doing, they do not
consider the extent to which consumer preferences and habits have changed and
interacted with important social institutions and public policy over time.
Taubes (2007) argues that current, popular explanations for obesity’s prevalence
essentially blame obese individuals for being “gluttonous” and “slothful”. Experts and
professionals seek to correct their behavior by recommending what were once called
“semi-starvation” diets along with increased exercise, methods bound to fail. Meanwhile,
healthy, viable alternatives are warned against based on years of weak evidence and
popular misconceptions. The observational studies that dominate the nutrition literature
are little help in discerning which of these rival hypotheses is correct.
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The federal government has been actively interested and involved in shaping
American eating habits by promoting, directing and funding nutrition research for over
70 years. The goals of these policies and their makers were, and continue to be, wellmeaning, and earnest. One has to assume that these efforts have affected consumer
preferences and resulting habits in innumerable ways which may be relevant to the study
of widespread obesity. According to the USDA, in 1999, Americans were “slowly
adopting more healthful diets--the share of calories from fat is declining, people are
eating more fruit than 10 years ago, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Healthy
Eating Index has shown some improvement in recent years,” (USDA ERS, 1999). What
has failed to emerge, however, is a decline in the obesity epidemic.
According to Taubes (2007), the McGovern Committee’s decision, to reduce the
“complexity” of dietary decision-making back in 1980 has amounted to a decades-long,
nationwide experiment, testing one of at least two available hypotheses of diet and health,
including obesity. If other, plausible hypotheses were available or have emerged since the
publication of the Guidelines, this suggests a breakdown in the interaction between
science and government.
I know of no theory of the ideal use of science in policy which has the
government deciding to “test” a medical theory on the entire population. Rather, in the
treatments I am aware of, sound science is assumed as an input—it is hard enough to
design efficient policies even then. If, instead, untested science was used as an input, then
bad policy, in the form of bad information, is not necessarily a surprising result. The
long-run effects of bad information could be negligible or significant, depending on the
situation.
Based on my review of the literature, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the
McGovern Committee’s seemingly benign policy intervention set in motion an
institutional environment which reinforces suboptimal eating habits. That is, widespread
obesity may have come about because of a dysfunctional, path-dependent policy process
that prevents efficient consumer decision-making from the outset, eventually leading to
the United States’ present predicament. If that is the case, the origins of American eating
habits deserve some attention.
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Nutrition Institutions and the Microeconomics of Habits
It is central to my argument that researchers and consumers alike use credible
social institutions in their everyday decision-making in order to form expectations about
their future health. The extent to which economists, for example, can know whether or
not a particular food, nutrient or behavior is relevant to the study of obesity is, itself,
determined by outside experts on the subject. In this case, obesity’s severity is typically
modelled in terms of one variable: calories. Thus, the task of any economic or policy
analysis has been to use the tools of social science to describe or explain why calories
have become so easy to “overconsume” despite the costs of doing so. Though certainly
not the first, Margaret Meade referred to obesity as a problem of “overnutrition” (1964, p.
24). It has been conceptualized and enshrined in policy as such ever since. If, however,
there are gaps in our knowledge regarding the causes of obesity then calories per se may
be the wrong consumption characteristic to focus upon in analyzing obesity. The case for
public policy interventions intended to prevent nutritional maladies is severely limited, if
not nullified, if the nutrition authority in charge is sufficiently uncertain about the basic
causes of, and solutions to, the problem.
While the Guidelines are supposed to respond to new evidence, the extent to
which new evidence is useful or relevant is determined by a small group of individuals
who are now professionally invested in a particular set of beliefs (Hite, et al., 2010, Hite
& Schoefield, 2015) and protected by licensing laws (Center for Nutrition Advocacy,
2015). Those beliefs, in turn, reinforce widespread, decades-old beliefs about nutrition in
society. They may have also inadvertently led to institutional and political structures that
are neither thorough enough nor responsive enough to objectively present the most useful
and accurate findings about the relationships between diet and health to consumers.
If so, this weakens a narrative in which “positive” institutions (science, medicine,
government) are unable to overcome consumers’ more ‘primitive’ urges, preyed upon by
institutions and actors possessing more ambivalent motivations—the market, agriculture
policy, food-related firms, marketing, and advertising. Instead, obese consumers’
excessive trust in those more positively regarded institutions may be the very source of
their problem.
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The mainstream perspective does not fully consider the fact that our preferences
are hidden or unknown, even to ourselves, thanks to the subtle influence of institutions
(Hodgson, 2003). Of course, food companies may not necessarily have our best longterm interests in mind when marketing their products, either. Nevertheless, they do have
an incentive to make their products appear as healthy as is profitable, which can include
changes in production decisions, including ingredients.
It is sometimes argued, particularly by nutritionists, that food companies send
possibly misleading signals via their labels in order to entice consumers (Nestle 2007).
These positive health signals are generally sent on the front of the package without
mention of any other changes to the ingredients, which are listed on the back of the
product. For example, a product labelled low-fat may, simultaneously, have more sugar
than its higher-fat competitor. In terms of useful information, it is not clear that the
consumer is better or worse off with the “low-fat” label on the front—simply turning the
food package around or repeated experience with the product ought to reveal whether the
health signal is reliable or useful. As long as consumers are aware of what is going on,
overall efficiency is hardly affected, particularly as consumers learn and are able to
generate expectations in accordance with their own preferences. The salient point,
however, is that the health signal on the front and the “Nutrition Facts” label on the back
of the package both derive their credibility or lack thereof from basically the same set of
institutions and organizations.
These institutions shape the way consumers think and, in turn, the marketing
behavior of food companies in subtle ways. For example, although low-carbohydrate
versions of popular foods are increasingly available, I have yet to see one that markets
itself as high in fat even though the two characteristics are complementary under a true
low-carbohydrate diet. Nor have I observed labels on bacon or other pre-existing fatty
foods extolling the same virtue. In theory, such labels would appeal to a small segment of
consumers who value those characteristics. The downside to this approach is that the
label would likely reduce demand for the final product among a much larger segment of
consumers—those who believe that additional fat will increase their risk of health
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problems. Those seeking higher fat might be expected to choose bacon and other such
foods on their own, without a label.
Instead, marketers of low carbohydrate foods use their labels, which are also
regulated by the FDA, to draw attention their products’ lack of carbohydrates, including
sugar, wheat, gluten, etc. Presumably, this is a way to attract either group (low-fat or lowcarb) because carbohydrates make up the majority of almost all consumers’ calorie intake
(as the Guidelines suggest) and so are likely the easiest to give up at the margin.
Meanwhile, foods which are low in both carbohydrates and fat are free to use
both the low carbohydrate and low fat labels, which will predictably lead to sub-optimal
decision-making if high-fat diets do not actually increase the consumer’s risk of heart
disease and the consumer has a taste for fat. Like mainstream nutritionists, lowcarbohydrate diet proponents are quick to point out that one should be careful relying too
heavily on packaged foods that advertise their lack of characteristics because they may
still be relatively high in carbohydrate or sugar.
What the above examples suggest is that the role of food companies in causing
obesity is not purely negative, at least partly due to government regulation. Sophisticated
or motivated consumers could, and probably do, educate themselves on how to use labels
effectively and on which pitfalls to avoid in order to cultivate healthier habits. As
mentioned above, the USDA had evidence suggesting that Americans were adopting
modestly healthier habits at least as far back as 1999.
If the credibility of many commonly-held beliefs about nutrition is as dubious as I
have argued, then an alternative hypothesis for a significant portion of America’s obesity
epidemic is possible. Americans have only one, inferior consumption technology
available to them in pursuit of weight-loss. They might have been better served by a
market of competing commitment devices, and professionals that would allow for more
personalization and individualized learning. Since only one approach to weight loss is
widely considered credible, the market for such credence goods (Dulleck &
Kerschbamer, 2006) has been narrowed relative to what it would have been without any
official endorsement of a particular set of beliefs about nutrition and health.
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In short, government policy both set the stage for, and encouraged the creation of,
the credible nutrition institutions which, for better or worse, have shaped nearly
everyone’s understanding of obesity at all levels of analysis. Obese consumers’ habits,
rather than being biased, may reflect their best adaptation to credible, but bad,
information. Those same institutions remain in a position to address the obesity epidemic.
To the extent that the true causes of obesity are unknown—e.g., to the extent that calories
are the wrong characteristic upon which to base obesity models, economists and most
others working in service of credible nutrition institutions will incorrectly model
individual behavior and habits. This includes self-control’s supposed central role in the
obesity epidemic
Concluding Remarks
In this section I emphasized the extent of heretofore mostly unacknowledged real
uncertainty in the nutrition literature. While it is convenient to separate uncertainty into
various categories, reality is far more complicated. John Stuart Mill (On Liberty, 1859)
recognized the difficulty of categorizing conflicting opinions
"Popular opinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom or
never the whole truth. They are a part of the truth; sometimes a greater,
sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, and disjoined from the truths
by which they ought to be accompanied and limited.” (On Liberty, 1859 (ch.3,
paragraph 34))
If few opinions can be assumed to be 100% true, then there is considerable value
in allowing dissent and debate within society so that better truths can be substituted for
worse ones. Likewise, excessively confident beliefs in untrue opinions would delay such
substitutions. To the extent that federal pronouncements are considered credible, they
inspire confidence in the beliefs they espouse, including consumer confidence in
everyday decision-making. Therefore, the possibility for improved decision-making must
be weighed against the possibility that such pronouncements will inefficiently restrict the
range of options available in the market—i.e., the range of competing hypotheses that are
treated as credible beliefs. As Tullock (1971) points out, it is rather unlikely that
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policymakers will devote the requisite effort to this task because they lack the incentives
needed (and perhaps the ability) to do so.
This is not to imply that the government endorsed information that was
considered incredible at the time—if anything, the information embodied in the
Guidelines was becoming more accepted and more mainstream among the general public
and medical professionals alike. In the intervening years, experts, professionals, and
various levels of government, through their funding decisions and regulations, have
further reduced any competitive pressure this viewpoint might otherwise face.
But, according to critics of the Guidelines, there were still experts within the
nutrition community who questioned the beliefs embodied therein. That is, the
competitive pressure within the scientific community had not been allowed to play out
completely prior to the publication of the Dietary Goals. Those same critics argue that
there is still reason to believe (because the science remains unsettled) that the Guidelines
continue to emphasize the wrong nutritional characteristics altogether, for at least some
portion of the obese population. Moreover, stakeholders’ emphasis on calories, may be
discouraging Americans from consuming diets that are both lower in calories and more
satiating than their present diets—diets that would be strictly preferred to their current
options.
In the next section, I present a theory of policy, institutions and individual
behavior that could help to explain the discrepancy between the American public’s desire
to lose weight and their actual eating habits. Though the insights from the obesity
literature discussed above are surely relevant to the discussion, those hurdles to eating
well seem like small potatoes compared to the billions of dollars per year that obesity has
cost the American economy in recent times, particularly if those costs mostly accrue to
the obese.
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Chapter 3. Theory
Introduction
The theory of individual behavior which forms the basis for my model of
widespread obesity is more rational than is commonly assumed in the obesity literature.
That is, I hypothesize that most consumers’ current buying behavior already mostly
reflects their motivated attempts to adjust their preferences in ways that are consistent
with institutionally credible advice from nutrition and health authorities.
Consumers’ preferences are therefore consistent with accepted economic theories
of preference formation and purposive, self-interested behavior. Based on this basic
model, my aim is to provide a possible explanation for why the long-term health
outcomes associated with these adjustments have been disappointing, at best. Obesity’s
recent, meteoric rise remains difficult for economists and other analysts to precisely
explain, even when models include a variety of behavioral modifications to agents’
behavior (Baum & Chou, 2015). To some, more direct market interventions may appear
to be the only solution left which is likely to lead to improved consumer habits—
government information and labelling, professionals, and the market have all failed to
bring about a desirable outcome after several decades of efforts.
My hypothesis for this discrepancy between observed behavior (improved, if
imperfect, consumer habits) and observed results (widespread obesity) is unique in that it
includes a significant role for non-Bayesian uncertainty, as discussed by Shackle
throughout his career (Cantillo, 2010). According to Shackle, the probabilistic view of
uncertainty which had already come to dominate most economists’ thinking in his time,
embodied in more recent authors like Herschleiffer (The Analytics of Uncertainty and
Information, 1992), is not always the best guide for understanding how decisions are
actually made. His most pertinent point to the current discussion is that Bayesian
reasoning [italics in original] “stands for a language for expressing judgements as to the
weight that the individual in choosing his conduct ought to give to each of a variety of
rival hypotheses concerning the outcome of some one course of conduct...It assumes,
implicitly, that the hypotheses that have been enumerated, specified and presented for the
assignment of weights are the only relevant ones”. Social scientists, including
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economists, have long assumed that one hypothesis should be considered relevant to
weight-conscious, obese consumers. It is the one which has been endorsed by
government nutrition policy, credible institutions and respected professionals for over 35
years.
In other domains, consumers’ trust in respected social institutions, including the
government and market, could theoretically enhance their certainty as to the proper
course of action, and they subsequently would realize an outcome that approaches their
expected results. Although there are informational and behavioral hurdles to any dietary
change, they are not obviously onerous to the degree that the current obesity epidemic
would suggest. I argue above that there is ample scientific evidence which undermines
the trust placed in the major nutrition institutions considered relevant by consumers,
government officials, and most researchers. As a result, potentially relevant options may
be quickly or altogether excluded from the vast majority of obese consumers’ menu of
options when they otherwise would not be. On the research side, the long-term influence
of political interests and institutions has been misinterpreted, and counterfactual scenarios
left unconsidered.
The highest-quality evidence that many accepted dietary restrictions are
unnecessary comes from recent clinical results on the efficacy and safety of lowcarbohydrate diets. The evidence is compelling because it contradicts years of credible
advice regarding the proper mix and quantity of macronutrients for weight-loss and good
health. The evidence is not definitive, but the stark difference between low-carbohydrate
diets and credible low-fat, low-calorie alternatives suggests there may be a wide range of
viable relevant options in the region between these two approaches which have been
outside of consumers’ consideration set (Shocker, 1991) for some time now. Other lines
of research raise the possibility that other restrictions on micronutrients (e.g., sodium) are
unnecessary for most consumers. Others suggest the role of other commonly consumed
micronutrients and specific foods (fructose, flour, wheat, sugar, etc.) in obesity is understressed, and that exercise is, at-best, a weak substitute for dietary changes aimed at
weight-loss.
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To the extent that viable behavior changes are simply not known to obese
consumers, Americans’ apparent widespread self-control problems may be more
appropriately treated as a longstanding knowledge problem, facilitated by public policy,
and ultimately manifested in consumer habits. Self-control theories begin by assuming
the consumer has an appropriate plan in mind to realize a future goal but finds it difficult
to implement when the time comes. For example, a spendthrift who cannot stay within a
reasonable budget may need a more binding commitment device like a savings account or
Certificate of Deposit (Strotz, 1956). Likewise, consumers have for some time had many
commitment devices, i.e. diets, (U.S. News & World Report, 2016) available to them.
If, however, consumers have been mostly dissuaded from otherwise viable diets
by credible institutions, the explanatory power of self-control centered models is severely
weakened. This is because one of the fundamental assumptions that accompanies theories
of quasi rational behavior is violated from the outset i.e., a complete knowledge of
alternative courses of action and their consequences. If relevant knowledge is widely
considered incredible or is absent from the market, the odds of an inefficient equilibrium
developing increase. My theory traces the source of this knowledge deficiency to
institutional dysfunction in the nutrition policy domain. My model attempts to explain
widespread obesity based on a theory of demand wherein this dysfunction is unknown to
credible stakeholders, leading rational consumers to act under a false sense of certainty.
Theory
I assume that a representative obese consumer does, at some non-extreme point,
reach a threshold at which she will make some attempt at behavior change in order to
increase long-term expected utility. Further, I assume that the consumer forms her
expectations and adjusts her behavior in a way roughly consistent with the dietary
component of the “SLOTH” model advanced by Cawley (2004). For simplicity, I ignore
the tradeoff between consumers’ demand for exercise, leisure and time—I assume her
preferences for behavior change between diet and exercise are separable and that diet is
strictly preferred to exercise, at least in early stages of the “dieting game”.
Instead I focus on the tradeoffs between satisfying known, existing dietary
preferences and adjusting behavior, and ultimately habits, in pursuit of long-term weight65

loss. Preference formation is a not a popular topic in economics but given that the
ultimate goal (and to some extent the result) of nutrition policy is to change society’s
preferences—i.e., its dietary habits, I believe a discussion of the relationship between
preferences and rational, diet-related behavior is more than appropriate.
I make no positive theory as to how the consumer arrives at her ‘obesity
threshold’ because both exponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting strike me as
plausible stories and it is empirically difficult to distinguish between them. I am less
interested in explaining obesity’s onset because it is easily explained by existing theories,
rational or not. I am far more interested in explaining why a consumer might cross this
threshold but not cross back, long-term, in spite of the microeconomic incentives and
opportunities to do so. Though I am most concerned with obesity, I do not assume that
the threshold point necessarily coincides with a BMI greater than 30—it may arrive when
the consumer is merely overweight (BMI of 25-29.9) or at higher levels—but I assume its
probability of arriving is positively correlated with BMI and time, given fixed habits.
BMI is positively associated with fixed habits if those habits were positively associated
with BMI in the past.
For simplicity, I assume that the consumer has not, prior to the threshold, engaged
in sustained dieting behavior and that she is mostly uncertain about the value of δ, her
genes’ effect on her metabolism. She is therefore aware that some uncertainty
accompanies her choice over the proper level and proportions of calories and exercise. To
be clear, this is the traditional version of uncertainty where the range of possible values
for calories and exercise which will lead to weight loss is known, in this case based on
USDA guidance. The consumer has little problem determining which characteristics are
relevant to his decision to lose weight. In the face of this probabilistic uncertainty, the
consumer attempts to ‘satisfice’ (Simon, 1987) as best she can, given her existing
preferences, expectations and results.
More economically, in my model consumers rely on credible institutions like the
USDA for guidance as to the characteristics of food and behavior (primarily, calories, fat
and exercise) that they should consider salient in their plans to lose weight and live long
lives (Lancaster, 1971). That is, consumers will tend to develop beliefs about these
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particular characteristics’ role in their own health. These beliefs may not immediately
manifest themselves in individual behavior because of differing perceptions of risk or
differing preferences for healthy weight, among other reasons, in line with most theories
of subjective, rational decision-making.
Given what consumers know about themselves, including their own weight, past
habits, and preferences, as they approach their own threshold points they are more likely
to devote increased mental attention to their calorie intake and exercise habits. They may
begin to make plans and form new expectations about their dieting and health. Depending
on their temperament, they may be confident in their probability of success. In any event,
if and when the individual arrives at her threshold, she will embark on an iterative,
experimental, and procedurally rational process of behavior change.
Figure 2, below, depicts the dynamic manner in which a consumer plans to
‘reform’ her preferences in a way more consistent with her long-term health goals.
Importantly, and rather obviously, in order for good habits to become fixed, the consumer
has to experience some positive improvements, i.e., feedback, in perceived health status
within a reasonable time frame. By construction, I assume that the vast majority of
consumers will make a change to their diet consistent with a belief in the efficacy of a
low-calorie, low-fat diet for at least the first iteration of this process. That is, consumers
will make at least marginal reductions in their daily calorie intake, fat intake or sodium
intake. Even without precise knowledge on one’s own past intake, this is a relatively safe
and seemingly painless strategy for anyone wishing to lose weight, given the typical
American diet exceeds recommended official recommendations for all three.
As Figure 1 shows, the representative obese consumer’s decision to iterate or
continue with a new dietary change depends on whether she experiences improvements in
her health. Quick results following minor changes predict continued behavioral
convergence to USDA norms. A lack of results need not imply the consumer gives up
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Figure 2. Food Market Schematic
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because there are plausible explanations and sources of optimism. The consumer might
believe she mis-measured her calories, did not exercise enough, or needs to try some new
strategy to aid in her compliance.
It is here, where short-term results differ from short-to-medium-term
expectations, that “self-control” becomes most important in predicting the consumer’s
future choices. Higher levels of patience and self-control predict further or more creative
iterations while less self-control predicts a faster reversion to old habits in the absence of
results. Regardless of the consumer’s patience, she is relatively unlikely to attempt
dietary changes that she believes to be risky to her long-term health.
In his paper, Cawley (2004) refers to the costs that are experienced by a consumer
who falls for deceptive dieting claims. In such cases, the most damaging aspect of these
claims may be the discouraging effect it has on the consumer’s future attempts to diet.
Figure 1 helps to show just how costly this adjustment process can be, and
discouragement would increase with repeated iterations. At some point, the consumer
may reach another threshold: the discouraged dieter threshold, where it becomes unclear
whether further dietary changes are worth pursuing relative to a reversion to old habits.
To the extent that Shacklean uncertainty regarding the relevant nutritional
characteristics is applicable to significant portions of the obese population, Cawley’s
discussion anticipates my theory’s major prediction: that a significant proportion of the
obese population has already ‘rationally’ given up on changing their diets because their
new diets failed them and they remain ignorant of viable alternatives. That is, USDA
advice could be considered deceptive for at least some consumers if it could predictably
lead them to ignore viable, obesity-reducing consumption habits that they might
otherwise prefer. It is worth reiterating that a USDA-style diet requires typical consumers
to give up several food characteristics which they enjoy for a bundle of less-preferred
characteristics, all in exchange for their ultimate goal of better expected long-term health.
Low-carbohydrate dieting also requires the reduction in a characteristic which
consumers enjoy (carbohydrates, particularly sugar and flour) but it also allows them to
safely increase their consumption of at least some forms of fat and, further, to ignore
foods’ calorie-content. Moreover, exercise is mostly ignored for weight loss purposes,
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though certainly not discouraged. In microeconomic terms, the marginal rates of
substitution between the low-carbohydrate and low-fat diets as compared to a typical
American diet are vastly different. While no approach is guaranteed to be “easy” to adjust
to, based on typical American eating patterns, there is reason to believe that some
consumers might prefer such an approach, all else equal. It also represents one point near
the end of a long spectrum of options that contradict credible advice.
Earlier, I modelled the uncertainty of this situation using Shackle’s “surprise
function”. The surprise function measures the amount of surprise the consumer would
feel if she were to experience a particular, unexpected outcome. Bayesian versions of
uncertainty will not suffice because she may be ignorant of the possibility of the
surprising outcome altogether. For all intents and purposes, the surprising outcome’s
probability of occurring is zero—the consumer is certain it will not occur, until it does.
The relevance of surprise to the present topic is demonstrated with a simple
thought experiment: Suppose, after years without seeing each other, you run into a
longtime friend who was obese the previous time you met. Over the course of your
friendship, he was not always fat but he was not always a healthy eater, either. Now, you
see him and he is in the best shape you have ever seen him. Eventually, you ask him what
he did to get into such good shape, what lifestyle changes he made. What answers would
most people anticipate? Which answers would surprise them? More to the point, which
answers would surprise a doctor or nutritionist?
In order for the widespread uncertainty I have discussed to result in the drastic
uptick in obesity rates observed in the United States, some method of comparing these
two diets (and, for that matter, the range of alternatives between them) is needed in order
to investigate their behavioral implications with clarity. The application of Bayesian
decision theory is further complicated by the fact that the two approaches are derived
from rival hypotheses which promise the same outcome to consumers by stressing the
relevance of several, overlapping nutritional characteristics. Because of these differing
emphases and assumptions, another standard assumption in consumer theory must be
relaxed: that of non-satiation.
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Satiation is an important concept in this domain because the disparity between
consumer habits and credible advice suggests that many consumers are unwilling to make
the tradeoff between the utility they associate with their current diets and the health
outcomes they expect from a “healthier” diet. Economists typically assume that
consumers exhibit non-satiation in consumption—more of a good is always better, all
else equal. In this domain, however, the obese consumer is relentlessly counseled to treat
the marginal value of the ~2,001st calorie as negative.
The microeconomics of day-to-day demand for meals is somewhat unusual in that
the consumer’s overall utility is highly dependent, if not contingent, on finding goods
(meals) that routinely satiate her demand. No organism functions optimally on a poor diet
and, as such, can hardly be assumed to optimize optimally in such a state. Our relatively
recent ancestors would be envious of how easy it is to routinely cure our hunger in the
modern world, even were they to ignore the vast improvement in the quality and variety
of foods available within it. According to many commentators, it is obvious that our
species is not adapted to such easy access to food, and that this is a major contributor to
consumers’ chronic overeating, to the point of widespread obesity (Prentice & Jebb,
2003).
Perhaps this is why satiation is commonly associated with the calorie content of a
given food or diet. But satiation clearly depends on other dietary characteristics and is not
solely dependent on individual metabolism—individual preferences still matter.
Everyday experience suggests that some consumers do ‘naturally’ find a USDA-style diet
satiating. Whether because of their metabolism or preferences, eating well is not difficult
for them. But following a USDA diet would, evidently, require the typical consumer to
make macronutrient cross-substitutions and to reduce the overall quantity of food
demanded, either of which would lead to a less-satiating, lower utility diet in the shortterm, i.e., prior to any observable changes in health status. Based on the advice she has
received, the consumer expects an intertemporal utility tradeoff to take place in the
medium-term—after expected weight loss has commenced she expects her metabolism
and preferences to adjust to the diet and she may expect to optimize the diet to her
preferences. Long-term compliance depends positively on whether results match
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expectations. The probability of healthier habits actually taking hold depends on whether
the consumer can successfully satisfice and form new habits.
There is no telling whether the mix of macronutrients recommended by a lowcarbohydrate diet would be preferred, taste-wise, to that of its low-fat counterpart because
the nutrient cross-substitutions it requires are so drastic relative to both the typical
American diet and the Guidelines. Consumers who have not already tried such diets do
not really have the required knowledge needed to evaluate them because a novel diet is
an experiential good (Kolb, 1984, Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982). Asking the typical
American to decide if she prefers a low-carb diet to her current one is likely akin to
asking if she prefers food from a country she’s only passingly familiar with to her current
diet. Given its high fat content, I expect rational consumers (who rely on credible
institutions) to be highly skeptical of the low-carbohydrate diets or any others that are
starkly different from the norm.
Regardless, advocates of low-carbohydrate diets are likely to argue that if
consumers do follow advice to limit carbohydrates, they need not worry about overall
calories consumed because excessive calorie intake, per se, does not cause obesity.
Further, because low-carbohydrate diets are supposedly inherently more satiating, calorie
intake tends to drop ‘naturally’ (without conscious effort) though the drop itself is not the
cause of the weight loss. The lack of a calorie restriction seems to be a feature of such
diets relative to low-fat competitors, which inevitably include a calorie limit (Taubes,
2010) because such diets lack this satiating effect.
My aim is not to evaluate the accuracy of these claims but, rather, to provide a
framework for analyzing consumer behavior that allows for either theory of obesity to be
true. To that end, I go out of my way not to assume any particular mechanism of action
for either theory of obesity. Mainstream researchers tend to argue that low-carb diets
work, to the extent that they do, because calorie intake decreases by necessity
simultaneously when the proportion of calories derived from carbohydrates is reduced.
Low-carb advocates, on the other hand, contend that any attempted dietary change is
likely to be lower in carbohydrates (particularly sugar or flour) than whatever was
previously eaten. By this logic, their approach should be the most effective overall, all
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else equal. This is one of several avenues of disagreement between various camps.
Neither side’s set of arguments definitively refutes the recent evidence suggesting both
approaches are associated with a decent probability of success, when followed.
For the purposes of my argument, it is sufficient to take the position that for any
given consumer there is a roughly equal probability of a significant predicted average
treatment-effect for either dieting approach, consistent with recent observational studies.
That is, there is no a priori reason to assume that either approach will prove more
effective, behaviorally, in the long run, whether because of the consumers’ metabolism,
preferences or other factors. Since I do not assume either approach is technically
superior, I cannot dismiss the possibility that either approach would work if access to
food were strictly controlled. However, I allow for the possibility that one approach will
be strictly preferred on the basis of some combination of the characteristics it allows and
the consumer’s actual weight-loss experience with alternatives.
In Modern Consumer Theory (1972), Lancaster analyzes the issue of demand
satiation, as it relates to diet and food. In line with Lancaster, I hypothesize that the
degree of satiation a particular diet confers at various intake levels (the shape of its
satiation curve) depend on that diet’s characteristics and those of the consumer. In
Lancaster’s analysis the characteristic that determines the shape of the indifference curve
is “flavour”. He hypothesizes that there may be regions on the satiation curve where the
consumer is indifferent between consuming more or less of a given characteristic, in this
case calories are used to measure the quantity of flavor. At low levels, calories exhibit
non-satiation, followed by a neutral zone, and finally by a segment in which additional
calories have a negative effect on utility because the consumer is assumed to be weightconscious.
It is notable that Lancaster uses this sort of satiation as an illustrative example
when this apparent lack of consciousness forms the cornerstone for most theories of
obesity. Today, researchers are more likely to remark on the apparent weak correlation
between calorie content and consumers’ decisions to cease eating. Since all consumers
do, eventually, stop eating for a while, these two examples suggest that there are two
types of satiety— psychological and metabolic—which operate somewhat independently.
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That is, one consumer’s metabolism may require her to impose an ‘artificial’
psychological calorie or nutrient constraint upon her existing diet in order to hit a certain
target while another may feel satiated, metabolically, prior to reaching her calorie target,
in which case the psychological constraint is unnecessary. Both constraints will affect the
shape of consumers’ satiation curves, discussed below.
With some modifications, Lancaster’s framework can be adapted to compare the
relative merits of many diets vis-à-vis existing consumer preferences. First, it is not
obvious that the flavor profile of either diet will be preferred by any consumer. Therefore,
flavor is too ambiguous of a dimension along which to compare these diets. Second, I
cannot compare the satiety of these diets purely in terms of their calorie content because
the low-carbohydrate diet does not have an upper limit on calories and because advocates
claim that such diets are inherently more satiating than low-fat diets, calorie-for-calorie.
However, for the purposes of this analysis, I will assume that a 2,000 calorie, lowcarbohydrate diet is at least as satiating as a 2,000 calorie low-fat diet (if anything,
favorable to the low-fat diet). By the same token, I assume a 2,000 calorie or less lowcarb diet will, in fact, bring about weight-loss in at least some consumers. The value of
2,000 calories is used for convenience and an initial calorie target but 𝛿 will determine
the consumer’s efficient calorie target.
Finally, for the sake of tractability and visualization, I simplify the
recommendations of both the low-carbohydrate and low-fat diets such that neither diet
requires consumers to change their protein intake. This is not far from reality because
Americans’ average protein intake (15% of calories=300 calories= 75 grams, in a 2,000
calorie diet) is currently at the upper-bound of what is recommended by the USDA and is
close to the lower-bound of what some low-carbohydrate diets suggest. The two diets
differ far more significantly in their recommended proportion of calories from fat and
carbohydrates: the USDA recommends at most 30% of calories from fat and around 55%
from carbohydrate whereas low-carbohydrate recommendations translate to less than
30% carbohydrate and at least 55% fat. Thus, regardless of which diet is settled upon,
intake of some variety of fat or carbohydrate is more likely to be adjusted because of
those two macronutrients’ relative importance.
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With protein intake safely ignored, I use grams of carbohydrate and grams of fat
as the axes of the graphs in Figures 3 and 4. As in Lancaster’s article, the satiation curves
in Figure 3 are more “C”-shaped than indifference curves exhibiting non-satiation.
Vertical segments signify “open satiation”, meaning the consumer is indifferent to more
of the y-good. The positively sloped portions represent “negative satiation”, the segment
where additional units of the x-good are regarded negatively.
Most attempts to model eating behavior, including Lancaster’s, treat calories as
the most salient variable with regard to both weight-loss and satiety, preventing finergrained analysis. This application allows me to compare two or more diets whose
macronutrient composition differs substantially along the same indifference curve, as
though the consumer’s range of possible alternative diets is being chosen. The ideal diet
is the one which is the most satiating, a judgment which depends mostly on the relative
weights the consumer attaches to her two types of satiety, metabolic (a feeling of
fullness) or psychological (consistent with a plan of action). Diets located away from this
most preferred point are higher in calories as a tradeoff for that diet’s lack of overall
satiety. The inherent difficulty of precise calorie-counting indicates that this tradeoff may
occur without inexperienced consumers immediately knowing it.
The curves in Figures 3 and 4 (next two pages) represent the obese consumer’s
complete preference schedule for various diets (i.e., combinations of carbohydrate and
fat). The slope of the curve at each point measures a mix of fat and carbohydrate. All the
mixes on the curve represent potential choices in the short-term, but preferences are still
subject to updating based on actual experience. The nature of habitual consumption is
such that consumers are unlikely to jump around on the curve without some compelling
reason for doing so.
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Figure 3. Indifference Curve for Typical Consumer
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Figure 4. Indifference Curve for Atypical Consumer

The proposed framework allows for a comparison of disparate diets in terms of
the different constraints they place upon the consumer. This is analogous to studying the
likely effects of budget constraints in traditional demand analysis, but more flexible.
Food represents a relatively small proportion of the budget share for most Americans,
which means the budget line is more a matter of choice than a binding constraint
compared to most demand analysis.
Traditionally, the main “price” obese consumers have worried about is the calorie
content of their diet. The 2,000 calorie budget line is shown connecting the X and Y axes
in Figures 3 and 4. Diets can now be compared in terms of their satiety by moving along
an indifference curve. Given a calorie constraint and schedule of indifference curves, one
can also determine which mixture of macronutrients is likely to be preferred at the
constraint, according to which appears on the higher indifference curve.
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Any insights one wishes to draw from such an analysis depend heavily on the
shape of the indifference curves proposed for the representative consumer or, ideally,
various sets of consumers. It has been my contention throughout that consumers mostly
do not have full knowledge of the range of viable weight-loss diets and, as a result, their
preferences are technically incomplete and distorted in favor of methods (bundles of
characteristics) which may be inefficient or ineffectual. As a result, consumers are
unlikely to prefer options which lie a considerable ‘distance’ from the credible, USDA
option. In fact, if one visualizes the consumer standing on the point represented by her
existing habits and planning for future changes, all of her attention is likely to be in that
direction, to the exclusion of others, ultimately affecting the shape of the indifference
curves in Figure 3.
The actual shape of the consumer’s indifference curves will hinge to a great
extent on the information, beliefs and experiences she brings to her decision-making
problem. The apex of the curve in Figure 3 represents an obese consumer who plans to
follow USDA advice because she expects to lose weight and for her long-term utility to
increase. Though her current diet is satiating in the metabolic sense, she believes her
overall satiety would improve if her diet more closely resembled credible advice. It is
expected be more psychologically satiating in the short-term and to move the obese
consumer to a higher overall indifference curve over time, as positive health outcomes
accrue. She may think her metabolism will adjust, too. Low-carbohydrate diets are
dismissed or not considered viable and so do not appear on the consumer’s indifference
curves because she has either zero information or experience upon which to base her
expected utility or has been actively discouraged from learning about them.
Although the shape of the indifference curves in Figures 3 and 4 are speculative,
the exercise lends itself to some rather intuitive insights. For one, isocaloric diets (i.e.,
those which contain an equivalent number of calories) need not be equally satiating. This
is self-evident if, as an extreme example, one considers the satiating effect of 1,000
calories of white sugar versus 1,000 calories of protein or fat. This point is often
neglected, perhaps because the carbohydrate content of the USDA diet and the typical
American diet is not so different. Rational consumers may tolerate a diet that is
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significantly less satiating in the short term in exchange for an expected an increase in
long-term utility. A more satiating diet predicts improved long-term compliance, all else
equal.
In Figure 4, the obese consumer is indifferent between a 2,000 calorie lowcarbohydrate diet and a 2,000 calorie low-fat diet—they are considered equally satiating.
This represents an atypical consumer, one who is ambivalent toward both approaches but
nevertheless wishes to lose weight and is flexible enough to try most things. By
construction, the shape of the atypical consumer’s indifference curve is somewhat
provisional because she has not undertaken any sort of diet, but considers it safe to
assume that either diet might work, enough to try either for a while anyway. She is
analogous to a consumer in the “Open Mind” region of the graph in Figure 1 (p. 20). The
large difference in shape or area of the two sets of curves illustrates just how different
this atypical consumer is from the norm.
To understand the source of this difference, consider the marginal American
consumer who knows the basic tenets of a USDA diet but mostly ignores them for
whatever reason (e.g., her health is otherwise fine) and mostly eats the typical American
diet. While she is unlikely to accidentally end up eating a truly low-fat, low-calorie diet
prior to reaching her threshold, she might still make marginal changes here and there.
However, she is altogether unlikely to follow a low-carbohydrate diet for any reason both
because it differs so starkly from her existing habits and because she would perceive
doing so as unnecessarily risky. Therefore, I assume that the expected diet of an obese
consumer will generally lie in the region between the standard American diet and the
USDA diet as long as procedural rationality holds.
In Figure 3, the typical obese consumers who has a plan to change her diet will try
to make iterative substitutions in goods space to arrive at point E(N*). The more
sophisticated among these consumers are more likely to be aware of their biases in the
marketplace and will act rationally to avoid them, bringing them close to point E(N*), all
else equal, i.e., independent of short-term results. Discouraged dieters are the exception
to the typical-atypical distinction because they no longer believe in the merits of any diet
and, all else equal, their diets would revert to their old habits, close to point A.
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E(N*) is the point that the consumer expects to bring about weight loss, and its
location is unknown to the consumer at the time of crossing her threshold but assumed to
be interior to the calorie constraint. Its value depends on the underlying, unknown
metabolism of the individual, which dictates the technical utility of different
macronutrient mixes with respect to weight loss, leading to dietary uncertainty—
uncertainty regarding the technically superior diet.
Under dietary uncertainty, either a low-carbohydrate or low-fat diet may be a
strictly preferred weight loss method because of a combination of the consumer’s
underlying preferences and metabolism. The consumer has some knowledge of her
preferences but does not know which diet is best suited to her metabolism, so she does
not know with certainty which diet her future self will prefer, contributing to the
uncertainty about the true value of N* prior to any dieting behavior
When rationality holds, obese consumers who cross their thresholds and attempt
to change their habits will almost always choose a strategy meant to bring about some
combination of calorie reduction and a decrease in the proportion of calories from fat. In
cases where the consumer’s experience approximates their expected weight loss after
changing their diet, rational expected utility models hold (e.g.., Cawley, 2004). Those
consumers will remain on the weight-reducing regimen or refine their strategies, in line
with Figure 3, losing weight and increasing expected long-term utility over time until
some new equilibrium near point E(N*) is reached.
Ideally, typical consumers who do not experience weight-loss or other positive
health outcomes in the medium-term would update their beliefs to correct for metabolic
differences and embark on a different path of dietary change. But if consumers are
procedurally rational, they will not be aware of the full range of alternatives available to
them because the credible option is at the level of common knowledge (Geanakoplos,
1992).
It is tempting to argue, even assuming USDA advice is sorely mistaken, that the
existence of a variety of market-based diet alternatives would be sufficient to at least
avoid an obesity epidemic. That is, the fact that USDA advice is the most accepted does
not preclude consumers from trying other options with more proven results, nor does it
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preclude market-based dietary innovations, which have indeed emerged, though the most
popular, credible options are indeed quite similar to USDA advice (U.S. News & World
Report, 2016).
In reality, the fact that low-fat, calorie restricted diets have long-been the most
credible alternative, aided by government policy and occupational licensing laws,
narrows the boundaries of competition, limiting the variety and scope of credible options
which might otherwise find market success (Commission on Dietetic Credentialing,
2016, Young, 1993). Competition from rival hypotheses will be particularly negatively
affected because credibility cannot be shared with the government-sanctioned option.
Credibility among certain diets is therefore a rivalrous characteristic in consumption
which forces most consumers to choose the one credible option.
The most well-known low-carbohydrate diet, Atkins, enjoyed notable popularity
at a time before the federal government had taken an official position on dietary fat and
heart disease. It was notable precisely because it contradicted the advice of low-fat diets,
which were already gaining in popularity at the time. Widespread interest in Atkins’s diet
quickly faded, though never completely, and Atkins remains synonymous with the lowcarbohydrate diet although he was only modestly successful in bringing about a dietary
‘Revolution’, I suspect, consistent with my theory, that he would have had even less
success had his book come a decade later, after the Goals/Guidelines were published.
Figure 4 depicts the preferences of a consumer who is indifferent between low-fat
and low-carb methods of weight loss. This consumer has a widened consideration set
relative to the status quo consumer, she has more options to choose from but a more
difficult, uncertain choice to make. It is reminiscent of the fable of Buridian’s Ass, in
which a hungry donkey has a choice between two equally attractive piles of hay and dies
of starvation because of his indecision. The story inspired Pareto and Edgeworth to come
up with the methodology of utilitarian indifference curves that are now so common in
microeconomic analyses. Normally, the logical extension of rational choice is to arrive at
an indifference curve like the one in Figure 3, in which preferences are single-peaked and
a best choice is easily made by the agent.
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In a way, Figure 4 depicts a scenario that is more consistent with a theory of
obesity based on an obese consumer’s lack of self-control compared to Figure 3. Selfcontrol theories implicitly assume the full-range of options for action are known to the
consumer. In Figure 3 the consumer ‘knows’ what she is supposed to choose and is
assumed to fail in the choosing. If consumers’ have complete knowledge of their range of
alternatives and still remain obese, self-control, rather than lack of knowledge, is a
defensible hypothesis because the basic requirements for rational behavior are already
met. In the absence of such knowledge, assuming that consumers lack self-control is
premature.
Figures 3 and 4 both depict the difficulty of choosing to follow an unpopular diet.
Economists typically assume preferences are fixed because they rarely change drastically
and the sources of change are difficult to detect empirically. A radical change in
preferences may require changes in beliefs, and a willingness to ignore trusted
institutions, authorities, and even friends, all of which are psychologically costly. Even if
the results of such a change are initially positive, remaining on such a diet still requires
patience, self-control and continued confidence in one’s results. As a result, the size of
the region between the two curves, though large, may still understate the difficulty of
changing one’s preferences. The consumer has to, in effect, ‘bend’ her preferences while
various credible institutions try to bend them the other way.
Therefore, I hypothesize that only in rare cases will consumers actively choose to
contravene the rules given by nutrition or health authorities precisely because those same
authorities have long-emphasized the supposed risks of violating their advice. Figure 3
depicts satiation curves with shapes that seem consistent with a reality where consumers
believe there is a strong, negative association between saturated fat intake and
cardiovascular health. Their failure to stay at the locus of the curve is the result of
satisficing behavior based on incomplete information. At the margin, behavioral biases
are relevant but remediable. In comparing Figure 3 to Figure 4, one gets a sense of how
much consumer preferences would need to change in order for consumers to credibly
consider weight-loss options that differ substantially from USDA advice, especially
regarding fat intake.
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I further hypothesize that the discrepancy in preferences between Figure 3 and 4
is a rough measure of the unwarranted certainty that permeates policy, the market and the
obesity literature. That is, Figure 3 is a depiction of preferences based on a false sense of
nutritional certainty which has led to preferences which bear some resemblance to
credible advice. In Figure 4, the consumer knows she is uncertain about the best course of
action, so she is not out of the woods, but she has a rough map of them—a range of
options. In the scenario depicted in Figure 3, she has a segment of that map with a
theoretical way out that she nevertheless believes to be the whole thing, possibly
preventing an efficient escape.
While surprise functions are theoretically appealing, they are difficult to apply in
this context because there is, by definition, little room for surprising results following
habitual behavior. Neither low-carbohydrate nor low-fat diets promise immediate weightloss so even short-term weight-loss requires some patience and consistency. Since
feedback is not immediate and is subject to interpretation, the possibility of true surprise
is exceedingly low. Few consumers who decide to undertake a dietary change would do
so if they did not think there was some probability of success.
The concept may be salvaged using a thought experiment similar to an earlier
one: If a consumer were told by an omniscient individual that she (the consumer) lost
weight in the future by following an unspecified diet, how surprised would her current
self be if a given diet worked, either in theory or in practice? That is, the consumer might
be surprised by her ability to conform to the diet (e.g., due to unfamiliarity) or by the fact
that the advice was actually reliable in the first place, because of her current beliefs.
The Role of Uncertainty in the Institutional Food Environment
If uncertainty is indeed a ‘real’ problem in this domain, the satiation curves
(preferences) in Figure 3 are the result of a path-dependent learning process whose
boundaries were unnecessarily and inefficiently restricted decades ago because relevant,
credible, stakeholders in the nutrition domain, including policymakers, prematurely
adopted a universal nutrition standard (Stack & Gartland, 2003, p. 487) and continue to
ignore contradictory evidence and dissenting viewpoints (Hite, 2011). There is little
argument about the lack of meaningful changes to the USDA Guidelines since they were
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first adopted in 1980 but this alone is not sufficient evidence from which to conclude that
that they, or any other single government policy, have “misshapen” preferences in the
hypothesized way.
According to critics, the McGovern Committee’s decision to endorse one
approach to healthy eating for all Americans and discourage most others was enough to
settle or stifle most remaining scientific debate about important diet-related, and often
inter-related, health issues such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes and obesity.
According to Taubes (2007), passage of the Guidelines set in motion what amounts to a
now decades-long experiment, testing the “calories in/calories out” hypothesis of obesity
on the American public.
Although this may appear to be an extraordinary claim, it should be less-so to
economists and policy analysts. According to Tullock (1971) there is a degree of publicness to any government decision in the sense that the government will underprovide the
care needed to insure that its decisions are, indeed, correct and not overly burdensome.
There is a similar insight out of the emerging field of behavioral political economy which
says that even if policymakers recognize an opportunity to incorporate behavioral
economics into policy, should it be assumed that they will not fall prey to similar
behavioral shortcomings, among others, in trying to design those corrective policies?
Among the other behavioral shortcomings of policymakers, the outsized influence
of “pressure groups” (Olson 1971) is under-explored in this policy area. If it is the case
that, by passing the Guidelines, the government inefficiently redistributed credibility in
favor of one viewpoint (thereby reducing the credibility of contradictory or otherwise
competitive viewpoints), then any pressure groups associated with the credible viewpoint
would likely increase in stature and attempt to further their agenda by attracting research
dollars and erecting barriers to competition.
According to Hite (2011) this is more or less how the situation has played out.
Consistent with the economic literature on occupational licensing, 45 states, the District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico, now have regulations regarding, or laws prohibiting, the
practice of dietetics without proper certification (Commission on Dietetic Credentialing,
2016). Certification is handled by the Committee on Dietetic Registration, the
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credentialing agency for the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, which certifies
university programs in nutrition education. RDs make up the majority of the Dietary
Guidelines Advisory Committee. RDs are also the professionals to whom obese patients
are likely to be referred by their doctors. Not surprisingly, up until relatively recently, the
majority of government-sponsored observational, interventional and clinical nutrition
research was devoted to testing or measuring the efficacy of low-fat, low-calorie diets.
Earlier, I discussed the well-known perverse effects that occupational licensing
can have on economic efficiency due to reduced competition and innovation.
Nevertheless, in the economics of obesity literature most researchers have implicitly
assumed that the role of nutritionists in shaping policy has been benign, a view more
consistent with old political science theories and older institutionalists like J.R. Commons
on the proper role of pressure groups in shaping social outcomes. By implicitly assuming
the government endorsed the ‘correct’ viewpoint, as Cawley (2004), for example, does,
economists ignore the ways in which nutritionists and other authorities have acted to
shape the policy debate, as well as the economic and institutional landscape, in their own
favor (Olson, 1971).
Theoretically, once an RD or other nutrition professional endorses a particular
viewpoint she has an economic and reputational interest in seeing that it is not
contradicted, whether she is making policy or advising a patient. If word were to get out
that patients seeing a competitor had drastically better outcomes while following wholly
different advice, the RD’s career would be short-lived. Reputational incentives may help
to explain why USDA advice has remained so consistent despite its apparent lack of
efficacy. This tendency is further encouraged by the difficulty of even assessing a
patient’s actual compliance with advice.
In addition to government and nutrition professionals, the popular media have
also acted to shape how consumers think about nutrition issues. They report the results of
nutrition studies, often without proper clarification or beneath sensational headlines. The
studies themselves are almost always observational or on animals other than humans.
Until recently, most nutrition research was directed at confirming the recommendations
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within the Guidelines rather than subjecting them to rigorous testing, much less testing of
alternative theories.
Compared to the above-mentioned institutions and their associated actors, the role
played by firms has been more reactionary. No doubt firms act to influence policies
demarcating which foods are deemed healthy and unhealthy, how foods are labelled, and
so on. But firms are at least somewhat constrained in their actions by widespread,
credible opinions on proper nutrition. This may be why old food advertising extolling the
health benefits of foods like lard, vegetable shortening, and white sugar are considered
comical today, now supplanted by others earnestly extolling the virtues of olive oil,
coconut oil and artificial sweeteners.
At this juncture, it is not as though food firms could credibly embark upon their
own nutrition research because any worthwhile research is likely to prove their product
“safe and effective” but even honest reporting of the results (particularly if they differ
from credible advice) is likely to be met with skepticism, undermining the predicted
efficiency of the initial research investment. This is over and above the public good
problems inherent to funding research that is likely to benefit competitors, of course.
Policy and Research Implications
In the previous chapter, I summarized some of the research suggesting that
nutritionists have been pursuing an unfertile area of obesity research and that a diversity
of viewpoints regarding the causes of obesity have been stifled for a long time. Past
economic research on obesity has treated nutrition science itself as a sort of “black box”
whose output can be used to understand consumers and design policy. Though I am far
from an expert on nutrition or obesity, my reading of that literature (along with my own
experience) suggests that more social scientists interested in obesity would do well to
study the inner-workings of this black box. Outsiders are likely not in a position to
correct disciplinary issues but, if groupthink is a relevant concern, they may be the only
ones able to “see” the problem and point it out in the first place.
When it comes to America’s obesity epidemic, the relevant policy question is:
Was the government’s decision to monopolize the credibility of one consumption
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technology (and market it to the general public) utility-enhancing, on net, compared to
plausible alternative arrangements, including no endorsement at all?
My model allows for the possibility that the federal government acted
prematurely in advocating an unproven theory of diet and health. If true, the most
obvious policy implication is that the government should never have done so and should
have instead waited for more evidence to accrue before re-considering such actions. If
uncertainty remains a real but unacknowledged problem in obesity research, the policy
response would ideally be to fund research reassessing the scientific evidence objectively,
including outsider viewpoints. If necessary, new research explicitly testing these rival
hypotheses should be funded. Not long after writing Good Calories, Bad Calories,
Taubes founded a non-profit with the purpose of funding research doing exactly that.
If uncertainty is of real concern, another possible policy response might be to
intentionally reduce the credibility attached to conventional dietary wisdom, thereby
expanding consumers’ range of choice over both commitment devices and food
characteristics. The latest version of the Guidelines does not inspire confidence that the
federal government will change course any time soon. Public health, economic and policy
researchers have been preoccupied with incorporating behavioral anomalies into their
models of eating behavior for some time now, but even in combination, they are
incapable of explaining more than a fraction of the dramatic increase in obesity’s
prevalence. So long as certainty regarding the proper consumption technology is
assumed, there are few other obvious avenues of research in this area.
This is not an optimistic outlook but it is consistent with accepted theories of how
institutions, government, and policy tend to interact (North, 1991). Economists tend to
stress the positive value in most institutions other than government, perhaps because the
negative aspects of various social institutions including markets often stand out and
receive more emphasis elsewhere in society. All else equal, voluntary institutions are
preferred to government as sources for rulemaking authority, particularly regarding the
proper way to live one’s life.
The model above assumes that the interaction between government and credible
nutrition institutions has been rather dysfunctional for at least 36 years. Although public
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policy may not have been necessary for the present situation to occur, government action
probably made it more likely. When the Guidelines were passed, some uncertainty
arguably remained regarding various relationships between diet and health—there was
some room for disagreement among credible professionals. By passing the Guidelines,
the credibility of a subset of those experts became associated with that government
advice and the credibility of the field as a whole. This agreement signals to consumers
that the advice being offered on federally mandated nutrition labels and by licensed RDs
is basically the same and should be considered credible while rivals are considered
incredible. Since licensed RDs enjoy a competitive edge, would-be nutritionists are
funneled into RD programs that teach them to think in a way consistent with federal
advice.
In a counterfactual world in which the McGovern Committee chose not to weigh
in at all on what constitutes healthy dietary advice, the field of nutrition may or may not
have taken a different path. Scientists who disagreed with the low-fat consensus may
have felt more confident in questioning a status quo that was not endorsed and funded by
the government. Consumers and would-be nutritionists might have experimented with a
wider variety of remedies. Over the course of 35 years, it is impossible to predict what
direction nutrition research, nutrition policy or society would have taken. Of course, I
cannot reject the possibility that the same institutional rules would have come about
through means other than official government endorsement.
So long as public policy continues to grant monopoly privileges to one nutrition
paradigm, it is hard to imagine how competing paradigms could possibly carve out a
sizeable “market-share”. This designation has meant that, up until relatively recently,
most nutrition research has tended to study the precise benefits of eating in a way
consistent with USDA advice or the costs of not doing so. As a result, proponents of
typical nutrition advice have a much larger body of research to refer to when trying to
attract clients. Critics will argue that these studies do not prove anything definitive, but
the nature of reputation, experts, and credence goods means that consumers are unlikely
to know the difference between “good” and “bad” research, just as they cannot
distinguish between experts and quacks in other contexts (Sandford, 2010).
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Furthermore, Horner (2002) points out that consumers can observe other
consumers in order to determine whether a given firm is as high in quality as it appears—
i.e., to determine whether the firm’s reputation is deserved or not. Since low-calorie, lowfat diets remain the most credible option by far (U.S. News & World Report, 2016),
consumers interested in losing weight would need to take something of a ‘leap of faith’ in
order to determine whether the promises made by other diet peddlers are reputable,
making incredible options unlikely to be among the highest ranked options.
A further complication in the study of obesity is the evolution of the American
healthcare system, which is likely to continue to encourage more of the same thinking
and advice. As part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), many chain restaurants are, or
will be, required to print nutrition information along with their menu items, in order to
comply with Section 4205 of the ACA, which also requires restaurants to register with
the FDA so that it may monitor compliance. The FDA estimated that the total costs of the
final requirements for the rule would be between $311 and $481 million initially and
between $28 and $81 million per year.
In their assessment of the costs and benefits of the rule, the FDA notes, “Abaluck
(2011) is the only study that translates the potential effect of increasing nutrition
information on consumption into estimates of welfare gains using willingness-to-pay
based on revealed preferences” (FDA, 2014, p. 64). He estimates that extending nutrition
labels to restaurants will result in an average of $116 (2011 dollars) per year per label
user. The FDA argues that Abaluck’s estimate for consumer’s willingness to pay for
additional labeling is too low because the new rule covers more than just restaurant
menus and adjust their model accordingly. It will be interesting to observe whether the
new rule leads to the between $5.8 billion (7% discount rate) and $8.1 billion (3%
discount rate) in net benefits of the next 20 years (p. 78).
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Chapter 4. Empirical Estimation
Introduction
In this chapter I investigate the ways in which American food and dietary
preferences may have changed over time. In the first section, I perform a content analysis
of historical American cookbooks to determine whether Americans preferred a different
array of food items between the post-colonial period and the early 20th century versus the
period from the middle of the 20th century to the present. In the second section, unrelated
to obesity, I replicate Butler (1982), modelling the relationship between the social stigma
of food stamp participation and food expenditure.
I employ two approaches to analyze the preferences and behavior of the American
public, based on data from the Dietary Health and Knowledge Survey (DHKS) phone
survey conducted by the USDA from 1994 to 1996. First, I use standard regression
analysis to model the association between consumer beliefs about diet and health and
their consumption behavior, based on their individual characteristics. The results indicate
that consumers were relatively well-informed about the tenets of eating in a healthy
manner at that time and that their consumption behavior was roughly consistent with
those beliefs. The implications of these findings, in light of the obesity epidemic that has
emerged in the interim, are discussed.
Finally, I use a finite mixture modelling (FMM) procedure to investigate whether
American consumers might be better modelled as belonging to one of various
subpopulations, rather than being treated as a homogenous group with respect to their
food and health preferences. I construct models of the demand for five different nutrients
(calories, total fat, carbohydrate, cholesterol, and protein) which are similar to the earlier
regression model. My results show that American consumers can be appropriately
modelled as though they belong to one of three subpopulations for all nutrients but
protein, which appears to have two. I show that behavioral predictions are highly
sensitive to the parameters that are used to model a given subpopulation because both the
value and statistical significance of the variables in the model differ substantially between
subpopulations.
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Section 1.
Introduction
The prevailing narrative used to explain and understand obesity often emphasizes
the ways in which consumers’ consumption plans fall short of their long-term health
preferences. The relatively rapid and steady rise in obesity’s prevalence suggests that
there may be a larger issue with how American preferences have evolved. As discussed
above, the mainstream view holds that changes to the modern food environment make it
exceedingly difficult for Americans to cultivate habits that lead to weight loss.
The source and reason for widespread changes in social habits is theoretically and
empirically different to explain (Hodgson 2003). Most economists theorize that economic
growth and change are, ultimately, demand-driven phenonena. Therefore, the modern
food environment itself may have come about because of an earlier change to the overall
environment, such as changes in society’s beliefs about the safety of consuming certain
foods or food characteristics. In order to determine the extent to which this is true, data
on preferences in the pre-modern era is required. Below, I use content analysis to arrive
at a rough picture of what Americans preferred to eat long before obesity became a
widespread public health problem.
Content Analysis of American Cookbooks
Content analysis “describes a family of analytic approaches ranging from
impressionistic, intuitive, interpretive analyses to systematic, strict textual analyses”
(Hsieh 2005, p. 1277) and “qualitative content analysis is defined as a research method
for the subjective interpretation of the content of textdata through the systematic
classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh 2005, p.
1278). Here, I peform a qualitative content analysis of 874 American cookbooks written
between 1814 and 1939.
The data come from the website Archive.org, which publishes books and other
documents that have entered the public domain. All cookbooks were categorized under
the subject heading “American Cookery”, which initially included over 1,000 books. Not
all results included a text document for analysis and not all books were strictly or mainly
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about cooking or food, and were therefore discarded from the sample. Others were
published since the 1950s and are too recent to be considered in my sample, leading to
my sample size of 874.
My theoretical motivation for using this sample is that cookbooks should convey
some information about the preferences of the consumers for whom they are intended.
Further, authors must convince publishers to print their work so they, in turn, must have
had some economic rationale for agreeing to do so. It stands to reason that books
appearing on Archive.org were more popular or at least more widely published than their
counterparts who do not appear. This could introduce some bias if unpopular cookbooks
are included in the sample because they would not reflect broad social preferences.
However, it seems more likely that the most popular cookbooks are the ones that
survived and were eventually uploaded to the internet.
I used the software program RStudio and the R programming language (R Core
Team, 2016) to compile and “clean” the texts of punctuation and extraneous, common
words. The output of this exercise was a matrix of term frequencies and their associated
documents. Many of the remaining terms had nothing to do with food and were
discarded.
My aim was to detect broad trends in American preferences so it was important to
remove food-related words whose meanings are ambiguous with respect to nutrient
content, which required some judgement. Most adjectives had to be removed for this
reason. For example, the word “creamy” might refer to a dish with heavy cream in it or to
the texture of a dish that contains little dairy or fat. “Cream”, on the other hand, is more
likely to refer to the actual ingredient.
Some terms that did refer to food had to be removed because the range of
characteristics associated with them was too varied. “Salad” and its variations was one of
the most frequently used words but, particularly during this period, includes various meat
salads and other mayonaisse heavy dishes—a far cry from the image the word conjures
up today.
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More practically, some words were similar enough nutritionally and qualitatively
that they can be treated as equivalent. Spelling variations are the most obvious example:
sweets, sweet, and sweeten all become “sweet”. I collapsed the word “sugar” into this
term as well. Similarly “Jam” and “Jelly” were converted to the single term “jamjelly”
and “poultry” “chicken” and “birds” were combined into the made-up term
“poultchickbird”, and so on. The total number of terms is a manageable 284.
Mine is what Hsieh and Shannon (2005) call a summative content analysis
because I am subjectively identifying keywords in the texts under study. It is therefore
rather rudimentary. Future work could take up the task of comparing this corpus of texts
to a modern equivalent in order to get a clearer understanding of changes over time.
Unfortunately, I did not have access to a comparison body of texts in the public domain.
The word cloud below depicts the 50% of terms that were used most frequently
over the sample populatoin. The larger a word is, the more frequently it occurs in the
sample.There are many familiar food items but some appear more prominent than they
might in cookbooks printed today, such as eggs, cream or butter. These are more likely to
take the form of foods that contain less saturated fat, such as olive oil or half and half.
Words like flour, bake, and bread are quite familiar and likely have not changed as much
in prominence over time. It is unclear whether terms like “meat” or “poultchickbird”
(i.e., all poultry) would have risen or fallen in popularity, given the increased popularity
of lean meats and vegetable-based diets.
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Figure 5. Word Cloud of Top Half of Terms

To get some sense of how consumer tastes developed over the 125-year period, I
decided to try the same exercise on separate halves of the data, cookbooks from18141877 and 1878-1932. In the remainder of this section, I refer to them as the “early” and
“late” periods. No clear, visual trends emerge but this may simply reflect the lack of
detail that this method allows for.
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Figure 6. Word Cloud of Top Half of Early Terms
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Figure 7. Word Cloud of Top Half of Late Terms

For a clearer picture of which of these terms was most popular over the three
intervals, I produced a word cloud plotting the 100 most popular terms for each. This is
only a slight refinement over the word clouds above since the dataset contains only 284
terms to begin with. There are not many changes but the words “fried”, “cake”, “cream”,
“bake”, “sweet”, and “eggs” all appear to have increased in size, an indication of their
relative frequency within the cloud.
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Figure 8. Word Cloud of Top 100 Terms
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Figure 9. Word Cloud of Top 100 Early Terms
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Figure 10. Word Cloud of Top 100 Late Terms

Below, I plot the 25 most used terms from each period on its own bar graph.
Again, there is little evidence for significant change over the period considering the seven
highest-ranked terms are sweet, butter, eggs, flour, milk, bake, and cream in that same
order. A lack of change in popularity should not be too surprising when many of these
same terms are likely to be prominent in modern cookbooks. Exceptions that are pertinent
to the present study might include ‘sweet’, given increased worry about the dangers of
sugar, ‘butter’, ‘eggs’, ‘cream’, ‘yolks’, ‘fried’, and ‘meat’, because of increased worry
about the dangers of cholesterol and fat, particularly saturated fat.

99

Table 1. Frequency of 25 Most Used Terms
500000
450000
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000

150000
100000
50000
0

Table 2. Frequency of 25 Most Used Early Terms
60000

50000

40000

30000

20000

10000

0

100

Table 3. Frequency of 25 Most Used Late Terms
450000
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0

While the results in this section do not reveal anything groundbreaking about the
evolution of American food preferences over the time period, the advent of nutrition
advice and common experience suggest that some of these ingredients have probably
fallen in popularity since these cookbooks were published. Butter probably ceded some
market share to margarine in the middle of the 20th century, which has since given way to
olive oil or coconut oil as the preferred, healthy cooking fats in some circles. Sugar may
have lost some of its market to artificial sweeteners for similar reasons. The same logic
could apply to eggs, cream and meat, none of which are necessarily easy to fit into a
USDA-style diet.
The reason for the rise or fall in consumption of any of these items is open to
considerable interpretation and speculation but would be difficult to test for empirically
without much better data. Have Americans shied away from eggs and butter because they
have become more health-conscious, because sugar and starch have gotten cheaper, or
because their basic tastes have or have not changed over time? Further research is needed
to answer such questions, particularly research comparing this period to the present day.
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The nature of preferences, habits, and institutions mean that precise, reliable relationships
will be hard to measure.
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Section 2.
Measuring the Effect of Stigma on Food Stamp Participation and Spending
Here, I replicate Butler’s (1982) work by measuring the effect of social stigma on
Americans’ decision to enroll in what was then called the Food Stamp program, and is
now called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). I do so using a
dataset published by the USDA derived from the Dietary Health and Knowledge Survey,
conducted between 1994 and 1996, comprising over 5,000 respondents. Fortunately, the
survey respondents answered many similar questions to those asked in Butler’s study,
which was more directly related to the Food Stamp Program.
The equations I test are based on the variables included in Butler’s “Preferred
Model” (p.122) for food stamp expenditures, reproduced below. In several cases, I was
forced to use a different variable to measure a similar concept. The DHKS did not ask
respondents for their state of residence but their region was coded. There is no “cashout
site” because these were specific to the study upon which Butler’s data was based. The
categorization “rural” was not used but, rather, the respondent’s relation to a
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) so I coded respondents outside of MSAs as rural
even though this may not be strictly true. Respondents were not asked how often they get
out but were asked how often they go food shopping, variables which could plausibly be
positively correlated so I use it instead. Positive and negative health effects were also not
measured but individuals were asked about their health status, which I used to create
dummy variables dividing them into positive and negative affect. Subjects were not asked
whether they had a car available so I cannot include that variable.
In order to control for differences in prices, I consulted the Department of Labor’s
(DOL) Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE). In Butler’s paper, he uses their figures for
elderly, single-member households to construct regional price indices. I was unable to
find these exact figures and, instead, constructed my own regional price index for food
and non-food items based on average expenditures for similar households between 1994
and 1996. The DOL did have national average expenditures for the elderly (65 and over)
and single-member households. I first took the average of these two figures from 19941996. In order to control for regional differences in prices, I used the DOL’s figures on
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the average regional food and total expenditures per household, which was not brokendown by household size. Taking the mean of the 4 regions (Northeast, Midwest, South,
and West) and dividing each region’s average total expenditures by that number produced
an appropriate adjustment factor. Fortunately, the DHKS did ask for fairly specific
income and food expenditure information. The DOL numbers are shown in Tables 4 and
5, below. Table 6 (next page) provides a comparison of Butler’s original model and the
one I was able to create using the DHKS data set.
Table 4. Average Food Expenditures
Food
NE
S
W
MW

>65 Avg.
3339
3339
3339
3339

Single
Avg.
2520.67
2520.67
2520.67
2520.67

Mean
2929.83
2929.83
2929.83
2929.83

Price
Region
Adjustment Final
4839
1.056 3094.01
4318
0.942 2761.08
4761
1.039 3044.35
4410
0.962 2819.90

Table 5. Average Non-Food Expenditures
NonFood
NE

Mean

Region

22935

Single
Avg.
19604.7

21269.8

S

22935

19604.7

W

22935

MW

22935

>65 Avg.

33240.3

Price
Adjustment
1.011

21504.2

21269.8

31077.0

0.945

20104.9

19604.7

21269.8

35439.7

1.078

22927.0

19604.7

21269.8

31755.0

0.967

20543.3
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Final

Table 6. Butler Model Comparison
Butler Variable

DHKS

participation

fs_rcv12

black

black

Anyone receive food stamps in last
year?
1 if race is black

Age 70-74

age70

1 if age between 70 and 74

Age>75

age75

1 if age is 75 or more

Two or more in household

hhtwo

1 if household is 2 or more people

Negative affect (0-5)

neghealth

1 if health rating is 1 or 2

Positive affect (0-5)

poshealth

1 if health rating is 3, 4 or 5

Male head of household

headman

1 if head of household is a man

Female head of household

headwom

1 if head of household is a woman

Log-income

logincome

Natural log of income

Getting SSI

minc_s2

Any member of hh receiving SSI

New York, South Carolina

region
dummies

Northwest, Midwest, South, West

Hispanic

hispanic

1 if of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban,
or other Hispanic descent

Education 8-11 yrs

grade8

1 if highest grade level is 8-11

Education ≥12 yrs

grade12

1 if highest grade level is 12 or greater

Rural

rural

Out daily
Out often

shp_alot
shp_often

1 = More than once a week
2 = Once a week

Out some

Shp_some

3 = Once every two weeks

Food budget
Log-price non-food

annufoodexp
lognonfood
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Explanation

1 if outside MSA

Total Food Budget1
Log of DOL nonfood budget

Continued From Table 6.

1

N/A

shp_groc

Expenditures on groceries last 3
months

N/A

shp_grou

Unit of Time

N/A

shp_nonf

Non-food grocery expenditures past 3
months

N/A

shp_nonu

Unit of Time

N/A

shp_spec

N/A

shp_speu

Expenditures on specialty foods past 3
months
Unit of Time

N/A

shp_fast

Expenditures on fast food

N/A

shp_fasu

Unit of Time

N/A

shp_away

Other Food expenditures away from
home

N/A

shp_awau

Unit of Time

=[shp_groc*shp_grou][shp_nonf*shp_nonu]+[shp_spec*shp_speu]+[shp_fast*shpfasu]

+[shp_away*shpawau]*4
Table 7 (next page) reports the results of estimating my food expenditure model.
In the original regression, northeast, west, south, grade8, grade12, rural, and neghealth
were omitted due to collinearity and so the estimation was performed again without them.
The model has an adjust R-squared of 0.1712. Variables that were significant at the 5%
level are double-starred.
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Table 7. Stigma Model Estimation Results
annufoodexp
fs_rcv12

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

p-value

[95% Conf.

Interval]

-164.46

37.70

-4.36

<0.001

-238.37

-90.55

41.57

67.39

0.62

0.537

-90.54

173.69

-124.05

51.10

-2.43

0.015

-224.23

-23.86

3.32

111.48

0.03

0.976

-215.22

221.87

Logincome**

371.63

27.70

13.42

<0.001

317.33

425.94

minc_s2

20.47

24.50

0.84

0.404

-27.57

68.51

age70**

-336.92

87.82

-3.84

<0.001

-509.08

-164.76

age75**

-315.51

78.24

-4.03

<0.001

-468.90

-162.12

onemanhh

-228.52

162.78

-1.40

0.160

-547.64

90.59

Malehhh

-37.62

78.35

-0.48

0.631

-191.23

115.98

Hhtwo**

465.08

128.26

3.63

<0.001

213.63

716.53

Hispanic

-9.27

80.95

-0.11

0.909

-167.95

149.42

Midwest

6.70

48.89

0.14

0.891

-89.15

102.56

shp_alot**

-866.32

72.22

-12.00

<0.001

-1007.91

-724.74

shp_often**

-914.81

59.26

-15.44

<0.001

-1030.98

-798.65

shp_some

-79.59

63.46

-1.25

0.210

-204.01

44.82

Lognonfood**

5044.25

833.98

6.05

<0.001

3409.27

6679.22

Logrefbudget**

-2855.99

862.42

-3.31

0.001

-4546.71

-1165.26

Poshealth

-47.95

42.14

-1.14

0.255

-130.57

34.67

constant**

-29142.37

4357.85

-6.69

<0.001

-37685.64

-20599.09

b_race
headman**
headwom

These results mirror much of what Butler found: income is significant, as is
household size, the price of food and non-food items, old age, living in a household of
one male. The negative coefficient on the food stamp participation may serve as a rough
measure of stigma in this model. More generally, the above results show that decisions
relating to food expenditure can be quite complex and difficult to model.
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Section 3.
Introduction
My purpose in this section is to test whether there is a relationship between
individuals’ knowledge, beliefs, and priorities regarding a healthy diet, their eating
decisions and, ultimately, eating habits. It is an attempt to measure individuals’ actual
preferences for a healthy diet, relative to their own claimed beliefs, knowledge, and
priorities as well as to that of a “healthy” diet defined by a nutrition authority, in this case
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), the agencies that have released the Dietary Guidelines for
Americans every five years since 1985, as mandated by Section 301 of the National
Nutrition Monitoring and Related Research Act of 1990 (7 U.S.C. 5341). HHS’s Office
of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (ODPH) had the administrative leadership
for the 2015 edition of the Guidelines, with support from the USDA’s Center for
Nutrition Policy and Promotion in Committee. HHS and USDA also appoint a panel of
experts in the field of nutrition, the Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee (DGAC),
“consisting of nationally recognized experts in the field of nutrition and health” (Dietary
Guidelines for Americans, 2015).
Economic theory argues that Americans will make consumption choices in
accordance with their preferences, based on the information they have at their disposal
(Allen, 2001, Beales et al., 1981, Stigler, 1961). Americans who face uncertainty with
respect to losing weight or eating an otherwise healthy diet have ready access to
information that should allow for them to remedy this problem, assuming they find it
utility-enhancing to do so in the first place.
In this paper, I assume individuals have a preference for maintaining a healthy,
normal weight, all else equal. I also assume that they may be endowed with food
preferences that lead to the gradual onset of obesity. Given their personal incentive to
avoid or alleviate their condition, economic theory suggests that obese individuals seek
out information and, if feasible, go about aligning their short-term preferences to their
long-term goals.

108

Data
I rely on the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Dietary Health
and Knowledge Survey (DHKS) 1994-1996, a sub-survey of their Continuing Survey on
Individual Intake (CSFII). The DHKS was ultimately administered to 5,765 respondents
who answered a battery of questions about the foods they ate, their individual health
characteristics and demographics, and their knowledge and beliefs surrounding food,
nutrients, vitamins, and minerals. Respondents were asked for their food intake on two
separate days, which I averaged to proxy their average meal (i.e., what the individual eats
habitually).
My hypotheses are that consumers who claim to have more knowledge, better
beliefs, and who place a higher priority on nutrition in their buying decisions will act
accordingly—they will eat healthier compared to a similar individual without those
characteristics. Again, “health” is defined and assessed by a nutrition authority in the
form of the USDA, whose questions go into some detail about what respondents think
about particular macronutrients, foods and their associated health problems. I also
hypothesize that respondents who engage in other healthy behaviors (such as exercise and
not smoking) will eat more healthily, all else equal.
I further hypothesize that consumers with diet-related health problems and other
demographic characteristics will be more likely to know about and follow the healthy
diet. Individuals with higher body-mass indexes (BMIs) have an incentive to seek out
information and use it to lose weight. I predict that older individuals will eat more
healthily since they are more likely to know about and have direct or indirect experience
with diet-related illnesses making the incentives associated with eating well more
temporally relevant. I am unsure of what the effect of education, income, or other
demographic variables will be because food represents a relatively small expenditure in
American households and these other considerations may override pure income or
education effects.
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Summary Statistics
Summarizing the data, the average woman in the survey population is age 46, 5'4"
tall, weighs 177 pounds and has BMI of 28.6. The average man in the survey population
is age 44, 5' 10" tall, weighs 187 pounds and has a BMI of 27.0, putting both in the
“overweight” categorization. The USDA Guidelines recommend that the average
American consume 2,000 calories per day, 55% coming from carbohydrate, 15% from
protein and 30% of energy from fat, including less than 10% from saturated fat. The table
and summary statistics below and on the following page seem to indicate that Americans
were not too far from these recommendations at the time of the survey.
Table 8. Mean Macronutrient Intake of Survey Population
Macronutrient (g)

W

M

%Cal(W)

%Cal(M)

Carbohydrate

209.13

294.86

51.46

48.41

Protein

62.51

95.91

15.38

15.75

Total fat

59.97

92.44

33.21

34.15

Calories

1625.29

2436.44

110

Table 9. Summary Statistics, All variables
Nutrient

Mean

Linearized Std.
Error

calories

2014.12

21.75

1970.26

2057.98

grade

14.09

0.20

13.68

14.49

height

67.17

0.09

66.98

67.36

foodstamp

0.13

0.02

0.09

0.16

age

45.22

0.43

44.36

46.08

sex

0.52

0.01

0.50

0.54

race

1.37

0.04

1.29

1.44

bmi_sp

27.84

0.26

27.32

28.36

exercise

3.84

0.05

3.75

3.93

health

2.37

0.02

2.33

2.42

knowledge

3.44

0.02

3.41

3.48

priosafe

3.86

0.01

3.83

3.88

prionutr

3.62

0.02

3.59

3.66

priopric

3.28

0.02

3.23

3.33

priokeep

3.50

0.02

3.45

3.54

prioease

3.14

0.02

3.10

3.18

priotast

3.84

0.01

3.82

3.87

lcdiet

0.07

0.00

0.06

0.08

smk_100

0.50

0.01

0.48

0.52

smk_now

0.25

0.01

0.24

0.27

urb

1.89

0.02

1.84

1.94

income

42055.59

951.08

40137.55

43973.63
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[95% Conf. Interval]

The THANKS Model of Dietary Decision-Making
To measure the extent to which demand for different nutrients is a function of the
consumers’ personal characteristics, I focus on predicting consumption quantities of
calories. I expect that individuals who are more health-minded, in that they know more or
place a higher priority on nutrition in their purchasing decisions, will eat fewer calories.
Those who derive greater utility from other considerations (e.g., taste) are hypothesized
to eat more calories, all else equal. The federal government has been consistent in
recommending low-calorie, low-fat diets for individuals suffering from overweight or
obesity and healthy individuals wishing to avoid chronic disease since the original
publication of the Guidelines in 1980.
The Guidelines, along with other health authorities, provide consumers with a set
of acts for consumers in various states, which are themselves a function of past actions
and nature. Nutrition information also provides a simple consequence function for
individuals wishing to lose weight wherein calories consumed and expended are the
primary variables. Because dietary advice is a credence good (Dulleck, Kerschbamer,
2006), a rational consumer presumably attaches a high probability to the belief that the
advice they receive correctly maps acts to their corresponding states. Consumers also
have a utility function which measures the utility derived from the various possible
consequences of their acts (Hirshleifer, 1992).
In the language of uncertainty (since consumers are not assumed to be nutrition
experts), the Guidelines are one tool (among many, similar, market-provided ones)
available to weight-conscious consumers (i.e., those who rank the utility of losing weight
highly) which enjoys a credible consequence function that will allow said consumers to
navigate the market for food, improve their diets, and lose weight.
The DHKS asked a long list of potentially pertinent questions to ascertain
respondents’ nutritional knowledge. To refine my model, I performed a linear regression,
with the correct survey probability weights attached and a long list of potentially relevant
questions about different foods and nutrients. A factor analysis revealed five factors with
Eigen Values greater than 1, each corresponding to a much smaller subset (2-6 questions)
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of the dozens of knowledge questions. These were readily collapsed into 5 individual
variables which I initially labelled: knowledge, sugar, priority, labeluse, and labelme.
Likert scales
The series of questions that make up the ‘knowledge’ variable ask if consumers
personally believe in the importance of maintaining a healthy weight, of eating a diet
with moderate amounts of sugar, foods low in saturated fat, low in overall fat, a diet low
in cholesterol and one with plenty of carbohydrate-containing foods on a 1 (not at all
important) to 4 (very important). Since a higher number corresponds to better knowledge
for each question, the average of those six responses should give some indication of how
knowledgeable the respondent is about the tenets of USDA advice.
The six priority questions ask for the importance respondents’ attach to: safety,
nutrition, price, food keeping well, ease of preparation and taste in their buying decisions,
again on a 1 (not important) to 4 (very important) Likert scale. Since my intention with
this study is to test the effect of nutrition priorities on consumption, independently of
other priorities, treating the ‘priority’ variable as representing a single effect would mask
the effects of a consumer placing a priority on nutrition itself. As a result, I found it more
theoretically appealing to leave these questions as separate variables in the final model.
The other questions did not suffer from this issue.
The two sugar-related questions included ask if the respondent is or is not aware
of the link between sugar consumption and diabetes, and sugar consumption and heart
disease (yes or no). The four ‘labeluse’ questions ask what parts of nutrition labels
consumers pay the most attention to and what parts they find easiest to understand:
calories, grams or milligrams of nutrients per serving, and percent of daily values (1=very
easy, 2=somewhat easy, 3=not too easy, 4=never seen) and a question on whether labels
are hard to interpret, on a 1 (not difficult) to 4 (difficult) scale. Finally, the five ‘labelme’
questions ask how consumers personally use nutrition labels and whether the labels affect
their buying decisions. They ask if nutrition labels: are useful to the individual, are used
by the respondent because she values her health, make it easier to choose foods, lead to
better food choices, and whether they are better than using her own knowledge
(1=strongly disagree, 4=strongly agree). I decided not to include these three variables in
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the final model because the knowledge and priority questions capture essentially the same
information in a less ambiguous way and to keep the model relatively simple.
I include highest grade-level achieved to control for the effects of education. The
foodstamp variable measures whether the respondent was eligible for food stamps at the
time of the survey. Bmi_sp measures the individual’s Body Mass Index (BMI), a rough
measure of individual fatness. Exercise measures how often the respondent exercises
vigorously (1=daily, 6=rarely). Health asks for the respondent’s subjective health
evaluation (1=excellent, 5=poor). Lcdiet asks if the individual is on a low-calorie or
weight loss diet. Smk_100 asks if the individual has smoked 100 cigarettes in her lifetime
and smk_now asks if they are a current smoker. Urb classifies respondents as being in a
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), central city (1), MSA, outside central-city (2), and
non-MSA (3). Income measures before-tax household income from all sources. Gender is
coded as women, ‘1s’, and Men, ‘0s’. Height is included as a control for body size—
taller individuals have greater caloric needs, all else equal. Age is reported in years.
With these independent variables, I estimated a linear regression analysis with
survey weights to model calorie consumption. My model is similar to the one used by
Wang, Beydoun, Caballero, Gary, and Lawrence (“Trends and correlates in meat
consumption patterns in the US adult population”, 2010) which uses the same dataset and
many of the same survey questions about consumer nutrition knowledge and habits to
estimate a model of demand for meat.
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Table 10. THANKS Model of Calorie Consumption—Estimation Results

Variable
lcdiet

[95% Conf.

Linearized
Coefficient Std. Err.

t

P>t

Interval]

-236.86

45.96

-5.15

<0.001

-329.54

-144.17

priotast

77.30

25.45

3.04

0.004

25.97

128.63

height

17.79

3.44

5.18

<0.001

10.87

24.72

age

-10.17

0.83

-12.17

<0.001

-11.85

-8.48

prionutr

-69.45

30.29

-2.29

0.027

-130.54

-8.36

knowledge

-93.52

35.35

-2.65

0.011

-164.81

-22.23

sex

-617.43

39.40

-15.67

<0.001

-696.90

-537.97

smk_100

60.26

22.86

2.64

0.012

14.15

106.37

health

-40.33

23.77

-1.70

0.097

-88.27

7.60

grade

-1.44

1.21

-1.19

0.241

-3.89

1.01

foodstamp

1.63

18.67

0.09

0.931

-36.02

39.29

race

17.97

17.07

1.05

0.298

-16.46

52.40

bmi_sp

-1.17

1.20

-0.98

0.332

-3.59

1.24

exercise

-14.13

11.33

-1.25

0.219

-36.99

8.73

priosafe

-13.67

27.43

-0.50

0.621

-68.99

41.66

priopric

-16.89

22.86

-0.74

0.464

-62.99

29.22

priokeep

-26.92

15.82

-1.70

0.096

-58.83

4.98

prioease

24.42

25.11

0.97

0.336

-26.22

75.06

smk_now

67.87

57.56

1.18

0.245

-48.21

183.94

urb

-11.35

36.86

-0.31

0.76

-85.68

62.99

income

0.00

0.00

0.36

0.719

0.00

0.00

constant

2156.77

305.65

7.06

<0.001

1540.36

2773.18
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Table 11. Significant (P <0.05) Coefficients & Estimates at Population Means
Mean
Mean
Variable

Coef.

P

(Women)

(Men)

Est.(W)

Est. (M)

Priotast (T)

77.30

0.004

3.80

3.88

293.75

299.94

Height (H)

17.80

0.011

64.42

70.10

1146.35

1247.43

Age (A)

-10.16

0.000

46.10

44.10

-468.61

-448.28

Prionutr (N)

-69.45

0.004

3.72

3.10

-258.35

-215.29

Knowledge (K)

-93.52

0.027

3.36

3.52

-314.22

-329.19

Sex s

-617.43

0.000

1

0

-617.43

0

lcdiet

-236.86

0.000

9.3%

4.0%

-236.86

-236.86

smk_100

60.26

0.012

42.1%

56.1%

60.26

60.26

Constant

2156.77

<0.0001

Table 12. Mean Calorie Predictions from THANKS Model
Category

Women

Men

Non-smoker, LC*

-455.36

-317.76

LC

1,701.40

2,474.52

non-LC

1,938.26

2,711.38

smk_100, non-LC

1,998.53

2,771.64

*low-cal diet
Results
The results of the regression indicate that many of the hypothesized variables are
significant at the 5% level and are generally in the expected directions. Taller people eat
more calories than short people, older people less than younger people, and women eat
less than men. More knowledgeable consumers eat less, as do individuals who place a
high priority on nutrition in their buying decisions. Not surprisingly, a higher priority on
taste is associated with eating more calories. Individuals on a weight loss diet do appear
to make significant reductions in their calorie consumption. I named the model
“THANKS” because Taste (T), Height (H), Age (A), Nutrition priority (N), Knowledge
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(K) and Sex s were among the most important variables in explaining calorie
consumption, along with whether the individual is on a weight loss diet.
In light of the obesity epidemic that has taken hold since, perhaps the most
surprising result is the mean value and rather large, negative coefficient on both the
Knowledge and Prionutr variables. If these results are indicative of trends at the time,
basic economic theory suggests that the priority of nutrition and the importance of
acquiring nutrition knowledge might be enough to mitigate obesity’s rise. Since height
does not change much after adulthood and Priotast is the only remaining coefficient with
a positive sign, one has to wonder what other concerns may have come to override or
supersede these priorities.
As the chart above shows, the model predicts that the mean woman will consume
1,701 calories if she is on a low-calorie or weight loss diet, and 1,938 calories if she is
not, a 12.2% difference. The mean BMI for a woman in the survey population was 28.6.
The mean man, meanwhile, consumes 2,475 calories if he is on a low-calorie or weight
loss diet, 2,711 if not, an 8.7% difference. Mean BMI for men was 27.01.
The results of the model also indicate that taste and nutrition priority have
opposite signs, which was expected, and that they almost cancel one another out, on
average. I ran a cross-tabulation for those two questions to get a better understanding of
how these priorities interact. The chart below shows that over half (53%) of consumers
attached the highest importance possible to both taste and nutrition. Twenty-five percent
of respondents gave taste a 4 and nutrition a 3 while only 7.7% gave nutrition a 4 and
taste a 3. Though Americans clearly prioritize both factors, this may be evidence that
taste preferences can override preferences for a healthy diet.
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Table 13. Priority Placed on Nutrition and Taste in Buying Decision
Prionutr
Priotast

1

2

3

4

Total

1

<0.0001

<0.0001 <0.0001

0.0022

0.0028

2

<0.0001

<0.0001

0.0040

0.0088

0.0142

3

0.0015

0.0087

0.0619

0.0765

0.1493

4

0.0070

0.0339

0.2495

0.5319

0.8274

Total

0.0091

0.0437

0.3154

0.6203

1

Obviously much of the differences in consumption between men and women
reflects physiological differences (men tend to be larger than women, on average) but it
could also reflect differences in priorities. To see if this was the case, I performed several
cross-tabulations (non-responses omitted from tables) between sex and the priority
respondents’ placed on nutrition and taste in their buying decisions. The results indicate
that 10% more women than men place the highest priority on nutrition. Tables 8 and 9
also show that nearly 61% of women place the highest priority on nutrition and taste
while only 45% of men felt the same. Nearly 70% of women gave nutrition a 4 while
only 54% of men did the same.
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Table 14. Sex and Priority Placed on Nutrition in Buying Decision
Prionutr

Men

Women

Total

1

0.0066

0.0024

0.0091

2

0.0296

0.0142

0.0437

3

0.179

0.1364

0.3154

4

0.2586

0.3617

0.6203

Total

0.4794

0.5206

1

Table 15. Priority Placed on Nutrition and Taste: Women Only
Prionutr
Priotast

1

2

3

4

Total

1

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

0.0020

0.002

2

<0.0001

<0.0001

0.0019

0.0076

0.0101

3

0.0018

0.0022

0.0407

0.0745

0.1201

4

0.0029

0.0247

0.2193

0.6093

0.8627

Total

0.0047

0.0272

0.262

0.6947

1

Table 16. Priority Placed on Nutrition and Taste: Men Only
Prionutr
Priotast

1
1

<0.0001

2

<0.0001

2
<0.0001

3
<0.0001

4 Total
0.0025

0.0037

0.0017

0.0062

0.0101

0.0187

3

0.0011

0.0157

0.0849

0.0788

0.181

4

0.0115

0.0439

0.2823

0.4479

0.7892

Total

0.0138

0.0617

0.3734

0.5395

1

Discussion
Great caution should be exercised in interpreting these results. It is probably most
important not to take the estimates and coefficients derived from the THANKS model too
literally. A calorie is a small unit of measurement and misreporting is always a concern
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when asking individuals about their own behavior. Furthermore, social-desirability bias
may lead individuals to over-estimate their knowledge or exaggerate about the extent to
which they care about nutrition. They may under-report consumption of unhealthy foods
or over-report consumption of healthy foods for similar reasons. Since intake data was
only collected over a two-day period, at a single point in time, it is an open question
whether these intake patterns truly reflect prevailing consumer habits. Nevertheless,
most, if not all, of the coefficients are what one would expect in this particular domain
and the signs of the coefficients are theoretically consistent.
In comparing women and men, an interesting picture emerges: it appears that
women prioritize nutrition in their decisions, are generally quite knowledgeable about
nutrition, they are more likely to be on a weight-loss diet (9.3% of women versus 4.0% of
men), and they do, indeed consume significantly fewer calories than men. Despite all of
this, on average, women’s BMIs are higher (28.06 for women versus 27.01 for men).
There are many possible explanations for this apparent contradiction—the most obvious
is that women are under-reporting their calorie intake relative to men, who could be
overestimating theirs. Women may simply not be doing enough to change their habits for
the results to show up in BMI figures.
Another, speculative, possibility is that there is unacknowledged uncertainty in
the model and insufficient data with which to reduce it. Under the assumption that many
women had begun adopting healthy eating patterns, to the extent that these habits resulted
in the desired consequences, one would expect for the desired behavior to rationally
continue. The high prevalence of obesity today belies that possibility. If it is the case that
calories are not the most important variable for explaining weight loss (i.e., they should
not be prominent in the overweight consumers’ consequence function) then consumers
may have failed to continue these habits simply because they were not working—they
were not net-utility enhancing.
Conclusion
Unfortunately, these results do not provide much guidance with respect to how to
improve consumers’ eating decisions. They do suggest that, at the time anyway, many
Americans were aware of what constitutes a healthy diet and were making improvements
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to their diets, consistent with economic theory. On average, American eating habits were
not completely out of line with recommendations and average calorie intake was close to
the 2,000 recommended, particularly among women. People who prioritized nutrition or
were more knowledgeable about healthy diets ate fewer calories as well, which is
consistent with more recent survey research (Gregory et al., 2014). The recent economic
downturn seems to have had a positive effect on American eating habits, though this does
not bode well for treating the United States’ ability to lose weight when the economy
does eventually recover (Todd, et al., 2014). Based solely on the DHKS data, the positive
trends in eating habits found therein might have been predicted to continue and lead to
improved diet-related health outcomes. The reason for this discrepancy in results may lie
in Americans’ inherently unhealthy underlying habits (the most prominent, accepted
theory) or in the quality of advice consumers have received from credible sources over
the years; clearly more research is needed along both dimensions of this problem.
Section 4.
Analysis of DHKS Population Using Finite Mixture Modelling
While the THANKS model provides some interesting insights into the behavior of
the average American in the mid-1990s, it may be inadequate to capture more finegrained differences between different groups of consumers. In light of the discussion
above, it may not be appropriate to treat all consumers as though they will all respond
favorably to a low-fat, low-calorie diet because of unacknowledged dietary uncertainty
regarding that diet’s technical efficacy. Finite-Mixture Modelling (FMM) is one tool for
probabilistically identifying subpopulations within a larger population using maximum
likelihood estimation. FMM is useful in applications where the subpopulations are
thought to be heterogeneous but lack identifying information (Deb, 2012).
Since subpopulations are not easily identifiable, FMM takes an iterative approach
to identifying the number of subpopulations (the distribution of the subpopulations is
specified beforehand), or latent classes, within a given population. Classes are added and
compared to previous models (with fewer classes) to see which fits the data better. FMM
can also be combined with regression analysis in order to identify subpopulations on the
basis of their covariates.
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In this section, I use FMM, and a simplified version of the THANKS model to
identify potential systematic differences in consumption patterns among (possible)
American subpopulations. I assume the overall population is a mixture of Gaussian
distributions. My analysis cannot identify the source of these differences, but it may
provide some preliminary evidence that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to nutritional
advice is liable to be inefficient. This is particularly true if classes of consumers are
sufficiently different in terms of their metabolism or food preferences.
My dependent variables are calories, total fat, carbohydrate, protein, and
cholesterol. They, my independent variables, and their summary statistics are listed in
Table 17 (next page, “R” refers to the survey respondent). All statistics were computed
using the survey weights provided by the DHKS.
BMI_prime is meant to capture the extent to which consumers are technically
considered “overweight” as 25 is the lower bound for that category. Knowledge is a
composite measure of the respondent’s knowledge of the advice contained within the
Guidelines, based on survey responses. Eleven observations were dropped because
respondents did not provide answers, leading to a sample population of 5,092.
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Table 17. Summary Statistics for Finite Mixture Models
Linearized
Variable

Type

Explanation

Mean

Std. Error

Calories

Ratio

Consumption, in kilocalories

2031.71 22.81

Total Fat

Ratio

Consumption, in grams

76.066 1.108

Carbohydrate

Ratio

Consumption, in grams

252.591 2.692

Protein

Ratio

Consumption, in grams

79.002 0.991

Cholesterol

Ratio

Consumption, in milligrams

268.664 4.613

Notgrad

Dummy

1 if R did not graduate HS

0.144 0.127

Povcat

Dummy

1 if R is below Poverty Line

0.145 0.126

Age in years

44.66 0.455

Dummy

1 if R is Black

0.113 0.010

Likert (1-6)

Daily—Rarely

3.789 0.047

R’s BMI divided by 25

1.049 0.005

Age

Ratio

B_race
Exercise
Bmi_prime

Ratio

Health

Likert (1-5)

R’s health: Excellent—Poor

2.316 0.027

Knowledge

Likert (1-4)

Measure of R’s nutrition

3.389 0.015

knowledge
Prionutr

Likert (1-4)

Priority of nutrition

3.567 0.0138

Priopric

Likert (1-4)

Priority of price

3.242 0.024

Priotast

Likert (1-4)

Priority of taste

3.818 0.009

Prioease

Likert (1-4)

Priority of ease of preparation

3.091 0.022

Lcdiet

Dummy

1 if R is on a low-calorie diet

.067 0.005

Sex

Dummy

1 if R is female

.517 0.011

Similar to the THANKS model, these figures do not appear particularly worrying
if they were used to speculate about the future trajectory of American health outcomes,
including obesity. On average, Americans appear relatively knowledgeable about the
nature of a healthy diet and, based on their reporting, the average American was not far
from conforming to USDA recommendations for both calories and fat, broadly consistent
with a satisficing model of behavior.
FMM analysis reveals that a consumer’s demand for each dependent variable may
depend on which latent class a particular respondent belongs to. The results of each
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model are reported separately in the pages that follow. The first 15 lines of each table
report the regression results for each component, with linearized standard errors for each
coefficient shown in parentheses. On the remaining four lines, I report the predicted mean
(PredMean) for each component, the classification of respondents based on their
estimated posterior probability (PostProb), the classification of each respondent based on
their most likely latent class membership (LClassMemb), and the average posterior
probabilities (AvgPP) for each latent class.
PredMean gives the predicted mean for the sample population if the parameters
for a given latent class were used to model all respondents. If these predictions are
significantly different from one another, it may be an indication that an FMM approach is
valid because of unobserved heterogeneity within the population. Significant,
theoretically valid, differences in coefficients between subpopulations may be further
evidence for real differences between groups of consumers, be they metabolic, behavioral
or both.
The FMM procedure, implemented using the ‘fmm’ and ‘fmmlc’ (Luedicke,
2011) packages in Stata, revealed that the survey population can be decomposed into
three different subpopulations to model overall demand for all nutrients except protein,
which was broken into only two latent classes (referred to as “components” in the tables
on the following pages). When I attempted to add a third class to the protein model, Stata
did not appear to be converging to a solution after over 1,000 iterations. As such, it is
difficult to say whether demand for protein is better modelled with 1, 2, or more
components because both the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) and Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) are only useful when comparing competing FMM models,
not in isolation (Raftery, 1995).
In the case of the other four dependent variables, the AIC and BIC were both
reduced after the addition of the third component while adding a fourth did not improve
the models or prevented it from converging to a solution, indicating a 3-component
model leads to the best fit with the data (Raftery, 1995). Further, the average posterior
probability was over 0.70 for all latent classes, indicating the model performs reasonably
well at predicting the correct class to which respondents belong. Estimation results and
discussion follow.
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Table 18. FMM-Calories-Estimation Results
Variable
Component 1
Component 2
Component 3
notgrad
-24.08 (64.80)
485.4** (199.1)
-256.7*** (65.80)
povcat
-136.6* (77.51)
1,029*** (231.9)
-11.67 (50.23)
age
-14.58*** (1.896)
-22.19*** (8.263)
-2.756** (1.160)
b_race
-162.4* (91.60)
2,051*** (228.5)
-23.49 (66.60)
exercise
-5.579 (22.11)
28.45 (65.87)
1.878 (10.49)
bmi_prime
154.9 (124.9)
686.4** (334.9)
-122 (80.93)
health
-1.984 (23.91)
-254.0** (104.5)
-12 (16.10)
knowledge
-119.8 (73.21)
-259.5* (133.3)
-40.24 (36.03)
prionutr
-63.25 (41.94)
-195.8 (151.6)
-13.06 (32.36)
priopric
-66.02* (34.63)
-533.6*** (193.6)
13.21 (24.61)
priotast
72.49 (53.48)
-160.2 (139.8)
53.83 (44.14)
prioease
7.986 (41.95)
530.2*** (115.0)
-47.96 (29.25)
lcdiet
-184.4** (93.07)
-992.9*** (335.4)
-191.5*** (70.56)
sex
-927.5*** (68.42)
-1,984*** (192.1)
-355.0*** (58.49)
Constant
3,898*** (448.1)
7,034*** (865.2)
2,218*** (301.7)
PredMean
2228.164 (580.777) 3371.163 (1549.89) 1601.396 (242.61)
PostProb
2,120 [0.425]
246 [0.046]
2,622 [0.526]
LClassMemb
1,638 [32.8%]
123 [2.5%]
3,227 [64.7%]
AvgPP
0.743
0.828
0.710
Robust standard errors in parentheses, Population proportions & percentages in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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According to these estimation results over 96% of consumers can be divided into
one of two subpopulations (component 1 and 3). The mean intake for component 1 is
within about 10% of recommendations while it is 400 calories (25%) lower for members
of group 3. Consistent with the THANKS model, both women and individuals on weightloss diets consume significantly fewer calories than others. The size of the coefficient on
‘sex’, however, is rather surprising because, for component 1, it is lower than the
coefficient in the THANKS mode (-617.4) but higher than it is for component 3.
Similarly, the coefficient on age is negative, but much smaller for component 3. The
model for component 2 appears to fit the data quite well and many of the same
coefficients from the THANKS model are also statistically significant. I can only
speculate as to why non-high school graduates in group 2 eat much more than high
school graduates while those in group 3 eat much less. Group 2 is quite different and
consists of people consuming a large amount of calories.
Table 19. FMM-Total Fat-Estimation Results
Variable
Component 1
Component 2
Component 3
notgrad
-8.623*** (1.961)
30.23* (17.51)
-1.217 (3.150)
povcat
1.563 (1.740)
39.21** (16.85)
-7.529** (3.291)
age
-0.134*** (0.0378)
-0.549 (0.348) -0.466*** (0.0677)
b_race
-1.21 (2.165)
98.32** (44.46)
2.732 (5.382)
exercise
0.648* (0.364)
-4.887 (3.317)
0.186 (0.617)
bmi_prime
-1.404 (3.463)
36.98 (31.14)
15.41*** (5.213)
health
-0.524 (0.618)
-7.333 (9.815)
0.301 (1.139)
knowledge
-6.935*** (1.569)
-18.45 (15.67)
-3.288 (2.207)
prionutr
-1.778 (1.182)
-4.992 (8.810) -6.453*** (2.240)
priopric
0.158 (0.950)
-12.88 (16.48)
-0.967 (1.445)
priotast
2.472 (1.701)
-3.762 (21.55)
6.463*** (2.332)
prioease
-0.818 (0.927)
6.542 (6.499)
0.549 (1.444)
lcdiet
-7.100** (2.878)
-2.66 (48.64) -14.78*** (4.393)
sex
-13.01*** (1.736) -48.96*** (16.77) -38.22*** (2.818)
Constant
91.72*** (10.45)
293.2** (126.1)
124.5*** (17.69)
PredMean
53.84 (10.04)
153.52 (53.53)
86.21 (23.41)
PostProb
2,459 [0.493]
269 [0.054]
2,260 [0.453]
LClassMemb
2,906 [58.3%]
160 [3.21%]
1,922 [38.5%]
AvgPP
0.734
0.836
0.773
Robust standard errors in parentheses, Population proportions & percentages in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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For the total fat model, most consumer fell again fell into either component 1 or
component 3. Based on their predicted means and the significant coefficients in each,
respondents in class 1 appear to be more health conscious because they eat less fat and
nutritional knowledge appears to have more of an impact on behavior. This may overstate
the difference between the two groups, particularly among women, because the
coefficients on lcdiet are much higher, and equally significant, for consumers in
component 3. The coefficients on prionutr and priotast for component 3 are analogous to
those found in the THANKS model but it is hard to know what to make of the large,
positive coefficient on bmi_prime. As in the calorie model, consumers in component 2
appear to be the least healthy but are also vastly outnumbered by the members of the
other two classes. Group 2 consumes a large amount of fat.
Table 20. FMM-Carbohydrate-Estimation Results
Variable
Component 1
Component 2
Component 3
notgrad
-11.74 (9.015)
10.34 (45.03) -24.53*** (7.112)
povcat
-2.133 (9.307)
118.6** (48.18)
-9.904** (4.851)
age
-1.782*** (0.202) -3.141*** (0.898)
-0.303** (0.122)
b_race
-31.75*** (9.577)
96.09* (56.14)
-8.206 (7.284)
exercise
-0.238 (1.986)
-3.299 (8.348)
-0.317 (1.160)
bmi_prime
-25.81 (20.64)
-50.7 (63.11)
-3.047 (13.38)
health
5.048 (3.554)
-11.15 (20.75)
-3.032 (2.073)
knowledge
-4.593 (8.068)
-34.22 (22.18)
2.339 (4.812)
prionutr
-0.887 (5.368)
-21.32 (38.38)
-3.91 (4.231)
priopric
-9.882** (4.987)
-14.85 (31.23)
2.698 (2.773)
priotast
-7.229 (7.405)
31.59 (37.19)
2.88 (5.467)
prioease
3.713 (4.213)
53.36*** (17.20)
-3.52 (2.874)
lcdiet
-16.68 (10.52)
-99.44* (59.01) -29.50*** (10.80)
sex
-101.6*** (8.642) -209.3*** (37.78) -33.05*** (5.573)
Constant
511.4*** (48.27)
695.8*** (187.5)
240.4*** (38.21)
PredMean
280.85 (63.53)
420.76 (149.81)
189.84 (25.38)
PostProb
2203 [0.442]
280 [0.056]
2505 [0.502]
LClassMemb
1,910 [38.3%]
136 [2.7%]
2,942 [59%]
AvgPP
0.745
0.838
0.727
Robust standard errors in parentheses, Population proportions & percentages in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In the carbohydrate model, age turns out to have a significant and negative effect
for all three subpopulations. Race and the priority of price are significant for component
1 but not above the 10% level for the other two groups. Poverty status is only significant
for groups 2 and 3 but takes on opposite signs. Meanwhile, the priority of ease of
preparation is significant for class 2 but not the others while lcdiet only predicts lower
calorie consumption for members of component 3. Again, the coefficient on sex is
significant and negative for all three subpopulations, which may simply be because
women tend to be smaller, and thus have lower calorie requirements, than men. Group 2
also consumes more carbohydrates than others; group 2 just eats a lot of food.
Table 21. FMM-Cholesterol-Estimation Results
Variable
Component 1
Component 2
Component 3
notgrad
-16.71** (7.909)
39.17 (46.37)
18.03 (14.91)
povcat
-2.961 (6.322)
101.0* (55.24)
27.15** (13.82)
age
-0.0259 (0.131)
-2.052* (1.178)
-0.735** (0.330)
b_race
11.73 (7.538)
167.0*** (50.72)
36.73* (20.18)
exercise
1.466 (1.175)
-14.93* (9.031)
0.0307 (2.928)
bmi_prime
20.01 (12.49)
75.65 (106.4)
25.21 (24.81)
health
0.503 (2.177)
-57.55 (40.79)
6.053 (5.028)
knowledge
-13.57** (5.283)
-43.43 (44.43)
-15.38* (9.178)
prionutr
-8.320* (4.518)
-29.36 (45.62)
-12.63 (10.95)
priopric
4.139 (3.307)
-38.57 (33.19)
0.9 (8.003)
priotast
9.500* (5.511)
-8.014 (102.8)
13.48 (12.72)
prioease
-1.673 (2.983)
-9.581 (19.90)
0.691 (7.388)
lcdiet
-19.76*** (7.078)
-33.8 (88.47)
-22.58 (30.68)
sex
-51.96*** (5.175) -205.5*** (70.78) -122.7*** (22.36)
Constant
191.2*** (36.64)
1,282 (899.5)
416.9*** (69.81)
PredMean
157.1 (31.37)
568.9 (165.78)
332.9 (69.44)
PostProb
4,409 [0.884]
579 [0.116]
2,133 [0.428]
LClassMemb
2,786 [55.9%]
244 [4.9%]
1,958 [39.3%]
AvgPP
0.802
0.838
0.811
Robust standard errors in parentheses, Population proportions & percentages in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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At the time this survey was administered, nutrition authorities were
recommending that Americans limit their cholesterol intake to fewer than 300 mg/day.
By that measure, component 1, the largest of the three and the majority of the overall
population, appears to be the healthiest of the three, based on its predicted mean. The
significant, negative coefficients on lcdiet and knowledge are also indicative of a class of
consumers that is rather health-conscious. Again, component 2 appears to be the least
healthy but the estimation results do not provide much guidance as to why. It is
interesting that the coefficient on povcat is positive for cholesterol among class three but
the same coefficient is negative in the carbohydrate model. In addition to problems of
being overweight, group 2 is also moving toward problems with cholesterol.
Table 22. FMM-Protein-Estimation Results
Variable
Component 1
Component 2
notgrad
-6.420** (2.586)
24.15 (19.08)
povcat
-0.116 (1.564)
24.7 (18.41)
age
-0.181*** (0.0490) -0.894*** (0.289)
b_race
-3.222* (1.803)
53.18** (25.32)
exercise
0.169 (0.342)
-3.212** (1.567)
bmi_prime
0.213 (3.058)
37.20* (19.02)
health
-0.42 (0.562)
-7.772* (4.347)
knowledge
-1.495 (1.248)
5.527 (8.297)
prionutr
0.352 (1.172)
-11.48 (11.07)
priopric
-0.58 (0.876)
-2.529 (4.238)
priotast
2.679* (1.419)
-11.7 (14.93)
prioease
-0.686 (0.669)
-2.171 (3.491)
lcdiet
-0.791 (2.380)
-16 (10.38)
sex
-24.36*** (2.427) -64.40*** (7.830)
Constant
92.54*** (11.47)
250.9** (98.01)
Pred. Mean
72 (13.38)
116.03 (46.68)
PostProb
4,409 [0.884]
579 [0.116]
LClassMemb
4,713 [94.5%]
275 [5.5%]
AvgPP
0.925
0.822
Robust standard errors in parentheses, Population proportions & percentages in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The fact that the protein model could only be decomposed into two
subpopulations, one of which represents over 90% of the overall population, appears to
support my assumption in the THANKS model that protein intake tends to vary much
less than the other nutrients discussed above. As before, women eat less protein than men
in both models and age tends to predict lower protein intake over time for both groups
while African Americans in component 2 are predicted to eat quite a bit more. The
negative coefficient on exercise for component 2 may reflect the fact that people who do
not exercise have lower protein needs. The reason for the negative coefficient on notgrad
is somewhat unexpected but it may simply reflect the income effect of not being able to
afford as much meat as graduates.
Conclusion
I performed an FMM analysis in an effort to statistically distinguish between
heterogeneous groups of consumers who are part of a large subpopulation. My estimation
results seem to show that there are, indeed, significant differences between these groups
in terms of how their knowledge, beliefs, and preferences affect their nutrient intake. I
cannot investigate the extent to which these customers vary in terms of their metabolism
so I cannot comment on whether their behavior would be different if they had more
dietary options available to them.
Regardless of whether current USDA recommendations are correct, it is certainly
relevant to consider the different ways in which consumers might respond to new
information or perceived risks. Otherwise, advice directed at the entire population may
only have the intended effect on a portion of it. It would be ideal if publicly provided
dietary advice were tailored and marketed to reach only the consumers who are likely to
benefit from it.
This could also be taken as evidence against the claim that American eating habits
are, and have been, inherently poor. Both the THANKS and FMM models appear to
show that Americans were relatively close to USDA advice 15 years on and, given the
slow pace of habit change and the obvious downsides to diet-related health problems, it is
not obvious that habits should have gone in a different direction in the time period since.
The fact that habits have not improved or gotten worse may mean that a large proportion
of Americans have become discouraged from changing their eating habits altogether.
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Chapter 5. Conclusion and Policy Implications
Unfortunately, I do not know of any reliable methods for testing the hypothesis
that public policy and major social institutions have affected consumer preferences
drastically enough to give rise to obesity at the levels we now observe in 2016. In the
pages above, I have explored the question indirectly by trying to understand the policy
and institutional environment before, during, and after the onset of the U.S.’s obesity
epidemic. The evidence from my analysis of American cookbooks shows that consumer
preferences have, indeed, changed since the post-colonial period. Whether the change
was for better or worse is difficult to ascertain without more information.
By replicating Butler’s work, I have some further evidence that consumers
respond to more abstract incentives than simply the price and taste of food. If that is the
case, then the lack of consumer response to major health-related incentives appears all the
more perplexing. Though increasingly popular, behavioral economics, too, has proven
rather inadequate to the task of explaining the drastic uptick in rates of obesity.
The THANKS model, on the other hand, shows that, around 1994, American
consumers were aware of, and responding to the incentives the USDA first began
emphasizing in 1980, a period of about 14 years. Based on that finding, one might have
predicted a levelling out in obesity rates. Instead, nearly as many years later, there is little
reason to expect a reversal, or even halt, to current trends. Have consumers simply been
lying to obesity researchers and themselves or are the tradeoffs required to make dietary
changes really severe?
I offer a third explanation—that the government’s decision to endorse a particular
viewpoint was premature and has since evolved into an institutional environment which
dissuades consumers from trying efficient, weight-reducing diets. This may help to
explain the apparent heterogeneity among the subpopulations identified in the FMM
models. While the federal government may have set the stage for the current state of
affairs by endorsing one viewpoint, that alone is not sufficient to explain current obesity
rates, but that endorsement has given rise to a variety of organizations who are
economically invested in the credibility of that advice. As a result, the possibility for
major changes in this policy area seems quite remote. Even if a policymaker wanted to
change course, the backlash from individuals and groups with a long-standing
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commitment to the USDA message would be immense. In light of this, the most obvious
implication is that the McGovern Committee should have excused itself from weighing in
on matters of diet and health altogether.
A significant change in policy may not lead to any improvement, either, because
who says this time will be different? Most nutritionists have been busy studying the
efficacy of USDA’s message, not testing new hypotheses. Though I have discussed the
more recent, strong evidence favoring the safety and efficacy of various ‘new’ diets, it
would be foolish in the extreme to suggest that such evidence is sufficient to form the
basis for dietary advice to be given to an entire country, especially one as large as the
United States. What is really needed is better science related to obesity, among other dietrelated health problems.
It seems the most effective policy solution would be for USDA advice, and that
which resembles it, to somehow lose all the credibility it now enjoys. Until and unless
some new, convincing scientific breakthrough occurs, Americans will continue struggling
to lose weight or, understandably, become resigned to an unhealthy existence which at
least allows them to derive pleasure from their food.
The empirical estimation, including the regressions and the three groups estimated
from the data, showed that most Americans are following on average the 2,000 calorie
diet with 50% of calories from carbohydrates. A few percent of Americans are clearly
overeating relative to health needs, but not enough to explain the obesity epidemic. One
possibility, then, is that the obesity epidemic is occurring because the low carbohydrate
diet is not visible in the overall data. That is the point of the literature, theory, and
estimation in this work. The present regime is not working, and the low carbohydrate
regime has theory to suggest it and it might work. It should be tried.
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